MR. Trump`s Trade War with China; a Transactional Approach to Solving a Structural Problem
Trade Wars with the
World; Can Trump`s Approach Work
By
Dr.
Michael Sakbani
The Personae Trump
Donald J. Trump was for more than three decades before running for
President, a real estate tycoon in New York City, known for his hustle, hard
drive and lack of scruples. He went bankrupt four times, lost his casinos and
came back from financial disasters. For more than a decade, he became a TV
personality with a very successful show called the “apprentice” where he
relished firing job apprentices. The glamour of the show business led him to
run beauty contests in and outside the USA. His adventures with women cost him
two divorces, after which he encountered his present third wife, who was a
fashion model. In between, he had several affairs with beautiful women which
satisfied his libido as much as nourished his narcissism.
Mr. Trump`s ambitions led him into politics. He started as a New York
city Democrat and when that proved nonpromising for him, he became Republican.
To promote himself, he played brilliantly the TV media and kept himself in the
news by all kinds of outrageous declarations and notorious public stands. His
most infamous was advocating the “birther” controversy purporting that
President Obama was not born in the US, and his declarations about the US being
ripped off and raped by cheating China, because of spineless Presidents.
To add substance to his resumé, he hired Toni Schwartz
to ghost- write for him his book “the Art of the Deal” where he claimed
to be a consummate negotiator((Schwartz & Wikipedia)[i].
In 2012, he entertained running for President but recoiled when he
found scant support among established Republicans. But in 2016, he seized upon
the public discontent with Washington and the alienation of so many Americans
and launched himself into primaries against 16 establishment Republicans. He
berated all of them, thrashed their capacities, branded them with pejorative names
and never debated them on their terms. He appealed to the frustration and anger
of voters and promised to clean the swamps of Washington and follow a policy of
America First. To the amazement of so many, he succeeded in capturing the
nomination of his new party.
In his race for the White House, he ran against one of the best-known
establishment figures, Hillary Clinton; ex-first lady, ex-New York Senator, ex
Secretary of State, ex-prominent lawyer and ex Ivy-Leaguer. Hillary Clinton was
a highly prepared candidate but an unattractive public persona and an awkward
public speaker. She promised nothing new, did not take Trump seriously, and kept
repeating generalities and sanctimonious platitudes. Instead of campaigning on
policy issues which she buried in “Hillary.com”, she made Trump and his
supporters the issue. Her campaign outspent Trump`s three to one but failed to
communicate with the Democrats base in the rust belt states and failed to
motivate traditional party voters. She lost the young, and white women voters
(Sakbani,2016,”b”)[ii] Although she got 3 million votes more than
Trump, the US electoral college propelled Trump to victory by winning the three
often democratic voting states of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin by a
combined total of 68,000 votes.
China in Trump`s focus
One of the first guests President Trump received was President Xi
Jinping of China. He entertained him in his Florida residence and played Gulf
with him in his Gulf course. Thereafter, he declared the guest as his friend and
announced that they will negotiate a tremendous trade deal
that satisfies both sides (BBC,7 April 2017)[iii]. A few months later, President Trump imposed 10 % and
25 % tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from many countries, including
China. Fast in succession, he imposed tariffs on other imports from China. When
China promised to retaliate, especially on imports from states which voted for
President Trump, the President imposed 25% tariffs on $200 billion Chinese
imports and declared that the US is ready to negotiate a reasonable balanced
deal (Digital Journal, 9/ 24,2018)[iv]. Thus, he started his trade war with China.
This modus operandi is typical Trump. He puts his
finger on a long-standing issue tapping accumulated anger and frustration. His
first move is to throw his opponent off balance by being rough, crude and
taciturn. He offers nothing and then calls for negotiations. Subsequently in this instance, he
lost his way towards his end goal by his failure to follow an intelligent tactical
collective coalition. This coalition-building is not what Trump knows. In real estate, a unilateral approach might be fruitful,
but in international trade, only a coalition of states can bring China to stop
its entrenched ways by closing down its alternatives.
China`s trade surpluses are inseparable from its growth tale. In
1979, Deng Xiaoping, the then Chinese supreme leader
realized three things:
1. The Chinese private sector cannot be ignored. It is a part of the Chinese psyche and a connecting social tissue to do and be in business. A few years ago, Chinese schoolchildren were asked in a survey about what profession they aspire to in the future. The vast majority answered : Millionaire. Observation of the Chinese everywhere demonstrates clearly that they are motivated by personal gain and propelled by an innate need to prosper. Deng famously said whether a cat is black(capitalist) or white(communist) what matters is it's catching the mouse.
