The Spring that Has Not Flowered; What Went Wrong withe the Arab Spring?

TTheh  By  Th                   

                                                     

   The Spring that Has Flowered; What went Wrong With the Arab Spring.

                  By

 Dr. Michael Sakbani*

Published  in the Journal “Contemporary Arab Affairs”

         Routledge-Oxford, Volume 8, issue 2, April2015,pp219-251.

It is now almost four years since the eruption of the Arab Spring in Tunisia. The promise of these monumental eruptions has only been partially realized in Tunisia because it was blessed with a wise and prudent political class who made the necessary compromises to avoid strife and polarization. Tunisia has just had its second election with the centrist party “Call of Tunisia” winning a relative majority. On November 22, 2014, it had the first direct election of a President in full calm and transparency. The road is now opened for a new era if Tunisia can restart its economy and handle its unemployment problem.

In Egypt, the Islamists (those who do not separate religion from politics) of the Muslim Brothers variety won the elections and took power. Then they proceeded to monopolize authority and forgot about their revolutionary comrades. President Morsi, the first freely elected Egyptian President in three thousand years had a disastrous year in office. He tried to place his decisions beyond judicial scrutiny, tried to write a constitution on a majority basis rather than on national consensus, failed to restart the economy and failed in providing security in the streets (Sakbani, 2012)^[i]. At the end of the year, he and his party lost the popular appeal and the majority of Egyptians, traded off the new democracy for the old authoritarianism by calling upon the men in khaki to save the situation. General A.F. Sisi the Minister of Defense, soon became the new symbol of order. Claiming to answer the call of the people, he launched a popular coup d’etat in which he deposed the elected President suppressed brutally his supporters and declared the M.B. a terrorist organization. He then ran for President and got himself elected by the usual landslide majority of the Arab Dictators. Thus, Egypt made a return military autocracy. 

In Syria, the revolution is now four years old. After killing hundreds of thousands of people, maiming hundreds of thousands and destroying large parts of the country, thereby causing hundreds of thousands of refugees, Mr. Assad through it all has refused any negotiations for a transition of power and claimed the revolution to be a matter of international terrorist attack. He also cooked up a new constitution, and parliamentary elections in the midst of the fighting and got himself re-elected for another term with the usual majority of Arab Dictators (Cited documentation)^[iv].

In Libya, the institutionally defunct state left by Kaddafi’s dictatorship flipped into internal chaos. The political Islamists lost the first elections but managed to sabotage the functioning of three successive short-lived governments. Public order and the economy are in chaos and disarray.  The absence of central military and security forces and the failure to disarm the militias have created a failed state situation in which various militias took control of various districts and engaged in inter fighting and pillaging the national resources.

Add to all that the disastrous situations in Iraq, and Sudan and the Arab Spring looks like a deep winter (Thomas Freidman; Lisa Anderson)^[v].

What went wrong?

The factors analyzed below do not apply with equal force in all countries. Consequently, an attempt is made to name for each factor the countries of relevance.

relevance.

I.                Poor administration and Lack of programs and experience

In all the countries of the Arab Spring, the long-surviving dictatorships emptied out the political life and wiped out institutions of participation in public affairs. Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq are examples in point. In Egypt, the military since Nasser, passing by Sadat and Mubarak has effectively smothered internal political participation. In Syria, fifty years of the Baath and the Assads, have sniffed out the political life. Saddam’s rule did the same thing in Iraq. In Libya, Kaddafi not only banned public political participation but went further into dismantling the state institutions. All of this means that the Arab countries touched by the uprising had hardly any institutions of civil society in a functioning state. This implies that only organized underground parties, like the Muslim Brothers, and the beneficiaries of the regime had institutional support in place.

The result of this state of affairs is that when the old regimes were toppled, neither the state institutions necessary for good governance nor the civil society institutions were there; Egypt might have been the only country with some state institutions. Furthermore, the revolutionaries were by in large unprepared to take over; the political class that claimed the mantle of the revolution in Egypt was both dysfunctional in public administration and unfamiliar with participatory politics. The young revolutionaries were disorganized and lacked organized popular bases. They lost all elections and popular consultations (Bessinger et al)^[i]. Egypt, therefore, was under the mercy of a counter-revolution by the deep state.

