Syria 100 Days After Assad; an Essay

 Syria 100 Days After Assad; 

                an Essay

                      By

          Dr. Michael Sakbani

Michael Sakbani, Ph.D., is a former professor of Economics and Finance at the Geneva campus of Webster and Thunderbird. He is a senior fianancial consultant to the UN system, the European Union and Swiss banks. His career began at the State university of NY at Stoney Brook, then the Federal Reserve Bank of New York followed by UNCTAD where he was Director of the divisions of Economic Cooperation, Poverty Alleviation, and Special Programs.  Michael Sakbani has published 150 professional papers and co-authored six books. The « Intelligent Economist » elected michael.sakbani.blogspot.com as one of the top 100 economics blogs in the world in 2020,.2022 and 2023.

Brill & kudos disseminates Dr. Sakbani`s papers to all research institutions in the World.

 Dr. Sakbani won numerous prizes and awards for his intellectual distinction.

 

 

We have advanced beyond the first 100 days of the governance of Mr. alSharaa in Syria. So far, the “bilan” is mixed. The temporary government foreign affairs performance has been good. Except for his performance in Brussel, Foreign Minster al Shaibani has done well. However, Mr. al Shaibani has been one-man foreign affairs show. He has done little about running the Ministry and manning its embassies and consulates.  The answer is altogether different in domestic affairs.  local services in food, municipal services, energy provision and economic well-being have not seen improvement. Domestic security has not been achieved, and after the regrettable criminal events on the Syrian coast, internal peace has not been realized.  

The major lesson to be drawn from these regretable events is that the Sunni Arab majority in Syria, which has been victimized and prosecuted, should not allow its anger and cumulative hurt to sabotage its essential mission of building the new Syrian state on the basis of peacful coexisrtance with all the others as equal citizens. The criminals of the regime should be legally pursued by courts of law and not by mobs. Any collective punishment is an aggression on all Syria. This is the only way that the various componewnts of Syria, learn that the Syrian state is essential for their prosperty and security.

The Government inherited a bloated administrative apparatus. Assad had used the Administration to employ his supporters. Many were ghost underemployed personnel. With the paucity of revenues, the new administration cut off these people from its payrolls. the result was impoverishment of a large number of families in the Alawitte villages. This is indeed a dangerous situation.

If Mr. al Sharaa were not of a specific religious sect, and of a specific ideological color, one would have been more tolerant and pragmatic in accepting that he has changed from his youthful leanings and learned by experience, but the people around him, whom he trusts, have not shown such a change.This is all the more relevant if one observes that, so far, secrecy and lack of transparency have indeed been a mark of the authorities. There is no spokesman for the Government, there is no official media-outlet, no official has given an open Press Conference. Mr. al Sharaa has made no statements about his program and never mentioned Democracy or establishing a civil state in his speeches. 

Three more landmarks have been passed without clarifying these suspicions: the declaration of Constitutional Principles, the ”so called” results of the supposed National Conference, and the naming of the transitional government.

The Constitutional Declaration has gone into areas that should not have been broached: the religion of the President and the status of the Islamic Fuqh as the main source of legislation come first to mind. The irony is that only the religion of the President was stipulated but not his nationality. This is not an oversight when so many other unneccessary details were invoked. As to the status of Islamic Fuqh, it is obvious that Islamic Fuqh, as stated, is unspecified. Is it the four 1350-year-old schools of the Sunnis or is it that of the Salafist Jihadis or even the Shitte Fuqh? In all cases, Islamic Fuqh, outside personal affairs, is largely irrelevant to our days and place. There is no single case where the Political Islamists proved that they have answers to current problems, and not a single case where they proved capable and successful in Democratic governance. Besides, the religious specifications violate the principle of equal citizenry of all.