1. The Chinese private sector cannot be ignored. It is a part of the Chinese psyche and a connecting social tissue to do and be in business. A few years ago, Chinese schoolchildren were asked in a survey about what profession they aspire to in the future. The vast majority answered : Millionaire. Observation of the Chinese everywhere demonstrates clearly that they are motivated by personal gain and propelled by an innate need to prosper. Deng famously said whether a cat is black(capitalist) or white(communist) what matters is it's catching the mouse.
2. Deng was also convinced that the
Communist Party cannot control China without delivering economic
prosperity; economic growth was the tool of political control of his vast
country.
3. It was also clear to him that
the Soviet model has failed because, among other things, it ignored the
market and its pricing mechanism.
Growth theorist like Simon Kuznets, Moses Abramowitz,
Edward F. Denison and Robert Solow found out that to grow you
need the following things:
A. Labor and capital
supply,
B. Increase in total factor productivity, which
their research demonstrated it explains i.e. accounts for 2/3 of the
GDP growth. That implies that access to technology is critical and its
mastery must be a priority. All growth theorists attributed in varying degrees
total factor productivity to several related factors, namely, B.1.education and
vocational training; B.2.organized managerial and
industrial setup, B.3 marketing and
distribution know-how and B.4 good infrastructure and stable law and
order.(Denison ,1967)[v].
China got its labor supply from the underemployed
Chinese agriculture. Millions of Chinese have been willing to leave the rural
areas to the Eastern provinces for low-paying industrial jobs, which, in their
eyes, are much preferable to their subsistence rural jobs. This vast movement
of labor hardly affected agricultural production levels. As to capital,
financing came from the high Chinese domestic savings and, significantly,
from the Chinese overseas immigrants`savings which flawed into two
channels: the formal market of Hongkong and the informal personal market. In
this context, it should be remembered that China with $68 billion, is after India, the second
biggest receiver of remittances in the world, This was the true meaning of the
one country two systems voiced out at the time of Hongkong return to China. But
even that was not sufficient for the high growth required to transform the
country. If one takes an average capital-output ratio of 3 to 1, generating
high growth reaching into the upper single digits, would require savings in the
range of 35- 36 percent of the GNP per year, a hardly realistic saving level.
Consequently, China opened the door, under certain conditions, for Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI). These conditions involved forcing foreign investors to
surrender without compensation, their technology in return for doing business
in the enormous Chinese domestic market, and choosing the type of FDI wanted by
China. The profit lure proved irresistible to the capitalist firms which
flocked-in “en mass”.
B.1. Education and vocational
training were obtained from everywhere. The Chinese government sent tens of
thousands of students to western universities and technical
colleges. And FDI played a role as well.
B.2.The Chinese Government set up
numerous state enterprises with privileged market controls and endowed them
with lavish subsidies and all kinds of help as a part of its industrial policy
model. In addition, private enterprises were all required to accept government
appointed representatives on their managing boards, thereby keeping them in
line.
B. 3 China invested massively in infrastructure; some cities were built from scratch in the last 20 years. A bird-eye view of some highways recalls areal views of L.A. in California.
B. 3 China invested massively in infrastructure; some cities were built from scratch in the last 20 years. A bird-eye view of some highways recalls areal views of L.A. in California.
B.4. FDI firms and
indigenous Chinese innovations completed this list of prerequisites.
With
this massive collective effort, China embarked as of 1980 on the greatest
growth of income (GDP) in all recorded economic history. To
appreciate what, for example, a 10% annual GDP growth means, economists use the
so-called “68-year rule”. It takes 68 years for the GDP to double if the
economy records a real growth of 1 %. Therefore, China which has registered an
average real growth of its GDP since 1985 of 9.1%, has doubled its real income
in 68/ 9.1= 7.5 years (CEIC, 2019)[vi]. In concrete
terms, this means that an average Chinese in his/ her sixties working and
living in the industrial provinces has seen his/ her income doubles almost five
times over the last forty years. The policy of one child per family adds
to that by a parallel increase in the GDP per capita.
This explosion of growth carried with
it a tremendous expansion in the Chinese product base. China became a world
factory producing every possible good. The natural outlet was the foreign
import markets, especially in the US and Europe. In just a few years, China
became a surplus trade balance addict.
A
A Statistical Picture of China`s Balance of Payment
Surplus With the World
Table 1
Table 1
BALANCE
OF TRADE AND SERVICES OF CHINA OVER 1997-2017 WITH USA.
