The Tale of ISIS and the Problematique of the Islamists
The Tale of ISIS; the Islamists`Problematique By
Dr. Michael Sakbani
Al Qayda in Afghanistan moves into Iraq
The origins of ISIS are indeed murky. As far as one can ascertain the origins hail from al Qayda in Afghanistan, which was created by the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with the help of Israel. A side of this can be seen in the semi documentary film Charlie Wilson`s war. After the fall of the Talibans in 2001, elements of the Jihadis in
Afghanistan ran away to both Iran and Pakistan. Some important leaders were
hosted by Iran; that is where we know now was Bin- Ladden`s family.
There have been voices among commentators accusing the USA of being the founder of ISIS. This confuses direct founding as an act with preparing the background that enables the emergence of movements like ISIS. The invasion of Iraq on trumped- up grounds resulted in erasing all its governmental institutions and tearing apart the Iraqi social tissue. The US introduced under Proconsul Paul Bremmer, a sectarian political system which excluded the previous regime millions of supporters and collaborators (the Baath eradication) and marginalized the Sunni Arabs. The ensuing sectarian Governments, especially under Nouri al Maliki drove Iraq into Civil War and created a whole strata of aggrieved citizens. This furnished an excellent soil for breeding potential recruits for extremest groups which thrive on exploiting vacuums created by discrimination and chaos.
There have been voices among commentators accusing the USA of being the founder of ISIS. This confuses direct founding as an act with preparing the background that enables the emergence of movements like ISIS. The invasion of Iraq on trumped- up grounds resulted in erasing all its governmental institutions and tearing apart the Iraqi social tissue. The US introduced under Proconsul Paul Bremmer, a sectarian political system which excluded the previous regime millions of supporters and collaborators (the Baath eradication) and marginalized the Sunni Arabs. The ensuing sectarian Governments, especially under Nouri al Maliki drove Iraq into Civil War and created a whole strata of aggrieved citizens. This furnished an excellent soil for breeding potential recruits for extremest groups which thrive on exploiting vacuums created by discrimination and chaos.
After the
US invasion of Iraq, Iran was interested for obvious reasons to plant controllable
resistance elements in Iraq to pressure the US occupiers and so was Syria. Syria had thousands of imprisoned fundamentalist Islamists and a large number of Saddam`s Republicauards officers. In 2005 it released so many of these fundamentalists and put placed Saddam`s officers to lead the resistance to the American invasion of Iraq. Thus, Jihadis started entering Iraq with outside help from Iran and Syria
throughout 2005 and 2006. Iranian and the Syrian Intelligence services lent arms and
organization to these al Qayeda remnants to use them against the US. In a short time, al
Qayda in Iraq became operational in 2005 under the name " Bands of the Righteous People" and that is when Abu Musaab al Zarkawi emerged
as its leader. Zarkawi and his outfit, which later became known as al Qayda in Iraq were a major challenge to the USA and they edged Iraq in 2006 towards a sectarian civil war .
General
David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq, succeeded in 2007-2008 in drafting the Arab
Sunni tribes to fight al Qaeda. This was done by putting many Arab Sunnis, especially
tribal chiefs, on US`payrolls and making some other promises regarding their
future in Iraq. The phenomena therein were known as al Sahawat. The Arab tribes
indeed, defeated al Qayda by 2008. The idea of General Petraeus was to
merge these forces after the defeat of al Qayda with the Iraqi security
forces. However, being Sunnis, the Iraqi sectarian Shitte politicians, led by Nuri al
Maliki, and naturally backed by Iran, did not want that. Even more, Maliki cut
off their salaries and put many of them in prison, leaving many of them as non- protected targets for al Qayda. The US was feeble in its objections to what
Maliki did and Petraeus, the father of the idea, was transferred back to the
US.
Radicalization in camp Bucca
An Islamist outfit as an objective ally of Assad.