In Iraq, the political class was sectarian beholding to foreign supporters and had no reference to national interests. They spent the last years in delegitimizing each other and excluding whole segments of the society (Sakbani, 2014)^[ii].

 In Syria, there was no political class and the opposition was not up to the task and faced a very strong collectivist system willing to destroy the country in order to stay in power.

This state of affairs supports the claim of some commentators that the Arab Spring lacked the classical attributes of revolutions: it lacked political leadership, political programs and organized popular basis. And the uprisings erupted in countries with established beneficiaries of the old regimes in positions of military power (al Saidi)^[iii].

II.             The Attitudes of the political intellectual elites.

Dictatorships always suppress intellectual elites and neutralize their influence. In the Arab world, a considerable part of the elite became expatriates, on account of the brain drain to the West and emigration to the oil-rich countries. The elite that stayed in place was largely leftist and had historically allied itself with the national goals claimed by the dictatorships. An exception was the circle around the Centre of Arab Unity Studies which dealt with the uprising as an objective phenomenon of profound concern to the Arab World.

Two types of critiques were offered by the elites: a secularist one and a Marxist one. The Marxist critique revolves around the unchanged capitalist structure and ownership in relation to the welfare of the masses and the bourgeoisie nature of the advocated democracy. Samir Amin is the lead representative of this view^[iv]. This critique is dated for two reasons: the poor record of economic performance in the ex-Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and its paltry impact on the masses, and more fundamentally, the sheer contradiction of the econometric evidence garnered by growth theory to the Marxist analytic foundation (Samir Amin and Robert Solow)^[v]. 

The secularist critique is typified by Adonis, whose main point is the fear of political Islamists and the impact of religious thinking on modernization. This fear was shared by many others (Adonis, Moukaled)^[vi]. Adonis ‘secularist stand is a view which poses a dichotomous choice between the Islamists and the militant secularists. This is a stark choice contrary to liberal democracy and its pluralistic culture. In addition, many saw in the West supported uprisings attempts to undermine and dislodge nationalist goals. This is particularly the case in Syria, where the Assad dictatorship claimed nationalist aims and slogans for long years. The elite did not seem to have done an objective analysis of the nature of the popular demands nor a realistic evaluation of the false claims of the nationalist dictators and their dysfunctional prospects. Often, the elite did not know at first hand the fascist nature of the regimes. In addition, years of liberation struggles culled forth a knee jerk reaction towards the West and an outdated understanding of its policies. Not being of democratic traditions, they saw an Islamist bugaboo, which in their view, democracy cannot withstand.

The political and intellectual elites did not formulate a new Arab project that can focalize and guide the revolutionaries. In the span of less than a year, the Arab Spring became an opportunity for conflicting foreign and regional agendas. In the prevailing chaos, the revolutionaries had only rudimentary ideas and hardly any plans (G. Friedman)^[vii].

III.          The Islamists, the Soldiers, the Dissatisfied Societies; the Surrounding Noise

In the last two decades, the Arab World has been an exception to the global trend of liberalization and democratization. The secular military dictators and authoritarian traditional family Monarchs and Princes have both failed to transform their societies and develop their economies. Despite the evident prosperity of the Gulf monarchies, their economies are still rent economies with underdeveloped economic structures. In the Nationalist dictatorships, the economies have fared worse. There are massive population pressures, consequent unemployment, the slow transformation of societies and unjust social systems. And, the political development of governance was non- existent. On top of that, every one of these countries has had massive corruption (K. Haseeb, ed.)^[viii].

The autocrats and dictators eliminated oppositions. The only thing they could not do was to close down Islam and its mosques.  Thus, in the face of their comprehensive failure, Political Islam rose and presented itself as an alternative. But Political Islam is a phenomenon of faith and historical memory rather than one of concrete programs backed by experience. It appeals to a period of history, principally the first 35 years of Islam, which is irrelevant to our era. It also has in its folds regressive and non- modernizing contents: e.g. women rights, rejection of sociological liberalization, intolerance of diversity of beliefs, unacceptance of relativity in values and cultural pluralism and imposing on society a religious order enforced by the state.