Year
|
China
|
United
States
|
Trade
in goods & Services
|
Trade
in goods and services
|
|
1997
|
42.824
|
-108.288
|
1998
|
43.837
|
-160.13
|
1999
|
30.641
|
-258.619
|
2000
|
28.873
|
-372.522
|
2001
|
28.084
|
-361.516
|
2002
|
37.383
|
-418.956
|
2003
|
35.821
|
-493.893
|
2004
|
51.174
|
-609.884
|
2005
|
124.626
|
-714.252
|
2006
|
208.918
|
-761.715
|
2007
|
308.036
|
-705.372
|
2008
|
348.832
|
-708.728
|
2009
|
220.13
|
-383.778
|
2010
|
223.023
|
-494.659
|
2011
|
181.903
|
-548.629
|
2012
|
231.844
|
-536.773
|
2013
|
235.379
|
-461.875
|
2014
|
221.299
|
-490.179
|
2015
|
357.87
|
-500.354
|
2016
|
249.913
|
-500.561
|
2017
|
0
|
0
|
Source:
|
![](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVFSflUPrXtXFl322rBGtmtPfrKbeXibFGwOv1ATaURwzMXH38TN3etqAHgrx25lksVnDE2O1wF9AxvAGH7M1KNQVwn_5i7fJI0eMapedigy2AyWWvJ_e_hH5p9Lq82RgxHO7u/s400/Screen+Shot+2019-02-19+at+10.29.13+AM.png)
Table 2
![](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhTxcN_MKIim_FtX6nkE_6VEJpoBqul5PxJCtAlKDLT4V1MoeTHrUWdC9XmzpVv2l37hic44f7SmiuwtZhFsG59R5Kec-uWNTDBaQT5sEt-G49NbQdBy0OBTBYrhuqycclhSkaf/s400/Screen+Shot+2019-02-19+at+10.31.08+AM.png)
Table 3
BALANCE OF TRADE AND SERVICES OF CHINA OVER 1997-2017 WITH ASIA.
BALANCE OF TRADE AND SERVICES OF CHINA OVER 1997-2017 WITH ASIA.
Year
|
China |
Asia
|
Trade
in goods & Services
|
Trade
in goods and services
|
|
1997
|
42.824
|
77.82
|
1998
|
43.837
|
183.636
|
1999
|
30.641
|
193.126
|
2000
|
28.873
|
231.495
|
2001
|
28.084
|
164.704
|
2002
|
37.383
|
191.845
|
2003
|
35.821
|
252.495
|
2004
|
51.174
|
333.43
|
2005
|
124.626
|
444.199
|
2006
|
208.918
|
587.231
|
2007
|
308.036
|
685.145
|
2008
|
348.832
|
715.517
|
2009
|
220.13
|
467.611
|
2010
|
223.023
|
597.897
|
2011
|
181.903
|
668.509
|
2012
|
231.844
|
592.131
|
2013
|
235.379
|
574.503
|
2014
|
221.299
|
557.771
|
2015
|
357.87
|
525.01
|
2016
|
249.913
|
463.246
|
2017
|
0
|
443.578
|
Source:
IMF
|
AMERICA.
Year
|
China
|
Latin
America
|
Trade
in goods & Services
|
Trade
in goods and services
|
|
1997
|
42.824
|
-32.94
|
1998
|
43.837
|
-55.171
|
1999
|
30.641
|
-23.943
|
2000
|
28.873
|
-15.83
|
2001
|
28.084
|
-24.048
|
2002
|
37.383
|
8.225
|
2003
|
35.821
|
31.312
|
2004
|
51.174
|
46.425
|
2005
|
124.626
|
64.404
|
2006
|
208.918
|
80.796
|
2007
|
308.036
|
42.214
|
2008
|
348.832
|
5.832
|
2009
|
220.13
|
14.486
|
2010
|
223.023
|
-7.048
|
2011
|
181.903
|
-2.519
|
2012
|
231.844
|
-33.201
|
2013
|
235.379
|
-76.453
|
2014
|
221.299
|
-93.454
|
2015
|
357.87
|
-109.074
|
2016
|
249.913
|
-39.294
|
2017
|
0
|
-25.006
|
Source:
IMF
|
Summary
· The balance of trade shows surplus with the US in
every year.
· Surplus with Latin America all years.
· Surplus with Europe in all years except 2001,
and 2013-2014.
· Deficit with Asia all years.
· The merchandise account is where China`s
trading muscle is the strongest.
Table 5
BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT OF CHINA OVER 1997-2017
WITH USA.
