the Blog Papers of Dr. Michael Sakbani; Economics, Finance and Politics: October 2023

The Blog Papers of Dr. Michael Sakbani; Economics, Finance and Politics

Michael Sakbani, Ph.D., is a former professor of Economics and Finance at the Geneva campus of Webster and Thunderbird. He is a senior international consultant to the UN system, European Union and Swiss banks. His career began at the State university of NY at Stoney Brook, then the Federal Reserve Bank of New York followed by UNCTAD where he was Director of the divisions of Economic Cooperation, Poverty Alleviation, and Special Programs.Dr.Sakbani has published over 140 professional paper and coauthored 6 books.

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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 03, 2023

Putting Syria Together Again

Dr. Michael Sakbani

Michael Sakbani, Ph.D. is a former professor of economics and Finance at the Geneva campus of Webster-Europe and Thunderbird-Europe. He is a senior international consultant to the UN system, European Union and Swiss banks. His career began at the State university of NY at Stoney Brook, then the Federal Reserve Bank of New York followed by UNCTAD where he was Director of the divisions of Economic Cooperation, Poverty Alleviation, and Special Programs. Published over 140 professional papers and co-authored six books.The Intelligent Economist voted in 2020, 2021 and 2023 michaelsakbani.blogspot.com as one of the top hundred blogs in the world. Dr. Sakbani is a research contributor to Brill and Kudos who disseminates his publications to research institutions throughout the world.

Dr. Sakbani won numerous awards and prizes for scholarly distinction.

Putting Syria Together Again

Dr. Michael Sakbani

Twelve years of mayhem and destruction

The year 2023 marks the 12^th anniversary of the Syrian revolution. It is a painful anniversary of suffering, destruction and aborted unfulfilled political dreams. The Syrian revolution has failed but did not end, because the underlying problem has found no solution( al Majallah)[1]. However there has been four developments this year which might foretell of a bend in the road.

The first is the catastrophic deterioration of the Syrian economy after the earth quake of 2022. This comes on top of the stoppage of growth of the economy since 2012. The Syrian economy lost half of its agricultural land since 2011 as a result of the civil war. It lost most of its oil and gas production, all its tourism revenue and the majority of its industrial production (World Bank, 2023)[2].

The Syrian lira has drastically lost its foreign exchange value. In 2022 it was hovering around 4000 per dollar. It is in recent data hovering around 13, 000 (Forbs Advisor )[3]. The war in Ukraine has increased the prices of cereal imports and fuel imports. According to World Bank data, Syria imports now half of its oil and one third of its cereal consumption (World Bank)[4].

These drastic changes have affected all Syrians, in particular, those under the control of the Damascus Government. Eighty per cent of the Syrians are now living deeply below the poverty line. No wonder, the per capita GDP declined four folds. The Damascus Government has not been able to help its citizens. In fact its empty treasury was forced to remove the budgetary support of fuel and other basic items. Neither Russia nor Iran have been forthcoming in extending budgetary aid to the starved treasury of the government, which is highly indebted to these two states.

The Syrians in all the regions are facing shortages of medicines, food, fuel, and all other essential provisions. 12. 4 million Syrians face food insecurity of whom 6 million are in acute need of food. The conditions of the young are truly disturbing: 2 .5 million kids are out of school and 1.6 million are drop outs. This catastrophe has ignited popular discontent with the regime and revived the revolutionary zeal of the early days of the Revolution. Of special importance is the expressed discontent of the coastal population where is located the regime`s popular base. (UN Statistics, al Majallah)[5].

So, 2023 has pushed the Syrian population to the edge of tolerating the prevailing government.

The second development is the failure of the ” Arab Initiative” launched in the Jeddah summit. The Jordanian minister of foreign affairs whose country had led the efforts to normalize relation with the Syrian government, frankly said that his visit to Damascus in August was not the success he hoped for (The Jordan Times)[6]. Moreover, according to all press reports, the speaker of the Jordanian parliament Mr. Ahmad al Safadi said after meeting with the head of the Saudi Council of Notables Mr. Abdullah al Sheikh on 8 of September, that Jordan has received many negative message from Damascus (Saudi Press agency )[7].

According to the terms of returning Syria to the Arab League, the Syrian Government was expected to honor six demands of the Arab Governments that launched the initiative. These demands were finally revealed by the influential Saudi magazine al Majallah. They were 1. The stoppage of the narcotic trade manufactured in Syria; 2. Limiting the influence of Iran in Syria; 3. Freeing the political prisoners. 4. The safe and secure return of the millions of Syrian refugees; 5.opening up the commerce routs of Syria; 6. Combating the terrorist on the Syrian soil. The Saudi Al Majallah published these secret conditions in July 2023 (Hamidi, al Majallah)[8]

The obligation ensued from these conditions have not been fulfilled in any acceptable way by the Damasus Government. The reasons for this failure are due to the inability of the Government, even if it wanted, to enforce and carry out such obligations. Syria is under occupation and the constaltion of forces on the ground is such that its official government has no independent agency. This is of course, a clear indication that the Arab Initiative has failed because the Syrian government has not fulfilled the quid pro quo it promised in the Jeddah summit. (Sakbani,2023)[9].