Al Qayda v. ISIS: the Islamists`Problematique
The Iraqi prisons were notorious for
their ill treatment, and after the scandal of Abu- Gharib, the US decided to
establish a new prison for political detainees compatible with civilized
norms This was called camp Bucca. Camp Bucca was the place where the US put the
Iraqi prisoners transferred from Abugharib and other detainees imprisoned by
Maliki. The vast majority of the detainees were Arab Sunnis thrown into jail by
arbitrary arrests and sometimes without evidence of wrong doing. During a
couple of years, Sunni prisoners in the camp mingled with the imprisoned
remnants of al Qayda in Iraq and both got indoctrinated by the likes of Abubakre al
Baghdadi, who was authorized by the USA to teach religion to the camp
prisoners. Camp Bucca was in a sense a radicalization laboratory. Many of its
prisoners were gradually released and those that were not were involved in the
prison escape of 2012 during the post- US `s rule of Mr. Maliki.
In 2008-2011, Maliki`s sectarian
policies reached their peak. He had his own secret prisons where thousands were
imprisoned without legal warrants, hundreds were tortured and scores killed and
disappeared. This was in addition to overt discrimination in jobs,
opportunities and public services. The 30 % Arab Sunnis of the population began
to think of open rebellion against Baghdad. In 2012 huge demonstrations took
place in the six majority Arab Sunni provinces of Iraq. The Kurds, another 16.5
%, of whom 90% are Sunnis, plus the Sunni Turkomans (Another 3.5 %) boycotted
Baghdad. Maliki responded with brutal armed suppression and massive arrests of
men and women. Thus, when it arrived on the scene, ISIS found
receptive grounds for a militant Sunni action.
It should be recalled that the
remnants of Saddam`s Baath were present throughout Iraq, especially in the
Northern areas. Around Mosul, many of the cadre of officers of the old Iraqi
army were unemployed and living under constant security chase. Maliki`s
government inflicted abject discrimination upon the Sunni Arab population in
these areas, and, like in the rest of Iraq, provided no basic services. When
ISIS showed up the choice between it and Maliki was for all a Hobsian choice.
An Islamist outfit as an objective ally of Assad.
By 2012, after the eruption of the Syrian
revolution, Iran and its ally, Maliki, were eager to form fighting forces to
support Assad. And it took no genius to think of the remnants of al Qayda in
Iraq as candidates, Maliki further staged a prison escape of some 2500 Jihadis
from Camp Bucca in what was perhaps the biggest staged prison evasion in
history. In addition, the Syrian securities had thousands of imprisoned Jihadis
and several hundreds of Saddam`s Republican Guards ex officers who fled to and
were given refuge in Syria. The Syrian security forces, with Iraqi help, merged
all these disparate elements into a fighting force now called “the Islamic
State in al Sham”, ISIL. Assad had a genuine interest in implanting a terrorist
organization in the midst of the Syrian revolution. It would bolster his claims
that he was facing terrorists and not a Syrian revolution and would split
further his opposition and provides him with inside information. In fact, Assad
publicly acknowledged to the newspaper al Quds -al -Arabi, in June 2013, that
he has agents planted among the armed oppositions.
Armed and supported by the Syrian
intelligence, the new outfit started its activities by attacking the Syrian
opposition i.e., the Syrian Free Army`s liberated areas in northern Syria. For
a whole year, this pattern continued and there was not a single reported attack
on the regime`s units. In perfect symmetry, the regime did not once hit their
positions. In short order, this group, attacked and captured Raqqa and expanded
in North East Syria without any regime resistance. In 2013, it spilled into
Iraq. In their conquest, ISIL began to absorb in their ranks, more of the old
Iraqi army officers and many disgruntled other Jihadis from Islamists defunct
groups as well as disaffected Sunnis from everywhere in the world.
Saddam`s officers gave ISILa
professional military leadership and helped redefine their aims and tactics.