(Billions
of U.S. dollars)
|
||
China
with USA
|
||
Year
|
China
|
United
States
|
1997
|
36.963
|
-140.72
|
1998
|
31.471
|
-215.066
|
1999
|
21.114
|
-288.361
|
2000
|
20.432
|
-403.451
|
2001
|
17.405
|
-389.686
|
2002
|
35.422
|
-450.794
|
2003
|
43.052
|
-518.751
|
2004
|
68.941
|
-631.593
|
2005
|
132.378
|
-745.233
|
2006
|
231.843
|
-805.963
|
2007
|
353.183
|
-711.036
|
2008
|
420.569
|
-681.39
|
2009
|
243.257
|
-372.522
|
2010
|
237.81
|
-431.266
|
2011
|
136.097
|
-445.663
|
2012
|
215.392
|
-426.833
|
2013
|
148.204
|
-348.801
|
2014
|
236.047
|
-365.199
|
2015
|
304.164
|
-407.765
|
2016
|
202.203
|
-432.874
|
2017
|
164.887
|
-449.141
|
Table 6
· BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT OF CHINA OVER 1997-2017
WITH EU.
(Billions
of U.S. dollars)
|
||
China
with Europe
|
||
Year
|
China
|
EU
|
1997
|
36.963
|
99.962
|
1998
|
31.471
|
53.542
|
1999
|
21.114
|
-2.972
|
2000
|
20.432
|
-64.901
|
2001
|
17.405
|
-18.314
|
2002
|
35.422
|
15.85
|
2003
|
43.052
|
5.507
|
2004
|
68.941
|
59.345
|
2005
|
132.378
|
-3.535
|
2006
|
231.843
|
-42.629
|
2007
|
353.183
|
-116.975
|
2008
|
420.569
|
-263.272
|
2009
|
243.257
|
-28.527
|
2010
|
237.81
|
-9.385
|
2011
|
136.097
|
76.954
|
2012
|
215.392
|
206.568
|
2013
|
148.204
|
287.057
|
2014
|
236.047
|
304.405
|
2015
|
304.164
|
310.758
|
2016
|
202.203
|
324.939
|
2017
|
164.887
|
433.257
|
Source:
IMF
|
![](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjebKsTlBhwQn_U7jgrNgR93QxWQGgrFB0iXvkAjJ7lXlvuboZbBM9E1WWzxniyQDlcN-9JfKskDxrpJE3e1kDpZTaFBLl3cBC1LbkQ1GzOt5kMN1IZXm4pNWGkXAlHgtau2Ed_/s400/Screen+Shot+2019-02-19+at+10.19.55+AM.png)
Table 7
BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT OF CHINA OVER 1997-2017 WITH ASIA.
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
|
||
China with Asia
|
||
Year
|
China
|
Asia (Excl:China)
|
1997
|
36.963
|
141.741
|
1998
|
31.471
|
362.134
|
1999
|
21.114
|
359.316
|
2000
|
20.432
|
406.58
|
2001
|
17.405
|
344.927
|
2002
|
35.422
|
414.216
|
2003
|
43.052
|
544.154
|
2004
|
68.941
|
609.478
|
2005
|
132.378
|
679.745
|
2006
|
231.843
|
899.439
|
2007
|
353.183
|
1084.208
|
2008
|
420.569
|
998.716
|
2009
|
243.257
|
782.454
|
2010
|
237.81
|
951.779
|
2011
|
136.097
|
805.757
|
2012
|
215.392
|
638.452
|
2013
|
148.204
|
663.198
|
2014
|
236.047
|
799.776
|
2015
|
304.164
|
820.588
|
2016
|
202.203
|
883.089
|
2017
|
164.887
|
831.152
|
Source: I
|
Table 8
Balance on Current Account of China over 1997-2017 with Latin
America
(Billions
of U.S. dollars)
|
||
China
with Latin America
|
||
Year
|
China
|
Latin
America
|
1997
|
36.963
|
-65.873
|
1998
|
31.471
|
-89.528
|
1999
|
21.114
|
-55.538
|
2000
|
20.432
|
-47.399
|
2001
|
17.405
|
-52.284
|
2002
|
35.422
|
-15.442
|
2003
|
43.052
|
11.827
|
2004
|
68.941
|
23.426
|
2005
|
132.378
|
35.053
|
2006
|
231.843
|
51.04
|
2007
|
353.183
|
8.858
|
2008
|
420.569
|
-37.44
|
2009
|
243.257
|
-32.004
|
2010
|
237.81
|
-95.996
|
2011
|
136.097
|
-111.615
|
2012
|
215.392
|
-136.676
|
2013
|
148.204
|
-163.44
|
2014
|
236.047
|
-184.921
|
2015
|
304.164
|
-173.338
|
2016
|
202.203
|
-94.958
|
2017
|
164.887
|
-82.125
|
Source:
IMF
|
Summary of the statistics of the
current account :::
·
Unilateral
transfers are also important; more Chinese work abroad than foreigners work in China. The country is the second-largest receiver
of remittances in the world.