The third development is the recent uprising of the Druz community in the Suwayda province on the Jordanian border in the South. This region has not joined the revolution before and was claimed to be a minority one protected by the Damascus Government. Added to the regions outside the control of the Government in the North-West, in Idlib, in the Turkish occupied areas and East of the Euphrates, about 45 percent of Syria is now outside the control of the regime.

Significantly, this uprising raised double slogans; protesting the living conditions and the old slogans of 2011 demanding the departure of president Assad an the fall of the regime.

The fourth development is the apparent change in the stance of the USA regarding the Arab Region and Syria in particular (Sakbani, 2014) [10].

The US was a reluctant backer of the revolution in 2012, & 2013, but signed off Syria to Russia thereafter. The US policy since 2014 has been to recruit and arm local militias to fight the Islamist Jihadis, ISIS & Jabhatulnusra. The US tried at the beginning to recruit locals to fight ISIS as an exclusive commitment. But it found no ordinary Syrians interested in fighting ISIS exclusively. Thus, it recruited Kurdish separatists to be paid as mercenaries in the war against only ISIS. This emphasis on ISIS is not unexpected, for the US did not favor ousting the regime in the absence of acceptable alternatives (Sakbani 2021)[11].

According to Press report in July and August 2023, the US has modified its old strategy and is now aiming at controlling or even cutting the link between Syria and Iraq so that it can strangulate the Iranian militias in Syria and Lebanon. Towards this end, it has doubled its forces in Iraq and Syria and significantly reinforced its naval and air forces in the Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean regions. To achieve this goal, the US is trying to recruit Arab tribal forces in Syria to use in controlling the border between Syria and Iraq, but without an accompanying political vision to break the Syrian impasse. (Brian Katulis, 2023).[12]

The problem however, is that the US has supported and equipped the Kurdish YPG without placing limits on their scope of control and their behavior east of the Euphrates. The result was a significant alienation of the Arab majority in this area. The YPG which is controlled by the Turkish PKK has an agenda totally in contradiction with the interests of the local Arab tribes and has run rough shod over the inhabitants East of the Euphrates. Without the US forcing the Kurds to delimit their zone and change their behavior, its attempt at recruiting the Arab tribes is lacking in incentives. Thus, the US has to bring into the equation the third leg of the tripod: a political vision of how to tackle the Syrian problem and solve the local situation with the Kurds.

In recent weeks the Arab tribes have entered into arm disputes with the YPG Kurds. This is dangerous and can be exploited by the Turks, the Iranians and the regime in igniting an Arab-Kurdish fight, which is not in the interest of the Syrian people.

Putting Syria Together Againe

These developments have significant bearing on the Syrian situation if the Syrian people themselves can exploit them . Syria is at a fork in the road; either the situation of four occupiers and four zones will continue with Syrians absent from any political table, or the Syrian people will seize the situation and take matters into their own hands. There is no power on the ground that has now active interest in resolving the Syrian conundrum except the Syrians themselves.

The Suwayda demonstrations and protests are so far manifestations of discontent, of deprivations and of resurrected political goals. Even though they are at the time of writing in their eighth week, they might fizzle out and lead nowhere. To have positive outcomes and mark a bend of the road, the leaders of the uprising have to developed it into an institutional presence of administrative capacity and of political vision.

If they evolve institutionally and politically, the first step of an appropriate strategy is to spread the uprising to the other liberated regions. This requires building bridges among them and coordinating their actions and objectives. Obviously, to steer this coordination in the right way, there is a need for an overall elected and representative leadership (hereinafter, ESO), independent of foreign powers and capable of protecting itself.

The question arises how can this overall elected and representative leadership be set up and how it can convince the Arab states to support it. The Arab States have now come to the conclusion that their efforts to bring back Syria to the Arab League has produced no results. The Syrian government of Mr. Assad has no independent agency and cannot carry out the Quid Pro Quo it agreed to in Jeddah. Moreover, the millions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, cannot be repatriated to Syria unless there is a force on the ground to protect them, an infrastructure to house them and an economic infrastructure to gain their living. In the last week of September the King of Jordan addressing the UNGA in New York said that his country just does not have the means to support these refugees and keep them in his country. He also wondered aloud in view of the non-fulfillment of the Arab conditions, as to who decides matters in Syria. In the same vein, Saudi Arabia, announced an indefinite postponement of opening its consulate in Damascus. The prominent political advisor to the head of state of the UAE, Mr. Anwar al Karkash said in late September that Arab Patience with Syria is exhausted. Similar statements have been made by many Lebanese officials. Turkey faces populist demands to reduce the number of the four million refugees it has. Putting all that together, the inescapable conclusion is that the Arab initiative is dead and something has to be done about Syria. Moreover, the repatriation of refugees is not possible without reconstruction and building an economic infrastructure. These three have become imminent action issues that are interdependent and cannot be separated.

