Syria Between the Naive Arab Leaders and its Failed Opposition

The Blog Papers of Dr. Michael Sakbani; Economics, Finance and Politics

 Michael Sakbani, PhD., is a former professor of economics and Finance at the Geneva campus of Webster-Europe and Thunderfbird-Europe. He is a senior international consultant to the UN System, the EU and Swiss banks. His career began at the State University of NY at Stoney Brook, then the Federal Reserve Bank of New York followed by UNCTAD where he was Director of the divisions of Economic Cooperation, Poverty Alleviation and Special Programs. Published over 140 professional papers and co-authored six books.

The “Intelligent Economist” voted in 2020,2022 and 2023 michaelsakbani.blogspot.com as one of the top 100 blogs in the world. Dr. Sakbani is a research contributor to Brill and Kudos which disseminates his publications to research institutions world- wide. Dr. Sakbani won numerous awards and prizes for  scholarly distinction.

 Syria Between the Naive Arab Leaders and its Failed Opposition

By

                Dr. Michael Sakbani

Twelve Years of Suffering

In March 2023, The Syrian revolution marked its 12^th anniversary ; more than a decade of suffering, destruction, prosecution and repressive dictatorship.

 The Arab statesmen led by Prince Mohammad bin Salman of Saudi Arabia chose to take note of this anniversary by inviting the Damascus Government back to the Arab League. Prince bin Salman wanted to have a more serious summit than usual in Arab politics. He had a partial success in that the decisions of the Jaddah gathering, held on 12//5/2023, were  rather better focused  than the past summits. The  agenda placed the Palestine problem in a prominent place and the Syrian problem was central to the discussions. The two stars of the meetings were President Zelensky of Ukraine, invited by the Saudi Prince to balance his summit and the President of the Syrian Government Bashar al Assad, received with all the honours accorded to a head of state. 

Mr. Assad was accorded all trappings of a welcomed head of a state even though almost half of his country`s  population (13 million) are refugees, prisoners, maimed  or dead. The devastation of his country was glossed over by the high minded concern of the Arab leaders to restore Syria to its seat in the ineffective Arab League. So the Syrian government  returned to its ex-post-facto status as if nothing happened in Syria between its people and the Government. To facilitate that, the Syrian Government, but not the Syrian People, was reembraced in the Arab lap. Mr. Assad's speech offered no concessions and no regrets. His tongue-in-cheek response was that he returns to where his country belongs but not to any lap. He no doubt wanted also to pass to his fellow autocrats the message that this was the fate of people who revolt against their rulers.

All was well in the Arab Press coverage, and the area commentators often forgot to mention the Syrian people in this episode. It seemed, according to many of them, that the expulsion was a mis-judgement now corrected and nothing more (klaib)[1].

There is much speculation that there are conditions attached to this reinstatement which will be carried out in the promised step-counter step approach voiced out at the end of preparatory Amman meeting held just prior to the Jaddah Summit. The concluding statement of Amman read by the Jordanian Foreign Minister Mr. Ayman al Safadi, referred to a road map consisting of the following items; stopping the narcotic trade, returning the refugees to Syria, fighting terrorism and lastly a political solution to the Syrian problem in accordance with the "aspirations" of the Syrian people. The order of these items is an indication of the political priorities and the non-mention of UNSC 2254 by the Jordanian foreign minister was not lost on anybody.

 Aside from this Amman`s statement, all the evidence we have is the common sense proposition that the Arab Leaders would not return Assad without a quid pro quo.

Can Assad Fulfil the Presumed Conditions and What Are They?

From what one hears and reads, the quid-pro-quo consists first in putting limits to the Iranian presence in Syria. This is more possible because President Assad and his regime will have now the new Arab alternative enabling him to do so .This implies that the Syrian Government is expected to ask the withdrawal of all the foreign forces and militias including those it invited to save it. The second is to stop the narcotic trade of the Captagon out of which the regime gains, according to no lesser authority than Assad`s foreign Minister, some $5.7 billion a year (the Times)[2]. The third, is to allow the " voluntary" and "safe" return of the Syrian refugees, whose vast majority are Sunni Arabs, fled in a run for survival to principally, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. The fourth is to open the routes of commerce through Syria. And last, but not least, is to crush the terrorist activities in Syria. In Mr. Assad view, the terrorists are  the so called “opposition ». In this collective Arab view, Syria`s problem would be solved if Assad fulfils these conditions and Syria returns to its previous state prior to the revolution. That means clearly that the regime has no problem with its people and its continuation is the realistic alternative to the chaos of the revolution. 