·
- China had a surplus with the US every year under
study
·
- China had a surplus with Europe all years till
2012.
·
- China had a surplus with Latin America all years
·
- China had a deficit with Asia all years.
The statistical picture presented above
plainly shows that China has succeeded in becoming the World production
factory. In this regard, it is obvious that the world cannot have two Chinas at
the same time; there simply is no room for such volumes of exports by more than
one country; in every six dollars of the world’s exports, one
dollar has gone to China. Today, China exports every conceivable
type of good: household equipment, children toys, and wherewithal, tools and machines,
chemicals, heavy industrial equipment, locomotives, and autos, engineering products, an increasing number
of digital products, and as of late, high speed 5 G data transfer devices and a
new green technology endogenously developed.
Table 9
PERCENTAGE OF CHINA IN THE EXPORTS OF GOODS IN
WORLD EXPORTS: 2007-2017.
Year
|
Amount
|
Percentage
|
2007
|
1,553.93
|
11.16
|
2008
|
1,774.06
|
11.03
|
2009
|
1,513.70
|
12.22
|
2010
|
1,941.71
|
12.81
|
2011
|
2,226.73
|
12.34
|
2012
|
2,308.21
|
12.78
|
2013
|
2,405.96
|
13.05
|
2014
|
2,536.84
|
13.73
|
2015
|
2,448.55
|
15.15
|
2016
|
2,235.96
|
14.28
|
2017
|
2,346.10
|
14.55
|
Source:
WITS
|
The question legitimately arises : was
China`s success in running persistent surpluses due only to its export
production base and low prices or there were as well restrictive trade
practices and exploitation of the world trading system. The record shows that
China has various restrictions on imports in the forms of quotas,
tariffs and non-tariffs barriers. For example, cloths imports
are virtually banned. Food products are subject to a massive amount of regulations
restrictions imposed by the Chinese Food and Drug Administration. There
are quotas on 40 categories of goods. On South Korea alone, there
are 26 quotas (Economic help, 2019)[vii].
Moreover, political considerations, as in the case of South
Korea, are involved in the treatments of various countries. It should
be added, however, that there has been a gradual reduction of barriers in
the last five years.
Illicit industrial spying on digital
technology and copyright theft of entertainment products are widely practiced
by China (Intrepid sourcing, 2018) [viii]. The country has
lax environmental standards that confer a
competitive cost edge. Coupled with low wag for migrant underemployed workers
from rural China and a fixed Yuan exchange rate for at least ten
years, it is evident that the country does not play a straight game.
A very important development is that
China has become, an important supplier in the international production
chains, (International Supply Chain). Very few industries can now do
without China`s intermediary product exports. This is ,of course, a result of
global firms' choices to locate a part of their supply chain in low-cost places.
China in the
WTO System
China joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO) on 11/12/2001. It was already a powerful trading
country. Ever since it has benefited from market access enshrined in the WTO
trade system. WTO covers 90% of world trade and has membership with 85% of the world`s population; It applies the same rules of access on all.(Wikipedia,
2019) [ix]. The WTO system
assumes a level playing field for all members with provisions for settling
trade disputes. No barriers are admitted since the close of the Uruguay Round
of negotiations in 1995. This means traders, such as global firms would
access free of impediments all markets for products internationally produced
anywhere (international supply chain). The most favored nation clause taken
over from the GATT would generalize to all members any advantages given to any
country.
The
question arises are all countries of equal trading capacity and inversely
of equal retaliatory power? Obviously, the answer is negative. Another
set of questions is that developing countries might need to protect their
infant industries, those of strategic national importance, such as
in food and basic medicine. Agricultural barriers such as
exists in the EU and subsidies under the European CAP and the US agricultural
subsidies are tolerated (they existed prior to the end of the Uruguay Round)
while the developing countries are not permitted such
protectionism. The capacity of developing countries to negotiate in
the WTO is very limited for all but the large countries, which may have the
qualified personnel to do so effectively
The WTO system has been in place for
some 24 years. Over this period, it has shown many shortcomings. Hence reform
is definitely needed. The first issue is that the WTO system has very little to
say about the environment and labor standards. From a developing country
perspective, its rules on TRIPS are asymmetrical. Its dispute settlement system
does not cover dealing with persistent surpluses. The developing countries are
barred from raising barriers to secure their food needs or public health needs. And the process takes years to bear results (Khor &
UNCTAD, 2016)[x] .