The Arab states realize that if things stay as they are, Iran will have emerged victorious and in control of four Arab states and on the borders of Jordan and Israel. It is now clear to the Arab Governments that the crucial four demands of Jaddah: the stoppage of the narcotic trade, the return of the refugees, placing restrains on Iranian presence in Syria and bringing about a political settlement solving the governance problem of Syria cannot be achieved through negotiating with the regime for three fundamental reasons. 1. The regime is a sectarian minority one and cannot at the best of circumstances get more than 25 % of the vote in any free elections. Thus, it cannot accept any democratic governance; 2. Mr. Assad and his collaborators in the security forces and the army have committed enormous crimes and have destroyed the country. Therefore, their culpability can only be escaped by staying in power. 3. Finally, there is a whole nexus of vested economic interests of the corrupt official class in continuing in power positions to secure their economic gains. The proof is manifest in that Mr. Assad has never given any concessions in the seven years of negotiations with the opposition in Geneva and in Astana

The obvious choice is to have a real elected body of Syrians with local presence in Syria and with a transparent and acceptable vision and program of action to run matters in the liberated areas. This will crucially depend on convincing the reluctant USA and Turkey to accept the ESO as a viable alternative to rebuild the Syrian state destroyed by the Assad regime and the Baath.

This is the task for both the Arab states diplomacy and the Syrian activists. If The ESO is setup, it must assure the US that in a democratic non- ideological Syria, the Kurds will have all their cultural and human rights as equal citizens under the law. It should be recalled the US has never endorsed Kurdish separatism. Furthermore, the USA has a genuine interest in a democratic Syria in peace with all its neighbors, including Israel. For Turkey, the ESO can offer a guarantee of protecting its borders against the PKK and its Syrian Kurdish YPG followers. The ESO can also make it possible to absorb a great number of repatriated refugees. Both Turkey and the US can enlist the ESO as a part of the international Coalition to fight terrorism.

It follows that the prevailing opposition should be disbanded and replaced by the independent and elected ESO. The elected opposition with the help of Arab diplomacy should seek international recognition as the Elected Syrian Opposition (ESO).

One of the defects of the prevailing opposition has been its isolation from the popular base. The ESO must be present inside Syria and be in touch with the population. But mere presence is not sufficient. The ESO must secure legitimacy through elections. Under the present conditions, direct elections is not feasible, but a two- step elections can be used. The first step is that each regional district must elect a local council. The local council must build institutions of governance, such as a police force, independent judiciary, municipal services, fiscal departments and above all, inspection boards which scrutinizes the performance of the councils and report to the ESO.

A Vision and a Program of Action For a Future Syria

The ESO must have a clear and transparent program of instituting governance on the basis of a social contract where the Government is elected to carry out the responsibilities of governance according to a constitution. In all democratic forms, there has to be separation of power and checks and balances among the independent judiciary, the executive and the legislature. This is the contractual state that assures the peaceful alteration of power through elections and the freedoms of speech, of association and of assembly under the law for all.

In the transition to a new Syrian state, the ESO must have some military capability for defending its territory and imposing law and order. There are according to various commentators and according to the temporary Government set up by the old opposition about 100,000 armed men in the territories free of the official Government control (K. Labwani; A. R.Mustafa)[13]. There are also more than 3000 professional officers who deserted the old Syrian Army that can be pressed into the service in a temporary military force (TMF). Careful vetting of the TMF should insure that it will be free of Islamist terrorists and soldiers of fortune as has been the case in the National Syrian army set up by the provisional government. This temporary military force must have all the institutional set- up of an organized and disciplined military force.

In view of the past experience of Syria and of its population mosaic, the ESO must articulate for itself as well as for a future Syria, a government that is civilian and free of ideological religious dogmas, or ethnic identity. That is the modern democratic state of equality of all citizens under the law. It respects all ethnicities, all believes and all opinions but does not allow ideological or ethnic dogmas to enter the body-politics. Political parties can only compete on the basis of programs and not ideologies.

This participatory contractual state receives its legitimacy by the consent of the populous and its economic prosperity by social peace and political stability. This is how Syria will find its peace and recovery which have been destroyed by the Baath Party and the Assads`sectarian dictatorship.

In the past 12 years of the Syrian problem there has been four tribal leaders at the head of the Syrian opposition. This is remarkable and rather unexpected. Syria was advancing towards a modern state in the 1950s and the early 1960s as its tribal population became urbanized. But the military coups and the Baath regime have had a reverse effect. To protect themselves against the lawless repressive regime, individuals resorted to tribal affiliations for a security shield. This is a regression to pre modern state.

The literature of modern political sociology conclude that a tribal society cannot produce democracy, for people allegiances would not be to the state but to their group. Implicit in that is the concept of “the other” that is, the outsider (literature )[14]. Moreover, these types of societies have hierarchal structures in the tribe, in the family and in all other aspects of societal organizations. Hence, they produce authoritarian forms of governance. In the Muslim and Arab societies this pre- modern state has repeatedly produced fundamentalist and authoritarian regimes. ISIS and al Qayida and the political Islamists are all products of this state of being and not an implanted minority ideology. So are the autocratic states of the Arab Golf. This is a clear danger that must be kept in view.