The success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey buoyed the Arab political Islamists. But the Turkish Experience is fundamentally different. The Turkish Islamists built a new economic bourgeoisie and then proceeded to take power without imposing their views on the rest of Turkish society. Their outstanding economic performance lifted up the entire Turkish society and cemented democratically their power. By contrast, the Arab Islamists wanted to change the society from the top and brought with them the ideological baggage of Salafist thinking and an international quest for recreating the infeasible fantasy of the Khilafat without any economic success or a good record of public administration. Everywhere the Islamists took power, the results have been very poor. The Islamists' experience in Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Gaza and Iraq are all examples in point (Bessinger et al).

In the context of the Arab Spring, political Islamists rode on the populist uprisings and won favorable election results. But two types of Islamist contenders came into the scene, the extremists who wanted to change societies and take over governments without populist consent and without programs as well (various outfits in Libya, Ansarul Sharia in Tunisia, ISIS) and the MB variety who lacked experience and programs. The first group produced terrorist violence and the second group failed public administrations. Both combined in burdening the revolutions and costing the Arab Spring years of failure.

Unfortunately, the soldiers and elements of the old regime in Egypt as well as important segments of the civil society were not willing to await the ballot verdict on the failure of the Islamists. With large popular support willing to trade off Democracy for security and a functioning economy, the Egyptian military inversed the MB’s and established a military-dominated regime which has used repression and brutality in seizing power and started placing massive restrictions on demonstrations and free expression of political dissent. This is a true set -back to democratization.

The Egyptian army had ruled the country for 61 years, enjoying privileges and controlling close to 30 % of the Egyptian economy. Its officer leadership is beneficiaries with close ties to the rich Bourgeoisie beneficiaries under Presidents Mubarak and Sadat. Many army retirees are in charge of local and municipal administrations and economic institutions owned by the state. General al- Sisi and his fellow officers are authoritarians made of the same metal as were the old dictators. What happened in Egypt is thus a partial negation of the Egyptian Spring.

The political Islamists, the militaries and the old regimes’ beneficiaries exploited the Arab Spring and frustrated its promise. In Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Iraq, insecurity and economic non-performance have come to be the products of the populist uprisings and ordinary people saw no improvement in their lots. As documented above, poverty and unemployment increased. (UN)^[ix].

The popular masses in Egypt and Yemen and to a lesser extent in Syria and Libya looked for quick measures of social justice and improvements in their lots. But, these were beyond the capacities of the revolutionaries to deliver in the short run. There had been two decades of wrong economic policies in many countries, and their results were catastrophes that needed time to correct (Corm, Sakbani)^[x].

IV.           The retreat of the nationalist modern state

In Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, one saw before the Arab Spring a retreat of the modern civil state to one where sect, region, tribe, or party affiliation became the reference of allegiance and the payback benefits (Sakbani, 2009)^[xi]. Saddam fashioned a partisan state where tribal origin and family became the reference. After him, Maliki and the Shiite politicians used sectarianism as a state reference. In Syria, the Assads built an Alawite security apparatus and placed loyalists Alawites in the commanding positions of Army. Citizens were classified into descending order from the Assad family to the ordinary Sunni city dwellers. In Yemen, General Saleh used tribe and family as his point of reference and so did Kaddafi in Libya.

This abandonment of the modern national state made it near impossible to form a national allegiance to the principle of equal citizenry characteristic of the modern state. Thus, in Iraq, establishing a national compact among the Iraqi politicians to face the extremists and the economic and security problems became near unobtainable. In Syria, the beneficiaries’ class tied their survival to that of the regime and the Army took aim at its own citizens in defense of the regime and not the country. In Yemen and Libya, the army disintegrated in favor of tribal loyalties. All of that faced the Arab Spring with entrenched groups of beneficiaries whose interests are tied to the status quo and whose loyalties are tied to particular groups. These groups became structural impediments to change and transformation.

The weakening of the national state resulted in two major consequences: giving momentum to splintering tendencies and creating a power vacuum into which extremists moved and exploited the grievances of the disaffected segments of the society

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V.              The outside factors

The outside factors are the traditional Arab autocracies, the Arab League, Turkey, the West, Iran, Russia and Israel.