From an outfit fashioned by the intelligence services, ISIL morphed into an
Islamist independent fighting force capable of attracting thousands of Jihadis
from all over the world. Western intelligence estimated their number in
mid-2014 at 20,000 to 30,000. Thousands of them came through Turkey, which up
to 2014, looked the other way. The guilt in unleashing ISIL is shared by the
Gulf States, the US, Turkey and the Syrian regime. In 2014 the name changed to
ISIS, DAISH in Arabic.
Al Qayda v. ISIS: the Islamists`Problematique
ISIS ideology has the same Salafist-
Wahabi fundamentalist roots as does al Qayda. and both of these movements are ideologically related to the ideology of the Jihdists among the followers of Muslim Brothers. While the MB appeared in the 1990`s to accept democratic alteration, the movement in its present condition is far from cohesive and its organizational structure permits a wide spectrum of views including violent Jihadism. Both ISIS and al Qayda are essentially evolved products of MB. However ISIS differs from al Qayda in many respects. Al Qayda ideology is an austere Wahabi Islam not contaminated by
the historical and sociological developments of the different Muslim
communities. In its drastic historical simplicity it attempts to purge Islam of
all cultural and other influences subsequent to its first 40 years under the
four successors, Khalifs, of the Prophet. The Salafist understanding of Islam
is textual and literal and it takes selective elements of the text regardless
of the time and place they addressed. So, there is a dominance of the
"Madina" Soras even though they have often a specific and limited
relevance. On the intellectual side, the Salafist intellectual base took the political Islamist
thinking of the Pakistani Abualaa al Maududi, which rejects democracy and the
concept of a civil state and advocates a Shariia- based state. These thoughts of al Maudoudi were held at the time of struggle in British India to establish Pakistan. Later on after Pakistan was founded, he changed some of his old advocacies. Ironically, his Egyptian followers, Sayed Qutb and AR Yasin, advocated Maudoudi`s ideas in the Arab context where the societies were essentially Muslim societies The Islamists adopted the takfeeri ideas of the Qotb, who advocated
violence and disfranchising from Islam of anyone who has a different
interpretation than his and he further legalized their killing.
The Salafist
thinking suffers many epistemological flaws. In the first place, it mixes up
between the biographical virtues of the “righteous predecessors” and their
epoch. That the purity and sincerity of those early followers of Islam is
admirable, does not in any way furnish grounds to bestow the same admiration
upon their period. That period in human history was, of necessity, less
developed and less enlightened than our era. In the second place, what we know
about their period are tales whose veracity is suspect. The historians of that
epoch did not have under belt, the rigorous standards of historical
investigation that we have now. Thus, our knowledge of the historical example
set by the epoch is rather mythical and infused with imaginative details. Even
if we accept the proposed narrative, that era was troubled and flawed. Three of
the four righteous Khalifs were assassinated and the community of believers at
the time was not one with exulted history. In the third place, overlooking 1350
years of subsequent evolution in various countries and continents of Muslims is
ignoring sociological realities by which we must judge pragmatic phenomena.
There is no system of jurisprudence known to man, including that of the Islamic
Sharia, that does not take sociological realities as one of the sources of law.
Thus, the drastic purification of Islam from its attendant transformations, is
irrational and deficient in historic logic. In the fourth place, invoking this
restricted period as a historical example of success to emulate in our current
period is an exercise in pragmatic irrelevance; it is a fantasy to think that
we can recreate that epoch and re-establish its circumstances at present. To
give one example, re-establishing the “Khilafat” for 1.6 billion Muslims living
on five continents with different backgrounds, languages and cultures is a fantasy,
a fiction at best. Finally, all Islamists, including Salafists, morph religion,
which is a settled belief system, into the pragmatic conditions of the state which
are changing all the time. The economic, scientific, juridical and societal
realities are never a part of a belief system, they are dynamic changing
conditions. This stand of merging religion with the state, a hallmark of Islamists thought, appears in Islam under the Shiite doctorin of Willayatul Faqih, and in instances of political exigencies such as those that faced Ibin Taymieh at his time and Maudoudi in Britich India. Indeed there is nothing in the Quran or the time and deeds of the Prophet that calls for this merger. When the Prophet esablished his state in Madinah, he addressed two basic proclamations, one to Muslims and the other to non Muslims laying down the basic law of a joint, non discriminatory state. A state with equal citizenry and state neutrality in respect of religion, is the essence of moderate secularism.