If the ESO can implement such governance on the ground for a period of time, it will furnish a viable alternative to the Assad regime and satisfies the exigencies for support by foreign powers( Obama, 2015) [15]. It will also start the march towards unifying and building a new Syrian state that can spread gradually to all areas.

Problems on the Road Ahead

The ESO as a prior view of future Syria, must be cognizant of five problems that afflict Syria. There is first the problem of implementing UNSC 2254. This requires disarming all the militias and Islamists terrorist enclaves in these areas. The other problems are the political Islamists, the problem of ethnic nationalism, the problem of the inherited cultural heritage and finally, the problem of underdevelopment. The ESO must articulate solutions and visions in all these regards

Disarming the Terrorists and Militias in the Liberated Territories.

There are Islamist terrorists in Idlib and thirty militias of Iran and the regime as well as fiefdoms of war-lords and soldiers of fortune in some areas of the liberated territories. In addition, there is the Kurdish separatists under the YPG in the North East. With the help of Turkey and the USA, if they had the political will, these can be disarmed and cleared out. Furthermore, if the Syrians and the Arab states can convince Turkey and the USA, these two can join their areas together under the control of the ESO and the aggies of the International Coalition. That would be the start of a new Syrian state.

If the ESO succeeds in bringing law and order, economic prosperity and liberal governance to the liberated areas, the stage would be set to eventually bring the areas under the regime into a reunified Syria This was the example set by West Germany in bringing the repressed and economically failed East Germany into a unified Germany.

The Problematique of the Political Islamists

After Mustafa Kemal abolished the khilafah of the Ottomans in 1924, the Muslim world had no longer a central Sovereign with spiritual authority. This infusion of authority was essentially nominal in as much as it was limited to the shrinking Ottoman territories. However, many voices of Pan Islamism lamented this event. Among those was Hassan al Banna who established in 1928 the Muslim Brothers (M.B.) in Egypt. The MB advocated the reestablishment of the Khalifah for the entire Muslim world. It also advocated that the state and politics should be brought under the umbrella of religion. Finally, it founded a secretive sub organization, which was dedicated to waging arm struggle against the British occupation of Egypt at the time. However, it continued thereafter as a part of its mode of operation.

The M.B. therefore, created what is now called “political Islam”, a complexes of thought whose followers believe that religion and politics are one and the same.

Islamist parties spread throughout the Arab and in parts of the Islamic world. They appealed to a large segment of the conservative population for whom religion is central to their lives. However, the practical experience with the Islamists raises” a problematique” which has to be faced in Syria as well as in other countries.

The first aspect of this problematique is their concept of “khilafah”,i.e. one Pan Islamic spiritual authority for the 1.7 billion Sunni Muslims living on all the five continents of the world. This concept has no basis in Islam.

There has not been one khalif who had such an authority over such a mass of people at any time in history. Only for the thirty years after the death of the Prophet there were successor khalifs. The word Khalif, i.e., successor, did not have any sense for the generations after the Prophet`s contemporaries passed away from the scene. Throughout Islamic history there were more than one khalif at the same time. There was one in Damasus and one in Hijaz during the fight between the Ommayads and Abdullah ibinul Zubaire; one in Baghdad and another in Cairo and yet another in Cordoba during the Abbasides. The same was the case during the Ottoman period. History informs us that it is near impossible to have one spiritual authority over peoples with different cultures, different languages and different experiences.

The second problem of the Islamists is the mix between religion and politics. Religions are complexes of spiritual metaphysical believes and rules of behavior and social organization. While the spiritual believes are personal moral choices with unlimited validity for the individual, rules for societal matters are pragmatic and changeable over time and place. There is no jurisprudence in the world that does not give legal validity to customs, mores and practices of various societies. To believe that such things can be ordained and fixed for ever is an irrational dogma. Mixing the two has led to wars and cruel strife in Europe and in other parts of the world. In recent times, such mixing has given rise to fundamentalism and terrorism. And the reason is obvious: whenever a party thinks that God`s truth is his, the others become wrapped in falsehood and a target of intolerance.

At the time of the Prophet in his state of al Madina, Yathrib as it was called, the Prophet issued the” Yathrib Proclamation” in which he promised the Jews and the other non- Muslims, equal treatment and equal protection. This is the essence of modern secularism of equal treatment under the law of all. So, the religious state is an invention of al Banna in Egypt and Abualaa al Maudoudi under the British mandate in India (note )[16].

Another aspect of this is that the religiously mixed population of Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, would face in a religion based state a classification of first and second class citizens. A current example is happening in Israel where religious parties advocate a Jewish state.

In all the cases where the Islamists ruled, they turned out to have no experience in running a state and no programs to follow. Moreover, in Iran, Afghanistan and Sudan, the minute they passed into power, they abandoned democracy and the peaceful alteration of power.

That tendency was observed in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in various Arab countries: Syria, Tunisia, Sudan, Libya and Egypt where the Islamists rode to power on the popular wave that they did not initiate and after reaching power, tried to have full control. (note)[17].