The traditional autocracies of the Gulf had ambivalence with respect of the Arab Spring. They certainly did not want to see democracy spreading out and taking roots in their neighborhood. But they realized that they couldn’t stop the popular momentum. Thus, they each chose to support some local clients among the revolutionaries whose aims are not incompatible with theirs in the intermediate-term. The Islamists, who joined the uprisings after they started, were good candidates.  Qatar placed its support behind the Muslim Brothers, Saudi Arabia and the rest supported a variety of Islamists Fronts. The countries of the Arab League were as usual divided and the institution could not provide effective mediation different and independent of the member states. But, it did provide an Arab peace plan for Syria, which could have produced a solution, but was rejected by the regime (Sakbani, 2013)^[xii]. Had the revolutions been well-organized and well-led and possessed specific programs, these interventions would have been far more coordinated and perhaps better directed. But in the ambient chaos, each outsider interfered and supported a certain faction of the revolutionaries. The result was to splinter the revolutionaries, and in Syria, to divided the opposition and rendered it an incoherent maze.

The traditional monarchies were, however, united in wanting to remove the Syrian and Libyan regimes whose policies were opposed to theirs. In the particular case of Syria, they perceived the regime to be an Iranian Trojan Horse. Nonetheless, these countries provided to the revolution some humanitarian and financial aid.

Turkey supported the revolution from the beginning. Turkey tried from the start to convince Assad to accept the legitimate demands of the early protests to no avail. Subsequently, Turkey moved into active backing of its own Islamist clients in Syria and the Sunni opposition in Iraq. It also backed elements of the moderate opposition in Syria and bore a great burden in humanitarian aid to the Syrian refugees. But Turkey could not go it alone in providing logistic support to the opposition. After the ISIS crisis, Turkey proposed establishing protected zones for the Syrian refugees and for implanting the Syrian opposition in the areas it helps liberating from ISIS.

Israel saw the Arab Spring as a destabilization of the status quo and a threat of unknown alternatives. Its policy was to advise the US to let the civil wars fester and wait on the developments. Where there were splintering movements, the Kurds, the separatists in Yemen and Sudan, Israel was an interested supporter of splintering. Israel's policy has been security-oriented and short term; it did not factor in the consequences of transforming its neighborhood.

The West led by the US with the usual absence of European policy, was as surprised by the Arab Spring as anyone. The US first wanted to safeguard the friendly dictators, then the policy changed to accepting the Islamists of the M.B. variety in Egypt and Tunisia. After the coup d’état, the US gradually came to accept General al Sisi. In other words, the US dealt with whoever was in power.

 In Libya, the West supported very effectively the revolution but withdrew the minute Kaddafi was overthrown, leaving Libya to face the chaos of the aftermath. In Syria, the West supported the Syrian revolution only in principle, but in the face of the divided and ineffective opposition, it withheld logistic concrete support and let the civil war rage for three and a half years without choosing whom to support (G.Freidman.)^[xiii]. This policy has in effect sent to Mr. Assad the signal that he is free to do what he wants without fear.  In effect, while Assad is himself undesirable, his regime seems to be the preferred alternative. Even after the rise of ISIS, the US is still without a clear-cut policy about Syria and does not see the causal connection between what the regime has done and ISIS.

 Russia and Iran however, threw their full support behind the Syrian Dictator. According to Hasan Hashemian of the Iranian Studies Institute, Iran extended $15.8 billion in grants to Assad during the Presidency of Ahmadinajad and $4 billion in loans so far during Rouhani’s presidency (Orient TV)^[xiv]. Iran sent its Revolutionary Guard and the Quds Brigade into Syria and unleashed its militia clients in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon, to defend Assad at his critical hours. The Iranian intervention in Syria and Iraq is not that of an Islamic revolution; it is, in reality, a sectarian intervention by the Iranian state to establish an advanced strategic basis through splitting the societies in these countries along vertical sectarian lines, thereby destroying their national tissue.

 Russia kept the arms supply line open to Assad and blocked any possible UN Security Council action. It is extraordinary that neither Russia nor Iran saw their long-run interests tied to the Syrian people rather than to the Assad regime.