The Particular Problem
of the USA
Table 10
BALANCE OF TRADE OF CHINA WITH THE USA IN 2017
(Billions
of U.S.
dollars)
Year Exports Imports Balance
2017 505.470 129.894 376.576
The
large and persistent surplus of China with the US, has been for years a
tempting target for politicians like Mr. Trump, to advocate drastic
confrontation with it. Indeed, the relationship is unbalanced. Mr. Trump started by imposing 10 and 25 percent
tariffs on aluminum and steel and went after that to imposing another 25%
on $200 billion worth of imports from China effective as of 2 March,
2019. However, this deadline was suspended as the US-China negotiations
started in February.
The heart of the matter is that The US faces a structural economic problem with China. For a start, the US has
a limited export-product base as opposed to China`s diverse one. The US is
competitive in armaments, aircraft (the B. 737 notwithstanding),
agriculture, entertainment, energy, and digital industry. The old
manufacturing industry lost out quite a bit to lower-wage countries such as
Mexico and China, both of whom have unrestricted entry to the US
market. Minimum wage levels, environmental standards, and, social
protection standards are higher in the US than in Mexico or China.
This affords China and Mexico lower cost advantages, so tempting to business firms only interested in their profit line.
The
WTO system and free global trade advocacy are based on Ricardo`s theory of
Comparative Advantages (CA). This theory is a labor based one with
fixed proportion technology (Leontief `s input-output). CA assumes free access
to technology and the ability of labor to switch to higher value-added industries. Finally, CA was articulated for a closed economy without
service exports. For all those reasons it is easily violated in our
time. In particular, the technological access presupposed in the
comparative advantage theory does not apply, because the US`and other
global firms are willing to use their technologies outside their country.
Globalization has freed firms from loyalty to the country of the
headquarters to loyalty to their balance sheets and stockholders-
equity value (Sakbani”a”, 2016)[xi].
Modern labor-saving technology much more than trade imbalances has mightily contributed to the US structural unemployment in the industrial
states. Technology has become capital and knowledge-intensive. Robots and soon artificial
intelligence, are replacing labor. They are also boosting the capitalist owners'
share in income distribution to much higher than the econometric literature has
shown up from 1907 to the mid-eighties (Solow 1976; Denison, 1967)[xii]. It is no longer true that the share of capital is
stable and roughly around 27% of the GDP. The technology
owning claimant is now getting a much higher
share. In the words of investment billionaire Wilbur Ross, the current Trump`s
Secretary of Commerce, robots do not come late to work, do not get
sick, and will have no maternity leaves. It was supposed in the theory that
labor would be retrained and retooled for higher value-added jobs. But both
business and the US government did not initiate
sufficient programs. Besides being costly to retrain labor, the workers in most
cases do not have the educational background to move to the higher technology
in the digital age. Most older workers have limited educational attainments and
short payoff time for costly retraining. Nonetheless, the US compares poorly
with other industrial powers. The US spends less than half of what Germany
spends on retraining unemployed workers despite having close to 4 times
Germany`s population. The consequences of all such unrestricted trade are
the hollowing out of the US industrial belt in favor of lower-cost China, Mexico, and others.
President Trump Acts
To circumvent the WTO rules, the
President used national security to justify imposing tariffs
(on aluminum and steel) on partners, often allies and friends: Canada,
Australia, and countries in Europe. It is worth remembering that the US had a
current account surplus with some of these countries. But, as has become his
trademark, the President lied his way through.
Mr. Trump approach to trade is bilateral, i.e., each transaction should be balanced by a counterpart; this is how bilateral trade is fare and reciprocal. But according to economic theory, trade should be balanced multilaterally. Trump thinks multilateralism is crowded many. As it was stated above, the effective strategy to face China is to build a coalition against it. But America first would rule that out.
Mr. Trump approach to trade is bilateral, i.e., each transaction should be balanced by a counterpart; this is how bilateral trade is fare and reciprocal. But according to economic theory, trade should be balanced multilaterally. Trump thinks multilateralism is crowded many. As it was stated above, the effective strategy to face China is to build a coalition against it. But America first would rule that out.
For two months now (late April 2019),
there have been negotiations with China. What can China offer in these
negotiations?
• Increased energy imports
from the US,
• Increased agricultural
imports,
• Imports some more
aircraft (notwithstanding the Boeing 737)
• Redirection of
some industrial exports to other countries.
But, in a 4 to 1 trade matrix, this
will not solve the long-standing disequilibrium.
It might be interesting to ask can China import more than the above item over time?