The Problem of Ethnic Nationalism.

Ethnic nationalism of the Baath in Syria and Iraq, produced Kurdish nationalism and ethnic nationalism in Turkey has resulted in civil war with the PKK in the eastern provinces. Nationalism has a rich catalogue of atrocities and wars. In 19^th century Europe, nationalism was the motive force behind the intra German wars, the German -Danish war, the Franco-German war, the intra Italian wars. In the 20^th century, it was the motive force behind world war I, and world war II. It broke up the Ottoman Empire after the Young Turks took over in 1907 and advocated a Toranik state. In the Balkan in recent years, it broke up Yugoslavia, and caused the war between Russia and Ukraine.

In Syria the destructive pull of ethnic nationalism is now manifest in Kurdish separatism in North Eastern Syria. The rise of Iraqi Kurdistan, has given hopes to Kurdish Nationalists in Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran that their quest for one national state is realizable.

Kurdish Nationalism is a true 19^th century ideology which seeks to unite a multi-tribal society that speaks different languages and has different allegiances in one land-locked state that will be at war with all its neighbors.

In Syria, the rise of Kurdish nationalism and in some instances separatism, was given impulse by the wrong- headed repression and violations of human rights perpetrated by the Baath regime and by the success of Iraq`s Kurds in having an area of prosperity and security amidst the chaos of Iraq. However, there has been no Kurdish problem in Syria, because the repression that the Kurds suffered is identical to that suffered by the Sunni Arabs and other groups not looked upon with favor by the regime.

Syria`s Kurds, those who fled Turkey to Syria after th failure of the revolution of sheikh Sait Peran in 1925, live in the areas of the north and north east of country. They are a substantial minority in and around four provincial cities: al Hasakah, Kamishly, Efreen, and Kobani. However, in none of these areas and towns are the Kurds more than 36 % of the inhabitants; their modal number is less than 25 %. It should be recalled that the total Kurdish population in Syria in 2010 was about 1.7 million constituting 7.5% of the Syrian population of 21.6 million (UN Statistics and Syria Official Statistical Bulletin )[18].

After the eruption of the Syrian Revolution in 2011, many Kurds joined the revolution believing, as all Syrians did, that Democracy and the rule of law are the salvation from the Baath repression. Other Kurds, led by Saleh Muslem, were followers of the Turkish PKK of Abdullah Ocalan. These Kurdish nationalists stayed outside the revolution ranks. In 2013, the Assad government withdrew from the areas east of the Euphrates river and left arms and control to this Kurdish group so as to deny the arms to the opposition groups. This was an opportunity for these Kurds to start carrying out their program of separation or full autonomy within Syria without resistance from the central state.

They started by killing or expelling the Kurds that do not agree with their goals. Then, they followed a policy of ethnic cleansing against other ethnic population, in particular their Arab neighbors who were the majority everywhere (Amnesty International)[19]. They changed the name of the Syrian al Jazeera to Rohgova and brough PKK Kurds from the Qandeel mountains to join and lead them. They kidnapped teenagers and forced them into their ranks, changed the Kids educational system and took over the oil and gas areas to finance their operations. They achieved a “Fait Acomplis” control of some 30 percent of Syria`s territory and about half of its agricultural and water resources.

At that time, 2014, ISIS appeared on the scene and the US completely failed in recruiting Syrians to fighting ISIS under the condition that they pledge not to fight Assad. Thus, the US found in these separatists a pool of mercenaries that can be hired to do the fighting. This was a mutually beneficial deal: the Kurds get arms and equipment plus US political support while the US carries out the fighting without boots on the ground.

To camouflage their designs, they Kurds formed the Syrian Democratic Forces (Qasad ; YPG ) and recruited non-Kurds into the lower ranks. This outfit never fought Assad and was skillful in garnering up European, Russian, Iranian and Israeli support. In other words, the support of all the forces outside the Syrian people.

Fighting, the Kurds did, and they defeated the ISIS terrorists and raised the PKK flag and Ocalan pictures in Raqqa, the capital of ISIS.

The ESO cannot ignore these separatists but cannot equally accept their objectives. Kurdish independence or geographic or national autonomy within Syria stands on no historical basis and will bring no economic benefits to the ordinary Kurd. The Syrian state can guarantee the national, cultural and human rights of the Kurds, but it cannot function with a geographic federation. That would be a harbinger of wars and endless contentions. The Kurds can realize all their cultural and ethnic identity demands in a Democratic Syria living in social peace and in equality of all under the law.

The Received Cultural Heritage

The Islamic culture received in Syria is a medieval heritage passed over 800 years of petrification of Islam. The attempts to critically review and revamp this heritage in the second half of the 19^th century by Jamaludeen al Afaghani, Mohammad Abduh, Taher al Jazaeeri, Mustafa Abdulrazek and others were aborted with the advent of Western Colonialism into the region. The nationalist leadership that came up in the 20^th century had national liberation and not Islamic reform as its focus. The armed and cultural struggles that ensued brought national independence to Syria in 1946 but no critical evaluation of the received heritage. Indeed, the educational system that was put in place failed to educate a modern generation aware of the European Enlightenment and of the rational-scientific revolution of the previous three centuries ( Sakbani, 2008)[20]. This generation somberd either in the empty slogans of the nationalists or in the equally empty believes of the Islamists.