In all countries where the Islamists governed, they showed that they have no programs and no expertise in governing. The records of Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Afghanistan, Tunisia and Sudan ate ample proofs on that.
Al Qayda`s international posture is anti-Western, in particular anti-US, on the belief that the West has been aggressing the Islamic World. It does not seek to convert the West, rather avoids its influence and aggression. Bin Ladin actually offered in January 2006 a truce if the West quits Muslim countries and stops its aggression. Al Qayda did not conquer territory and never faced the problems of running a society.
In all countries where the Islamists governed, they showed that they have no programs and no expertise in governing. The records of Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Afghanistan, Tunisia and Sudan ate ample proofs on that.
Al Qayda`s international posture is anti-Western, in particular anti-US, on the belief that the West has been aggressing the Islamic World. It does not seek to convert the West, rather avoids its influence and aggression. Bin Ladin actually offered in January 2006 a truce if the West quits Muslim countries and stops its aggression. Al Qayda did not conquer territory and never faced the problems of running a society.
ISIS, in contrast, is an
international project for establishing an Islamic World Order. It recognizes no
boundaries and does not respect any national separation, hence its latest name
IS, the Islamic State. ISIS` behavior, is more savage than that of al Qayda and
it has a more developed know-how of media and its use. It has also a
developed commercial sense of doing business through religion. The organization
uses Islam as a recruiting platform for those looking for a spiritual and
psychological refuge. In fact, so many of its practices like self martyrdom and spilling the blood of innocents, violate the basic
tenants of Islam, the recruits of ISIS are on the whole thinly educated and most do not even speak Arabic and hardly know much about Islam.
Many of the recruits are from West Europe,
some researchers put that at a majority of the total Europeans of 6000. The
profile of these recruits, according to intelligence sources are social marginal
with police records for various minor crimes. Some (e.g. the terrorists of Paris and
Brussels attacks) had been drug dealers and owners of bars selling liquor.
Unlike those from the Arab world, their known profiles show that they frequent
no mosques or other public institutions and drift at the margin of their
communities. In contrast, the Arab jihads in ISIS, are largely unemployed
victims of economic poverty and above all blocked futures. The officers and
leaders are overwhelmingly Iraqi with many drawn from the ranks of Saddam`s
army. Naturally, there are some exceptions to this norm in the presence of some
Europeans from non- deprived backgrounds who are revolted by the materialism of
their society and equally enraged by the brutality of the Assad regime. In
conclusion, ISIS is not populated by religious fundamentalists but also
alienated social marginals, and young Arabs for whom the future holds neither
economic nor personal prospects.
Unlike al Qayda, ISIS is not led from the top, it is decentralized enough to be considered more populist. Thus in its controlled territory, it has a decentralized structure. These differences are revealed by their operational modes. While the al Qayda`s affiliate in Syria, Jabhatul Nusra, is willing to fight under the umbrella of the SFA for the purpose of deposing the Syrian regime, ISIS brooks no such alliance and has an Agenda distinct from that of the Syrian revolution and is in complicity with the Syrian regeme. Moreover, Jabhatul Nusra is overwhelmingly composed of Syrians, whereas ISIS has a vast majority of non-Syrians.