It is doubtful. The US might not have the products that China might want. Now-a-day, China is spending vast amounts on developing green technology, on developing artificial intelligence, on fast transfer systems for the G 5 devices and on digital technology, whereas President Trump wants to go back to coal. The question arises, however, can the US economy, which is dynamic, flexible and innovative recapture its export prowess in the digital future? That depends on many factors which Mr. Trump is disinterested in. One such factor is retaining skilled immigrants from outside Europe. Fifty percent of the PhD.graduates of US`universities in science and mathematics in recent years are born outside the US. Another problem is the disrespect of science shown in the denial of climate change and the lost investment opportunity entailed therein. Mr. Trump believes that reducing the costs of industry and having jobs even in lower technology are choices he prefers under his America first slogan. This is a static budgetary approach rather than one where the return on investment determines capital allocation. So, the answer is at this point uncertain.
It might be interesting to ask can China import more than the above item over time?
It is doubtful. The US might not have the products that China might want. Now-a-day, China is spending vast amounts on developing green technology, on developing artificial intelligence, on fast transfer systems for the G 5 devices and on digital technology, whereas President Trump wants to go back to coal. The question arises, however, can the US economy, which is dynamic, flexible and innovative recapture its export prowess in the digital future? That depends on many factors which Mr. Trump is disinterested in. One such factor is retaining skilled immigrants from outside Europe. Fifty percent of the PhD.graduates of US`universities in science and mathematics in recent years are born outside the US. Another problem is the disrespect of science shown in the denial of climate change and the lost investment opportunity entailed therein. Mr. Trump believes that reducing the costs of industry and having jobs even in lower technology are choices he prefers under his America first slogan. This is a static budgetary approach rather than one where the return on investment determines capital allocation. So, the answer is at this point uncertain.
Table 11
CHINA`S EXPENDITURE ON GREEN TECHNOLOGY
AND OTHER R & D
Years (China`s green
tech &
R&D) $ expenditure in
billions
1997 0.639
1998 0.647
1999 0.75
2000 0.893
2001 0.94
2002 1.058
2003 1.120
2004 1.215
2005 1.308
2006 1.369
2007 1.373
2008 1.445
2009 1.662
2010 1.710
2011 1.775
2012 1.906
2013 1.990
2014 2.021
2015 2.056
2016 2.107
2017 2.1
2018 2.108
Sources: World Bank, OECD,
The US negotiating demands
face China with an existential challenge: a change in its
system; giving up
subsidies; abandoning industrial policies; no
longer obedient deficit-ridden State Enterprises and
obedient private enterprises. and above all opening up its economy. On the other hand, China faces the US
with a formidable political and economic challenge. It has been for long assumed that as
China prospers, it would become more liberal and freer of controls. This is why
the US supported its application for the WTO. Nothing of the sort is happening.
Under President XI, China is becoming more autocratic and more controlled (
Rodrik, 2018 )[xiii]. Moreover, the command economy of China seems to be more efficient in execution than any other command economy we have seen.
CONSEQUENCES BEYOND TRADE
The fourth quarter of 2018 began to show the impact
of the trade war with China on the financial markets. In October and December,
2018, the financial markets everywhere took a severe beating as a consequence
of trade uncertainty. These losses were partially reversed in
January and February 2019 as negotiations with China were said to progress. To
be sure, the prospects of interest rate rises and the inversion of the yield
curve in the US had something to do with that. However, China`s future growth
has been hovering behind the scene. The IMF, the OECD, and J.P. Morgan, all
estimated that interest rates will move up over one year by 0. 8% ( Image
Economy et al. 2019) [xiv] But the US
Fed., given the state of the Business cycle, did not oblige.
Trade war undermines growth ;
Christine Laggard the Managing Director of the IMF said in Davos on 22/1/2019, that because of trade tensions, the IMF has shaved down the estimated world income growth from 3.7% to 3. 5%. Two months later, the IMF came down further to 3.3% once again citing trade tensions. In its press release of April 2019, WTO stated the following: “World trade will continue to face strong headwinds in 2019 and 2020 after growing more slowly than expected in 2018 due to rising trade tensions and increased economic uncertainty. WTO economists expect merchandise trade volume growth to fall to 2.6% in 2019 down from 3.0% in 2018. Trade growth could then rebound to 3.0% in 2020; however, this is dependent on an easing of trade tensions “(WTO, 2019)[xv].The impact of trade tensions on growth is not only through the multiplier impact on income , but runs also through the impact of uncertainty on investment and in particular on FDI.
Christine Laggard the Managing Director of the IMF said in Davos on 22/1/2019, that because of trade tensions, the IMF has shaved down the estimated world income growth from 3.7% to 3. 5%. Two months later, the IMF came down further to 3.3% once again citing trade tensions. In its press release of April 2019, WTO stated the following: “World trade will continue to face strong headwinds in 2019 and 2020 after growing more slowly than expected in 2018 due to rising trade tensions and increased economic uncertainty. WTO economists expect merchandise trade volume growth to fall to 2.6% in 2019 down from 3.0% in 2018. Trade growth could then rebound to 3.0% in 2020; however, this is dependent on an easing of trade tensions “(WTO, 2019)[xv].The impact of trade tensions on growth is not only through the multiplier impact on income , but runs also through the impact of uncertainty on investment and in particular on FDI.