The repressive dictatorships of the nationalists were defeated in the 1967 war. Their political claims were vitiated by the defeat and their social and developmental domains were negligible. This opened the door in the 1970s to a period of “Islamic reawakening”, that is, the rise of Islamist traditionalists who argued that Islam is the solution and cited as a proof the great achievements and successes of the old states of the Islamic-Arab empires (idem, 2008)[21]. Several Islamist intellectuals were leading figures like the M.B.`s Sayed Qutb, A.R. Yasin and A. al Zwahiri and several other M.B. leaders. A fellow traveler Hassan al Turabi of Sudan can be included. These Islamists referenced the Fuqh, i.e. the jurisprudence and the religious thought of predecessors who lived and produced their thought eleven to twelve centuries ago.

The historical reference of the Islamists is problematic. The invoked example is a period of thirty years after the death of the Prophet, an epoch of strife where three of the four successors of the Prophet were assassinated. There is no reliable record of this period, for the written accounts took place some 120-150 years later. At any rate, that period was not an advanced state of civilization. It was only more than 120 years after that the Arabo-Islamic civilization began its ascend. After the glorious days of al Maamoun, the Islamic civilization gradually went into a dark period where religious free thinking was frowned upon and at the time of the Saljukes, 500 years after the death of the Prophet, totally forbidden.

The position of women in the received heritage reflects the Bedawan nature of the Arab society at the time of the Prophet. Women were objects of coveted male sexual desire and to insure access to them, a kind of protected properties of males. This was manifest in all the works of the Imams of the Fuqh who converted the de facto tradition to a de Jure provisions where women were given half the male inheritance, half the witness status, domesticated under Hijab and robbed of their free agency in so many affairs.

In all the Islamic history, paternal masculinity was the character of the society, women were defined in reference to a male (father, husband, brother). This created a roll of servitude, of condition of economic dependence, and of subordination to male suzerainty. Even though mothers, sisters, wives and female relatives were honored and protected, it was strictly a domesticated hidden reverence.

For the society, it means suppression of half of the society, loss of so much genius , neglect of women education and a morality largely tinged by sexual prudence enforced via the separation of the sexes. At the beginning of the twenty first century, the UNDP Report on the Arab Countries revealed 50 % female illiteracy and less than 20 percent participation in the labor force (UNDP Report, 2002)[22]. This is not only unfair and undesirable, but fundamentally incompatible with modern conditions. To wrap women with Hijab and confine them to the artificial social separation of the sexes, does not fit with modern economic and technological conditions. Compared to other developing countries where women participation rate is 40 %, a Muslim society with women participation in the labor force around 20 percent, means a comparative growth retard of one fifth. Thus, at the modal rate of growth of the GDP of 5 % for developing countries, the average non- Muslim country doubles it GDP in 14 years whereas the Muslim country does so in 17.5 years.

Obviously a drastic revision in this matter is in order.

The current Islamists produced nothing of intellectual substance in economics, in sociology, in political science and in organizational matters (Author`s note)[23]. Moreover, they sprouted fundamentalists all over the Arab countries. Aided and supported by the fortunes of the Gulf Arabs, Wahabi Salafism found partners in these Islamists and soon Salafism became known outside its birth places. Syria, which never had this radical culture had to suffer from choosing between the failure of the nationalists and the false promises of the Salafists.

The Problem of Economic Development

In 1955, Syria had a per capita income of $ 150; the level of literacy stood at 59 % (world bank and Syrian statistical bulletin)[24]. In the same year the GDP per capita of South Korea was $70.54, and the level of literacy 20% (Trending Economics.com)[25] . In 2022, the per capita income of Syria was $537, declining from $ 2806.66 in 2010 (macrotrends.net; world bank)[26] whereas that of South Korea occupied the 10^th highest rank in the world standing at $32, 250 (www. Statista.com, international)[27]. In south Korea the level of literacy in 2011 was 100 per cent. In Syria, before the disruption of the revolution, the level of literacy in 2011, was at 79 percent.

This comparison juxtaposes the drastic failure of Syria in economic development and the drastic success of South Korea. The question arises as to why this abject failure of Syria. The Syrian military governments over all those years adopted socialism as an economic program and placed significant obstacles on the private sector and the national bourgeoisie in a country acknowledged to have an entrepreneurial reputation of its middle class. This resulted in the state running the economy and using this control to employ as many underemployed workers as possible.

The public sector policies in agriculture was to cut the prices of farm products for the consumers while raising the cost of fuel for farmers. The result was a decline in agriculture and a massive abandonment of farm land of young farmers. In the industrial sector, the state nationalized all the private sector companies and ran state enterprises, the majority of which had deficits in most years. Their continuation was assured by state refinancing, i.e. printing money.