Unlike al Qayda, ISIS is not led from the top, it is decentralized enough to be considered more populist. Thus in its controlled territory, it has a decentralized structure. These differences are revealed by their operational modes. While the al Qayda`s affiliate in Syria, Jabhatul Nusra, is willing to fight under the umbrella of the SFA for the purpose of deposing the Syrian regime, ISIS brooks no such alliance and has an Agenda distinct from that of the Syrian revolution and is in complicity with the Syrian regeme. Moreover, Jabhatul Nusra is overwhelmingly composed of Syrians, whereas ISIS has a vast majority of non-Syrians.
In a short period after it came
upon the scene, ISIS secured independent revenues from Gulf Donors,
from levies imposed on local populations and from selling oil after
capturing oil wells in Syria and later on in Iraq. Among its black market
customers was the Syrian regime itself as well as Turkish contractors operating
with partners in Iraqi Kurdistan and using the Turkish ports to export the oil
to third countries, among whom is Israel.
In June 2014, Mosul was attacked and the Iraqi army led by Malikis`political officers and largely manned by former Shiite militias ran away leaving their arms and supplies. Now, the ragtag elements had arms, money and larger numbers. With imparted discipline from Saddam`s officers, they started a rampage in northern Syria and Iraq displaying frightening and unprecedented savagery and killing hundreds of people from all groups, including Sunnis. They culminated this rampage by proclaiming Baghdadi as their Khalif.
In June 2014, Mosul was attacked and the Iraqi army led by Malikis`political officers and largely manned by former Shiite militias ran away leaving their arms and supplies. Now, the ragtag elements had arms, money and larger numbers. With imparted discipline from Saddam`s officers, they started a rampage in northern Syria and Iraq displaying frightening and unprecedented savagery and killing hundreds of people from all groups, including Sunnis. They culminated this rampage by proclaiming Baghdadi as their Khalif.
The cascade of events conferred on
ISIS new dynamics; it started to feel its own wings for flying independently
and developed its own agenda, which cut into both the Iranian and Assad`s
plans. When ISIS swept through the Kurdish lines and threatened the survival of
the Iraqi Kurdish region, Israel and the US woke up. They realized the
uncontrollable character of ISIS and took a measure of its barbarian savagery
and danger to their Kurdish allies.
As a new terrorist Islamist outfit,
ISIS was exploited by Assad to refurbish his credentials as a state force on
the ground opposing Islamists. Iran, the other initial sponsor, now felt that
these ragtag forces began to bite into its schemes in Iraq and acquired
independence in their action. Each of the initial God.-fathers, now offered
their services to combat ISIS: Iran to lubricate its nuclear negotiations and
Assad to refurbish his credentials.
The US quickly built up an
international coalition against ISIS, Many Arab countries as well as Turkey and
Iran joined up, even though they have different and contradictory agendas. General
John Allen was appointed Coordinator for this 61 -country alliance.
The muddled up US`coalition
The Coalition started to bomb ISIS in
Iraq and much later -on added Syria to the target list. After more than a year
of aerial bombardments, ISIS is still in occupation of 35 % of Syria and Iraq.
To be sure, its thrust into Iraqi Kurdistan was blunted, and it was stopped
north of Baghdad, but its hold on the Anbar province and the Mousil areas
continues. As to Syria,, with the notable exception of Kobani, ISIS has not
been rolled back in any way.
Several factors explain this
unsatisfactory situation. The first is the failure of Iraq to have a trained
and experienced armed forces capable of carrying the fight to ISIS. Mr. Maliki
replaced the old Iraqi army with a new one led by inexperienced officers and
manned largely by former Shiite militias, not a force that can produce results.
Furthermore, the mobilization ordered by the top Shiite cleric in Iraq of
thousands of Shiite Militias to fight alongside the army has brought into the
scene a sectarian and undisciplined force, which has since committed many
aggressions and exaction on the Sunni population whose cooperation is
indispensable for any success. Mr. Abadi, the new Prime Minister, has proven so
far to be a timid reformer still beholding to the sectarian power structure of
his Daawa party and the dominance therein of Mr. Maliki. Despite the full
support of the public and the Shiite leadership in Najaf, he has implemented
very few reforms. He has also shied away from effecting real conciliation with
the Sunnis and has steadfastly refused to arm them while giving reign to the
Shitte militias. He has however moved on reforming the Army and the security
forces with American help..