The reality is that Mr. Assad returned on his terms, which have always been: no terms and no concessions. He has triumphed, over what he has called "an international conspiracy" thanks to the military interventions of Iran and Russia. This conspiracy, according to him, is the demands and struggle of the majority of Syrians to have freedom, democracy and respect of human rights. Now, he said, what rests of his country `s population is more homogeneous, loyal and submissive despite the reported starvation and all depravities they bear (Endnote on press reports)[3].

Is there a chance that any of the secret wishes hidden behind the presumed conditions  of the Arab leaders be carried out?·

·      Iran is now entrenched in every niche of authority in Syria. It is far more powerful than Assad and can depose him if it suits its interests. Iran is trying to effect also a demographic change in Syria which places it at Israel`s doors. When its President Ibraheem Ra`eesy, came to Damascus just before the Jaddah summit, he summoned Assad to his Iranian residence near the so called “ Zaynab Tomb “ to have him sign all kinds of future payments of Iran`s due bills on Assad. After pledging similar payments to Russia when Putin summoned him to Moscow, it seems that the poor chap has no resources left except his Captagon drug trade.

·      What about the Captagon trade? Can Assad stop his collaborators and the Lebanese Hizbullah who are making a mint out of this trade? He cannot even if he wanted, because they are more powerful than he is. Moreover,with the collapse of the economy, his regime survives on these revenues.

·      The refugees ran out of Syria because of the brutal war between Assad and the majority of the Syrian people. These people had  experienced 50 years of repression, permenant security surveillance, corruption, violations of their human rights and disappearance of tens of thousands of them in the jails of his father and his own. How can they return voluntarily if nothing has changed in Assad `s sectarian minority regime ? (Sakbani, 2022)[4] Moreover, how could this return be "safe" if the liberated areas are bombed on daily basis and lack all the infrastructure necessary for a safe viable return?

On so many recent television programs (DW, on 25/5, CNN on 15/5, Misk on 23/5) Syrian refugees interviewed in the streets, were almost unanimous they would not return to Syria as long as the Assad regime is there. Assad`s foreign Minister glibly stated that such a return is not feasible anyway before reconstructing Syria. In other words, pay us first.

·      Finally, can Mr. Assad`s debilitated Army fight the US backed Kurds that Turkey wants to eliminate, or the rebels backed by Turkey or the remnants’ of ISIS?  Most probably he cannot; for his army`s forced conscripts have no stake in such wars and he will not have the Russian air-cover as before.

Is reconstruction possible after Mr. Assad's military triumph?

Iran, Russia and Syria itself, have no money to give and no capacity to reconstruct. The rich Arab States along with the US and Europe certainly have the money and capacity to reconstruct. However, any  reconstruction will run into a great deal of American sanctions. These sanctions are spelled out in the US` Ceaser Law, the coming into effect in June of the  Captagon Law and the new No-normalization legislation making its way through US ‘Congress. This is all in addition to European sanctions.

 It is reasonable to assume that none of these parties and none of their firms will risk investing or giving a penny if the sanctions reach them. If the Gulf States venture into such donations despite US sanctions, they will incur a whole panoply of penalties and the Assad regime will steal the money as it did with the humanitarian assistance of the UN and the Earth Quake donations.  So, as long as Bashar al Assad`s regime is in power, no reconstruction seems possible and no refugees would voluntarily return.

With all the above negatives, what are the basis of the presumed rationale of the Arab calculations?.

The Arab leaders see that after 12 years, neither the US, nor Russia, nor the revolution, nor the UN, nor even Iran have founded a solution. A decade of wars and instability cannot go on. As the Saudi Foreign Minister said,” the situation in Syria cannot continue as it is”. This is no doubt true and honorable. But, the Arab leaders do not realize that Syria is no longer an independent country and that its sectarian minority regime cannot accept any compromises; it has always been for it: either the regime`s  continuation as is or losing control to the majority which means the end of its power and control.            (UN/ World Bank statistics and al Azm[5]

This dilemma is real and it deserves a solution. 

Unfortunately, this Arab move and all the implicit demands are dead on arrival. Nothing will come out if the Arab leaders do not understand that the Syrian problem is the struggle of the Syrian people against the regime`s exclusive control, against its corruption, lawlessness and repression.

A Possible Solution 

The solution requires out-of -the- box thinking. A successful strategic plan to save Syria requires the Arab states and the Syrian people to do a variety of things in view of the tactical obstacles on the ground.