In the decade of the 1990s, the per capita income in Syria declined, because the average rate of GDP growth was only 1 per cent while the rate of population growth was 3 per cent (UN and CIA statistics)[28].

The discovery and exploitation of oil and gas should have been a boon to the Syrian economy. However, its revenues went not to the general budget but to president Assad personal control. Nobody knows how these funds were used, but the fabulous riches of the Assad family and its collaborators might be the unknown destiny. Corruption was the main practice by the regime`s collaborators and the theft of the public funds an acceptable pay off for services to the regime.

Syria has spent 60% of the public budget on the Army since 1949 and less than 6 % on education. This is the army that lost all its battles with Israel, suppressed civilian control and used its arms to kill the Syrian population and destroy the country since 2011.

This is the catastrophic state that Syria is in today.

The road towards economic development in Syria lies in doing five things: jettisoning off the socialist model and replacing it with a regulated market system; opening up the door for the nationalist bourgeoisie to invest and lead the economy; spending the lion share of the budget on education and technical instruction; drastically reducing the military and internal security expenditures and setting up effective legal mechanisms to stem corruption and public misuse of funds.

The experience of countries that graduated from underdevelopment in Asia: Singapore, Malaysia, and South Korea, is instructive. They all developed their workers skills and spent on technological education, they developed their export sector, they opened their economies and they carried out industrial policies in strategically promising sectors with sunset rules for stopping the support (Lee Kuan Yew)[29]. There is no reason for Syria to register growth rates below the median of developing countries except these wrong economic policies.

It is economic prosperity that engenders incentives and bring about social peace.

A Strategy for Resolving the Syrian Problem

The objective of the proposed strategy is to bring about the implementation of UNSC 2254 either directly through the Geneva negotiations or through other means. The new development permitting a direct implementation of UNSC 2254 is the decision of President Putin on 29 September, 2023 to withdraw the Russian military forces in Syria as of 3 October. The timing of this decision coincides with the opening of a new round of negotiation in Geneva.

The UNSC fundamental problem is that it has no implementing mechanism and it is interpreted by Russia, the regime and Iran as requiring the addition of a couple of opposition figures to Assad government, modifying a few articles of the Constitution and keeping everything as before. This would not solve the very fundamental problem of Governance in Syria and does not entice the relevant powers: Turkey and the US, to replace the regime. No Syrian refugee would gamble return unless he is safe and free from the repressive sectarian regime.

The alternative is to implement this decision indirectly by creating a liberated zone under the ESO as the first step in re-establishing a democratic and prosperous new Syrian state.

The first step is for the Syrians to establishthe ESO with all the characteristic spelled out above. The ESO should seek international recognition to replace the current opposition; the Ietilaff and all the Astana and Suchi bodies established by Russia, Turkey and Iran.

The ESO should thereafter establish the TMF and approach with the diplomatic help of the Arab states, the US and Turkey to enlist in the International Coalition for Fighting Terrorism. This implies that the TMF with its important military capabilities enlists its force under the coalition umbrella (Wikipedia)[30].

The US and the EU in general, Turkey and the Arab states, can be approached to support the ESO as designed and articulated above. Some of the money now spent on refugees can be reallocated to it.

How Would the Refugees Return Safely; the Role of the Arab States

The Arab states only effective card regarding Iran is the return of the Syrian refugees to their home-land. This is the only way to stop the National Iranian expansion in Syria and its attempt at demographic change. That should satisfy Israel and the US. Toward this goal, the Arab States would propose to the UNSC the deployment into Syria of a peace-maintaining military forces under Chapter Seven of the Charter to protect and supervise the safe return of the refugees and offer to provide combat forces and to finance this decisionn. Simultaneously, the Arab states would lobby the US for suspending the sanctions under the Ceasar Law on their firms and other firms involved in reconstructing Syria. Against such a resolution under Chapter seven, Assad and his allies cannot do anything.

Will Russia and China Veto That In The UNSC?

Russia can be gained over if its interests are secured ; for it, Assad is an exchangeable coin. After the protracted war in Ukraine, Russia`s ability and interest in Syria are limited. Indeed, President Puttin decision mentioned above should make it likely that Russia will support a political solution in Syria. To motivate it, it can be assured access to its base on the Syrian cost and promised that its other agreements with the Assad regime will be renegotiated in good faith with the future elected government.

China might be more difficult since it has no particular local interests. If it insists on opposing, it can be told that this can be done under the G.A.`s resolution of « Population Protect » with two third majority (UN, resolution 1973 and the declaration of the GA. on” the responsibility to protect” )[31]. Naturally the Iranian national project of dominating the area would be thwarted if Syria disappears from its chain of three rings towards the Mediterranean.

A UN authorized intervention, under chapter seven of the Charter or under the principle of « Responsibility to Protect » is the only way to solve the problem of the Syrian people and return a normal and a sane Syria to the Arab fold.