The trade tensions with China comes at a time when
China is facing a secular slow down in its income growth, which would affect
adversely its imports from other countries. As the supply of
underemployed labor dries up and Chinese workers age and require old people
services, the GDP growth should decline over the coming years, from the current
6.4 % to a lower pace in the range of 5 % per year. This slow down
would place downward multiplier pressures on the income of the exporters to
China.
The industrial countries have
been enormously helped by cheap Chinese imports in controlling inflation over
the last 25 years. A trade war with China, by raising the international
prices of imports, would promote inflation. Image Economy estimated that US
inflation will rise from the current levels of 2 % to 4.1 % in 2022 (Image,
2019)[xvi]. While trade represents 27% of the US` GDP and 37%
of China`s, it is much higher in Germany at 87%, in Mexico at 78% and in Canada
at 64%. The rest of Europe is in the same league (ibid,)[xvii]. Consequently, the adverse effects will be larger
on all the macro variables in China, Europe, Canada and Mexico.
President Trump has expressed his love
of tariffs on numerous occasions. He touted the billions of dollars they bring to
the US Treasury. He also has been using tariffs as a political weapon for purposes that have nothing to do with trade as he did with Turkey and plans to do with Mexico to stem Central American illegal asylum seekers. This weaponization of tariffs is a dangerous precedent and a threat to multilateral trade. Tariffs are taxes on consumers. Not only they raise
consumption bills but they also reduce consumer welfare by cutting down on the
variety of goods on offer. The Treasury gains will be offset by all kinds of subsidies and alleviation measures that politics might require. President Trump has gone around the agricultural states promising $ 16 billion of such alleviation.
In an article by Thomas Franck, he cites a new study by economists at the NY Fed, and the universities of Columbia and Princeton showing that by November 2018, Trump`s tariffs had reduced income at the rate of $1.4 billion per month. The study estimated the cost of the Trump tariffs to consumers was at $ 6.9 billion in 2018. Furthermore, the study says that the entire tariff increases were passed through to prices. According to the study, the figure cited above assumes that there will be revenue compensation as the President promised farmers. However, no action had been taken up to the time of the study`s publication. In the event, the true cost was $12.3 billion( Franck, 2019)[xviii]
In an article by Thomas Franck, he cites a new study by economists at the NY Fed, and the universities of Columbia and Princeton showing that by November 2018, Trump`s tariffs had reduced income at the rate of $1.4 billion per month. The study estimated the cost of the Trump tariffs to consumers was at $ 6.9 billion in 2018. Furthermore, the study says that the entire tariff increases were passed through to prices. According to the study, the figure cited above assumes that there will be revenue compensation as the President promised farmers. However, no action had been taken up to the time of the study`s publication. In the event, the true cost was $12.3 billion( Franck, 2019)[xviii]
Geneva , 29 May, 2019.
----------------------------------------
NOTES
I am grateful to Dr. Ayda Sakbani for her generous help in the statistical compilations and in organizing my presentation.
[i] Toni Schwartz
appeared on so many TV and media outlets detailing his ghost writing of Trump`s
book. This is confirmed by Wikipedia. No denial was voiced out by Mr. Trump or
his aids.
[ii] Michael Sakbani “b”, Trump The
President That Was Not To Be, in www.michaelsakbani.blogspot.com, November, 2016.
[iv] Edward F. Denison, Accounting for
United States Economic Growth 1929-1969. Washington D.C 1967; see also
Robert Solow, The Neo classical Trade Theory, 1978.
[v] Robert Solow, The Nobel
Prize Lecture, 8/12/1987. ; idem, “A Contribution to the Theory of
Growth”, 1, vol. 70,no.1,1965; see also Edward F. Denison, Op.Cit.
[viii] Martin Khor, ed. WTO, Wikipedia, consulted
on 24/4/2019. See also, China Import Quotas and Other Specific
Restrictions, in, www.intrepidsourcing.com
[ix] Michael Sakbani”a”, Free Trade in the Age of
Economic Discontent; Comparative Advantage Under Globalization, in www.michaelsakbani.blogspot.com, September, 2016.
[xi] Dani Rodrik & S. Mukand,The
Political Economy of Liberal Democracy , in economics for
inclusive prosperity, Harvard University, JFK school of government, 2019.
IDEM, Will China Rule The World, Business Standard,
1/12/2013
[xvi] Image, Op. Cit.2019