One has to start by observing that the Syrian problem has multiple faces in so far as the competing protagonists on the ground are concerned. These varied tactical configurations must be fully considered in mapping out a strategy of action. For the Arab states like Jordan, Lebanon and for Turkey as well, it is the return of millions of Syrian refugees. For Jordan in particular, it is economic interests. For the Gulf states and Jordan, it is stopping the narcotic trade coming out of Syria. For Turkey and possibly Syria, it is the PKK and the Kurdish separatists in the north-east. For Iran and Russia, it is the continuation of the Assad regime and the braking of it isolation. For the US and Israel,  it is getting Iran out of Syria. For the  Syrian people it is the transition to a freely elected Government which brings about equal treatment of citizenry, freedom and democratic alteration of power.   

What should the Syrians people do?

The first step is for the Syrians to establish in all the areas outside the control of the regime an Elected Syrian Authority (ESA) which would seek international recognition to replace the current opposition; the Ietilaff. The current opposition has proved ineffective, divided and has no independent decision making. Most of its leaders are paid agents of foreign masters and of the regime and it does not represent the Syrian people

This ESA would be elected by elected local administrative councils in each free district. It would have no national or religious character .The ESA would have under its control a temporary military council(TMC) to defend it if the regime or Iran`s militias attack it. The TMC would be led and manned by the three thousand professional officers who deserted the old Syrian army and not by Islamist jihadis and soldiers of fortune. It is estimated by informed observers that in the liberated territories there are some 30 to 50 thousand soldiers that can join the TMC and therefore constitute the nucleus of its force (Wikipedia)[6].

In the areas the DESA controls, there should be governing institutions like police forces that provide security, independent judiciary and no war-lords or Islamist terrorists as has been the case till now. There should also be accounting boards reporting any corruption and misuse of power.

 The legitimacy of the ECA rests  on meeting these requirements and providing all the usual  governmental services. Once that is done, the Syrian revolution will have shown the world what has been missing: a real able and representative alternative to Assad and his regime on the grounds (Obamma)[7]. That is the start of the road for recovering Syria and the Syrian State.

Who will support and finance such an authority?

The US and the West in general, Tukey and the Arab states, can be approached to support this authority if it is designed as articulated above. Some of the money now spent on refugees can be reallocated to it. Both Turkey and the US ( with Israel behind) can be persuaded to set up this Authority under the umbrella of the "International Coalition for Fighting Terrorism". Implicit in that, is a promise of local administrative autonomy for the majority Kurdish localities against a guarantee of being free of PKK domination and of any separatist goals (Sakbani)[8]. For Russia, a promise can be made to secure its naval bas and other legitimate interests.

How Would the Refugees Return Safely; the Role of the Arab States

The Arab states only effective card regarding Iran is the return of the Syrian refugees to their home-land. This is the only way to stop Iranian expansion in Syria and thereby satisfy Israel and may be, the US. The Arab states can see that Iran is now on Jordan`s border and has emerged victorious from the struggle with the Gulf states. Its control in Syria can only be challenged by the Syrians themselves. For this to happen, reconstruction should get underway pari passu with safe return. But, the "safe and voluntary return" of refugees are dependent not only on reconstruction, but on effecting, by force, a political solution to Syrian governance, on securing life in Syria. The transition to a new authority with full power as envisaged in UNSC 2254 is a sin qua non for a safe and voluntary return. The three goals of return of refugees, reconstruction and political settlement are intertwined and interdependent. Non of them is viable by itself. Toward this triple goal, the Arab States would  propose to the UNSC the deployment into Syria of a safe-keeping military forces under Chapter Seven of the Charter to protect and supervise the safe return of the refugees and offer to provide combat forces and to finance this decision. Against such a resolution under Chapter seven, Assad and his allies cannot do anything.

Will Russia and China veto that in the UNSC?

Russia can be gained over if its interests are secured ; for it, Assad is an exchangeable coin. After the protracted war in Ukraine, Russia`s ability and interest in Syria are limited. China might be more difficult since it has no particular local  interests. If it insists on opposing, it can be told that this can be done under  the G.A. Resolution of Population Protect with two third majority(UN, resolution 1973 and the declaration of the GA. on” the responsibility to protect” )[9]. All of this assumes that the US be willing to go along with sincerity and seriousness.

A UN authorized intervention ,under chapter seven of the charter or under the principle of of Responsibility to Protect is the only way to solve the problem of the Syrian people and return a normal and a sane Syria to the Arab fold.