(Geneva, 3 October, 2023)

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Notes

[1] al Majalla quotes UN statistics on the catastrophic state of Syria. According to UN statistics there were in May 2023, 6.7 million refugees, 6.6 million internally displaced people,

In addition, the number of killed and lost in theregime`prisones is 1 million.

[2] World Bank, Syria`s economic Ruin After a Decade -Long war, in Economic Monitor, February 2023.

[3] Forbs Adviser, September,2023.

[4] World Bank, op.cit..

[5] Almajalla quoting UN statistics, al Majallah, August, 2023, issue 1948.

[6] Ayman al Safadi the Jordanian foreign Minister visite Damascus in October,2023. The press reportin The Jordan Times, October 21,2023

[7] Saudi Press Agency, Monday1444/12/22

[8] Ibrahim Hamidi, al Majallah, Op. Cit.

[9] See for a consideration of the factors behind this inability , Michael Sakbani Syria Between the Naïve Arab Leaders and its Failed Opposition, in michael.sakbani, blogspot .com, July 2023.

[10] See michael Sakbani, “ISIL, a Phenmenon Pretold;valuation of President Obama`m Strategy “In michahelsakbani. Blogspot.com, September, 2014.

[11] Michael Sakbani, “ Why did the Syrian Revolution Fai” in michaelsakbani. blogspot .com, February 2021.,

[12] Brian Katulis,” Treading Cautiouslyon Shifting Sands;an Assessment of Biden`s Middle East Policy Approach”, in MEI, September, 2023.

[13] Kamal al Labwani and Provisional Prime minister Abdulrahman Mustafa on YouTube, May 2023.

[14] Modern states have Sovereignty over their territory, borders, bureaucracy and Laws applicable to all citizens. Tribal state has a chief, loyalty to the tribe and family attachment (Asabiah). So, there are outsiders in the tribal state. This is in direct contradiction with equality under the law of all citizens in a democracy.

[15] See Omar Aziz, «How Obama Has Betrayed the Syrian People » Aljazeera, 22 August, 2015.

[16] On the intellectual side, the Salafist intellectual base rests on the political Islamist thinking of the Pakistani Abualaa al Maududi, which rejects democracy and the concept of a civil state and advocates a Sharia-based state, where the sovereignty “hakimyah”, is for God , These thoughts of al Maudoudi were held at the time of struggle in British India to establish Pakistan. Later on, after Pakistan was founded, he changed some of his old advocacies. But ironically, his Egyptian followers: Sayed Qutb and AR Yasin, advocated Maudoudi`s old ideas in the Arab context where the societies were essentially Muslim societies.

[17] The MB of Egypt were not among the planners of the Arab Spring. In fact they joined the demonstration on the third day. After the elections that brought them to power, President Mursi tried to have governing by decree for a short period. Other revolutionaries were not partnein in power.

The same pattern showed up in the Iranian revolution. The coalition that speared the Iranian revolution was gradually pushed off and the Mullas took over completely. Again, the same pattern showed up in Sudan where the military Islamists shoved off Hasan al Tourabi and all others.

[18] www. Statista.com, international and Syrian Bulletin of Statistics, 2010.

[19] Syria Statistical Bulletin, 2010, UN official statistics, 2010.

[20] Michael Sakbani, “Islamic militancy and The Failure of Reform and Development”, in michaelsakbani. blogspot.com, December, 2008.

[21] Idem.i

[22] Arab Human Development report, UNDP Bureau for Arab States and the the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, 2002.

[23] Thr islamists economics consist of some general rules about fare trading, the banning of usuary, Islamic banking, and free trading. These are far from an economic systematized knowledge. In each of these topics, there is confusion and lack of understanding of the subject matter; like all religious edicts, morality rather than analysis dominates.

If we take usuary first, the Islamists do not understand that usuary only exists if there is no market with market information. By definition, banned usuary is a surplus non justified. In a market system the rate of interest is in the long run, equals to the marginal productivity of capital and the risk premium, which is the return to a factor of production; it is not a surplus. Without the risk premium we would be in a world of certainty where the future monetary unit value is equal to its value at present. That means no time value of money Therefore, interest rate is a justified reward for saving.

Islamic banking is not banking. It is investment companies where the commercial risk and its return accrue to the depositor. In commercial Banking, business risk does not involve the depositors. It involves only the equity holders in the bankBanking therefore, is investment companies with deposit withdrawal priviliges if the situation of the company permits that. There is neither microeconomic theory, nor macroeconomic theory in Islamic economics. .

[24] World bank. org.pdf., A59

[25] Trading economkic.com, 2023.

[26] Macrotrend .net 1960-2023. world bank historical data.

[27] www. Statistics international. Com

[28] UN official Statistics and CIA statistics.

[29] Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World To First , Harper Collins Publishers, New York 2000.

[30]Wikipedia, “the International Coalition to fight the terrorists”, consulted on 30/9/2023. The coalition has 43 members

[31] UN, resolution 1973 and the declaration of the GA. on” the responsibility to protect. The US used this resolution in establishing a no fly zone in Iraq.

the Blog Papers of Dr. Michael Sakbani; Economics, Finance and Politics

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