The US has depended on the
contribution of the Kurds in Iraq and, especially in Syria, to fight on the
ground. But the Iraqi Kurds seem to be only interested in guarding their areas
and liberating from ISIS the disputed territories they covet like Kirkuk and
not pursuing ISIS beyond that. In Syria, the PKKs affiliate, the “ Kurdish
Protection Forces”, headed by Salih Muslem, used US aerial backing to capture
and ethnically cleans Syrian territory in their chauvinistic quest to
consolidate an exclusive Kurdish area. The confusion ran also into other
coalition members, such as France, which under lobbying pressures of Christian
supporters, gave aid to the Kurds. France, according to the military commander
of the Syrian Kurds, has trained and equipped 450 Syrian Kurdish fighters.
Backing the Syrian Kurds, who are scattered geographically in small mixed areas,
introduces another complication in the Syrian scene and further strengthens
terrorist activities. This clearly raises legitimate security concerns for
Turkey in as much as the Syrian Kurds are an extension of the Turkish PKK and
their consolidation of territory is a further step in the PKK^s project of
independence. This further dissuades Turkey from giving emphasis to
fighting ISIS. Without Turkey, it is hard to see which sizable force will fight
on the ground.
In Syria, ISIS has behaved as an
objective ally of the regime; in close to two years, it has engaged the
revolutionary opposition and conquered areas from the Free Syrian Army only. A
flagrant demonstration of this objective alliance is ISIS’marche on Palmyra
over 400 km. of open land without any Syrian or Allied air force opposition.
Moreover, the regime has voluntarily handed over to both ISIS and the Syrian
Kurds many areas in the North East and the Center. Despite ISIS opposition to
the regime in principle, there seems to be a de facto alliances
between them against the other opposition. In the northern areas of Aleppo, the
minute, the opposition progressed against the regime, ISIS opened fronts
against the FSA.
The US strategy about ISIS seems to
be deeply flawed. The US makes a theoretical connection between fighting ISIS and the
broader aspects of the Syrian problem. However, for a year now, its policy
concentrates on fighting ISIS only and not on deposing the Syrian regime. On
the evidence, there is hardly any state except Iran and Russia, which agrees
with this single prong approach. The US also found out that no Syrians can be
lured into such one prong-approach. As President Holland of France, said in his
Press Conference of 7 September, 2015, “ISIS has filled a vacuum created by the
Syrian regime and recruited its fighters because of what the regime has done to
Syria”. Failing to see this connection is a serious strategic error. This is
becoming quite evident as the Syrian refugees pour into Europe. The Europeans
are beginning to see that the war in Syria- along with Libya- is the source of
the instability and the reason for the influx
of the refugees and that the effective way of solving this problem is to put an
end to the civil war in Syria. Indeed, press interviews with the refugees show
that two thirds are fleeing from the regime killing and destruction and the
rest from the terror of ISIS. This is a duality that juxtaposes two vectors:
the terror of the regime with that of ISIS leaving the moderate forces in
between. It would seem that the viable solution is to create or strengthen
these moderate forces which have no international agenda and who are willing to
accept a political settlement to create a civil pluralistic and democratic
Syria. It is only such a Syria that can defeat and eliminate ISIS. The Syrians
have suffered for so long from the two sided terror of Assad and ISIS and now
they suffer the muddle and indifference of the international community.
While the US fights ISIS in Syria and acknowledges Assad`s responsibility in its rise, it has not supported the FSA, which was the only moderate force fighting ISIS. This refusal to choose an ally, or barring that, to form an acceptable force in opposition to Assad, has been the hallmark of the US approach and it is perhaps one major reason why General John Allen resigned the coalition Coordinator- ship recently and Ambassador Robert Ford quit being responsible for the Syrian desk in the State Department. The US wants Assad out but has not found an acceptable alternative to him in its view and in the view of Israel.