The Declaration gave the President overwhelming power vis -a -vis the legislature and the Judiciary, all of which renders their independence a fiction. He appoints one third of the legislature and the entire Supreme Judicial Council. There is yet no Constitutional Court and no independent Administrative Court for checking the Executive. Moreover, his appointments to high posts passe without judicial approval. And to add to all the trappings of the faite accomplis power, there are no provisions for investigative authority of the legislator regarding the Executive, and no provisions for the impeachment of the President outside criminal matters. The choice of a Presidential System is a point of view of the Committee, not universally accepted. A Prime Minister would have been utterly helpful to a very occupied and overcharged single person. If the Presidential system is preferred, then a Presidential Council would have been advisable.  

On the other hand, elevating the principles of human rights and human freedoms of international conventions signed by Syria to supreme legal status above even the Constitution was an excellent choice. 

While the declaration provided for a transitional justice, it did not specify the character of the judicial organ involved, neither its scope of action, nor its instruments. One should hope that the Justice Minister be different in action than the previous Ministry. We have, so far, no list of suspects and no idea about the victims.

Regarding the National Convention findings, it is obvious that it was a quest for quick, expedient legitimacy. Mr. alSharaa collaborators held meetings for several days with people they chose and then invited them to the National Convention. This Convention lasted for five hours and involved six hundred chosen people. Can that really be taken seriously? Legitimacy can only be granted by an elected body in a society which has active political parties and civil society institutions.

The last event was the naming of the transitional Government to run Syria. It is an amalgam of 21 men from all components and only one woman from the 13 million Syrian females!! The Government brings back to power the National Bourgeoisie, which has been excluded for 70 years of disastrous economic and social policies.

Mr. al Sharaa and his HTS control all the sovereign ministries: Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Justice. This in addition to the National Security Agency. Looking at the performance of these ministers in the past 3 months, it is evident that loyalty ,not merit, was the criterion of choice. Syria has more capable people a plenty. The rest of the cabinet, 18 ministers, are bureaucrats of known capacities and established expertise. Mr. alSharaa introduced the Ministries but made no attempt to spell out his own program in re-establishing civil peace, in opening up on the civil opposition groups, in building up the economy or in his foreign relations goals regionally and internationally. While his Ministers made declarations about their programs and goals, he made no promise that these are his goals and that he will grant them the authority to accomplish what they promised.  Will this cabinet assure foreign and regional powers? If there were no concerns and fears, the answer would be yes. But as long as there are suspicions, it will depend on the authority granted or allowed to these Ministers. So, we remain in suspended judgment.

The appointment of many foreign nationals to high ranks in the new army raises questions of Syrian national security at a time when the 6000 or more defected officers of the previous Syrian army have not been returned to active duty or to official retirement status. While many historical precedents, can be cited in regard to recruiting foreign nationals, this act has been done in a vacuum of expertise and absence of countervailing power in the army ranks. These foreign nationals have put their lives on the line in fighting for HTS. Thus, they are hard-core Islamists whose prominence in the army is a security risk.The US is reported to have raised this point with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is a valid point and Mr. alSharaa should heed the advice because it is not in his interest to ignore it.

Syria is now placed under the “colimateur” of international surveillance; it needs international credibility before lifting the economic sanctions. She must dissipate the clouds of mistrust that hovers over it. Mr. alSharaa must prove that his rule is not that of a Political Islamists. He has no mandate from the Sunni majority in how to govern them, and no business in telling them what religious tenants they should uphold. The dissolved HTS is no longer a faction, but its cadres and supporters are the current authorities. They are in governance without the consent of people. They should realize the limits of their power and representativity.  Otherwise, they might well be faced with a UNSC decision under chapter seven and a continuation of economic sanctions. And, without removing the sanctions, there will be no foreign investment, and no reconstruction even by the National Bourgeoisie.

Finally, the declaration, as well as the views expressed by those close to the government, fixes the transition period at five years. This is too long. It does not take five years to do elections and finish transition. Five years is much more than 18 months provided in UNSC 2144. It should be left to the development of the situation rather than fix it on no basis

Geneva, 31 /3/25.

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