(Geneva, 23/5/2023) 

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                                                           Notes

[1] Sami Klaib, one of the better Lebanese Journalists typifies the Arab Press coverage of the summit. He had several programs on his YouTube channel"aljadeed"  in which he and his guests discussed the return  of Assad to the Arab League without ever mentioning the revolution of Syria or discussing President Assad future plans about a political solution in Syria.

 On the Gulf channels similar coverage can be seen on al Arabia and on Abu Dhabi TV.

[2] The figure cited by the Syrian Foreign Minister is a conservative one . Syria  under Mr. Assad is alleged to export up to $10 billion worth of narcotics, principally, captagon. See for details.  https://www.the times co.uk/article/Syria-catagon-president-assad-speed-drug-nlvjrp7

[3] The economic and sociological malaise of Syria received wide coverage in the international press. The bulk of the energy resources and the bulk of the agricultural resources of the country are outside the control of the regime. With the industry devastated by the bombardment of Assad`s air-force and the Russian air-force  and the stoppage of Tourism, the Syrian economy is at its knees. The Syrian lira which was in 2010 at 50 to the US dollar is now at close to 10,000 to the dollar. All segments of the Syrian society, including the Alawites area, are under severe stress. There is shortage of all basic needs everywhere. Neither Iran , nor Russia have stepped in to alleviate these shortages.

[4] See for a detailed examination and statistics Michael Sakbani, “ Why did the Syrian Revolution Fail”, in michaelsakbani.blogspot.com, 9 June ,2022.                 “

[5] Syria`s population in 2011 was, according o the UN and World Bank official statistics 22.5 million. see wikipedia, Demographics of Syria, consulted on 20/5 2023. .Of this total, the Alawite population was 10 percent, the Christian Arabs 5 percent , other minorities  6 percent and the rest, 79 percent, were Sunnis. Of this majorit,y the Sunni Arabs were about 72 percent. The 2023 estimates of the Syrian population would be around 27 million.

The Alawite population was prosecuted during the Ottoman era for being a sect not approved by the Sunni religious authorities. After establishing the Syrian state in 1920, there were fears of the Sunni domination of Syria by segments of this minority. The French mandate played on those ancient fears, and established in 1920 an Alwites state in North Western Syria. This mini state was rejoined to Syria in 1936. However, segments of this minority persisted in entertaining the ancient fears. Among those was the father of Hafez al Assad who signed a petition to France not to accept joining Syria and evacuating it.. The Syrian state after independence followed a policy of openness and equal treatment of all the population. Despite that, the economic conditions of the Alawite mountains were poor and the area was neglected.

 The open egaliterianism of the independent Syrian state, enabled Alawite youths to joine the Syrian army in large numbers. When Hafez al Assad came to power, he used Alawites as the base of his regime opening to his collaborators vast corruption opportunities. Soon, the privileged position of this community under the Assad regime started to create the phenomenon of Political Alawitism, an escape from fear to the security of political and financial domination.

For analysis of this phenomenon see the two interviews of Philosopher Sadeq Jalal al Azm : the first with Douglas Herbert, “the Interview”, France 24,  2016, and the second with Dima  Nawous, “Special rencounter”, Orient TV.,  2016.

[6] See Wikipedia,  “ Syrian Opposition”, consulted on 21 /5/ 2023.

[7] President Obama described the Syrian opposition as disorganized, ill-equipped and ill-trained…and iss made up of  farmers, dentists and teachers who have no local political base and no experience in running a government. See O. Aziz, “ How Barak Obamma Betrayed the the Syrian People”, Aljazeera, August 22 , 2015.

[8] The Kurds in Syria are two distinct types; the old Kurdish population which is an integral part of the Syrian social tissue and those who came to Syria in 1923 after sheikh Said revolt against modern Turkey. The latter settled in the North East of Syria. Their number is between 5 and 7 percent of the Syrian  population. They are a majority mainly in and around  three small cities: Ifreen, Kobani and Kamishly, which are separated by some 250 km. of each other. For a discussion of the Kurdish Problem in Syria and Turkey see Michael Sakbani, “The Kurds: Victims of wrong decesions and wrong National Aim”, in michaelsakbani.blogspot.com, 12 October, 2019.

[9] The USA invoked the spirit of the GA decision when it established in 1993 its No-Fly zone over Northern  Iraq after Iraq`s defeat in the Kuwait invasion.

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