While the US fights ISIS in Syria and acknowledges Assad`s responsibility in its rise, it has not supported the FSA, which was the only moderate force fighting ISIS. This refusal to choose an ally, or barring that, to form an acceptable force in opposition to Assad, has been the hallmark of the US approach and it is perhaps one major reason why General John Allen resigned the coalition Coordinator- ship recently and Ambassador Robert Ford quit being responsible for the Syrian desk in the State Department. The US wants Assad out but has not found an acceptable alternative to him in its view and in the view of Israel.
Turkey, supported by all the Gulf
countries, sees the Syrian regime as the facilitator to ISIS and thus argues
for targeting both with the same priority. Turkey`s long standing proposal to
build safe zones in Syria is, in our view, the most sensible devise to stop
ISIS, strengthen the moderate Syrian opposition, secure the lives of refugees
and reduce their burden on the hosts. The US objections which, ironically,
lines up with ISIS objections, seem to this writer unfathomable. A flagrant
example of the absence of a US strategy, is the training of its recruited
moderate opposition, one of the declared pillars of the US strategy. US vetting
of these volunteers included signing a pledge to fight only ISIS. After more
than a year and 500 millions of spent dollars, 54 graduated two months ago, and
when they entered Syria, al Nusra Front immediately captured and killed all but
four of them.
The Coalition poses other problems to
the Arab States and to Turkey. Its target is a terrorist Sunni organization,
which nobody condones and all are willing to fight. But totally missing from
the Alliance mission, are the Shiite militias, numbering dozens in Iraq in
addition to the biggest Shiite militia of all, the Lebanese Hizbulah,
which is fighting for Assad in Syria. Therefore, the question arises as to what
is the pay-off for the Sunni states, including Turkey, in fighting for the
Coalition; is not wiping out Sunni terrorists an advantage to Shiite terrorists
sponsored by Iran operating in the same zones? Is not it entirely sensible to
take aim at all the terrorists and their militias without distinction?
The US`dance of hesitation
The US`dance of hesitation
President Obama`s
opposition to US interventions after the disastrous US adventure in Iraq,
is like a personal post- trauma syndrome. It paralyzes the US policies and
explains the lack of strategy. But that is surely inappropriate for a world
power and irrelevant to the situation on hand in Syria. The US recognizes the
ISIS- Assad nexuses in theory, but refuses to act upon it. ISIS did not exist
three years ago and without the US invasion of Iraq it would have probably
never existed. The Assad regime and its savagery is the objective reason for
ISIS and the principal motive offered in its recruiting propaganda. The US
fully knows this objective connection but has followed policies of containing
ISIS and managing the Syrian conundrum rather than solving it. The US
repeatedly said, the Syrian problem can only be solved politically. But the
regime refuses any transition and still believes it can win militarily. This
refusal to negotiate was obvious in Geneva II to all and got more emboldened
after the Russian intervention. It is obvious that the US advocacy of a
political solution cannot be brought about unless the balance of forces on the
ground convinces the regime and its allies, Russia and Iran, as well as the opposition
that neither of them can win militarily. Russia and Iran have militarily and
financially supported Assad, while the US has supported the moderate opposition essentially in rhetoric. There is a need for balancing this unequal intervention for a
political solution to be possible.
This action suspension of the US is, in our
view, not a strategy fit for a world superpower with vital economic and
security interests in the region and a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council. It is an escape from action to sign over the problem to Russia
without having leverage on Mr. Putin whose aims in Syria of supporting the
Assad regime and thwarting the revolution are flat opposite of the US
objectives. To this author, President Obama`s Syrian policy, if any, is a big
puzzle.
Geneva, 10 /9/2015.