What is striking in these different positions is that no outside party supported the moderate and secular parts of the opposition; these seem to be the non- favorite children of the revolution. The Free Syrian Army who was primarily composed of deserters and moderates was almost about to fold in 2013 on account of a lack of resources. In 2014, many of its elements went over to the various Islamic fronts and the FSA became unimportant on the ground.

 Only after the rise of ISIS, did the US realize that sitting on its hands was not a viable policy and decided to arm and train the FSA. However, no clear timeline is known for this scheme and, by the time the US gets into action, there might be no FSA to train. (Sakbani, 2014)^[xv].

These lop-sided stands prolonged the Syrian stalemate and wrought destruction and human tragedy upon the Syrian population. The passive outside world created the vacuum into which came the Salafist Jihadists. Had the Syrian revolution been resolved in 2012, there would have been no ISIS today.  

VI.           The cultural factors

History informs us that nations undergo good and bad cultural dynamics. This is true regardless of religion, time, or ethnicity. During the first five centuries of Islam, its pluralistic and liberal culture laid out interactive brilliant examples of excellence in science, mathematics, literature, philosophy, theology and architecture. There are very few examples in history that can be compared to the pluralistic creativity of Arab Spain from the 9^th to the 12^th century.

However, in the last 800 years, the Islamic culture, and more importantly, the cultural traditions in the Arab countries have generally gone into the bad dynamics of a literal interpretation of texts and conservative, homogeneous and unqualified beliefs (J. Berkey, 2003)^[xvi]. This is especially true in the Gulf States where the Wahhabi Salafist traditions are dominant. The oil Eldorado of these countries since the 1960’s attracted millions of emigrant workers who gradually bore the influence of their hosts. Accompanied by active private charities promoting Salafism and official state financing of Madrasas, this influence began to culturally pervade in countries outside the Gulf and provided the Islamists with a base of potential followers. A greatly contributing factor was the comprehensive failure of the secular Dictatorships in all the domains (Sakbani, 2011)^[xvii]

Political Islamist ideas and movements started in the 1970’s in many Arab countries to present themselves as alternatives to the failed regimes. This came to be called later on the “Islamic Awakening” However, the traditions and practices that came with this trend were in many instances representatives of sociologies not common outside the Gulf’s societies. Yet, many Arab societies witnessed a steady growth in Salafist thinking during the last twenty years. What is extraordinary is that the Islamic establishment, the so-called middle roaders, neither opposed the spread of Salafism nor disputed the foundations of its thought. And while the establishment sank in dissipated energy, many young local mosque leaders preached energetically extremist ideas and notions.

The history of the development of the West shows that cultural development follows economic and political development (Moukaled)^[xviii]. Malaysia and Turkey, China and South Korea furnish a similar pattern in our time. Neither of these obtained under the dictators and the traditional autocrats. This view has tempted some researchers to consider the historical time span between the enlightenment and our times as a sign-post for the Arab Spring fruition, and therefore to believe that the Arab World will be 200 years in gestation (Shalala)^[xix]. There is in that an assumption that progress has a linear path. The time that elapsed between the enlightenment and the maturing of democracy in the West was particular to the historical evolution of communication, the extent of popular education and the progress of science, technology and the economies. This is an accumulated stock we do not have to wait upon, and the Arab Spring can mount upon its shoulders.

In the Gulf States, the Salafist cultural traditions were transmitted to a whole generation through the educational systems in the Gulf countries. A couple of generations were educated on absolutist beliefs with little tolerance to spiritual relativity and without a critical examination of the cultural heritage. Among a minority of youngsters, extremist views and beliefs took hold. The great number of members of fundamentalist terrorist hailing from the Gulf countries is a by-product of this skewed education.

During the Afghan war, the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan of General Zia, created al Qaida and other fundamentalists groups and exploited the favor of these youngsters in the Jihad against the Soviet Union (Cited documentation)^[xx]. And so does ISIS in our days. The fundamentalist Salafist ideology by its very nature is against change, all its references are to predecessors whose thinking goes way back in Islamic history. In the context of our era, the Salafists traditions in its original birthplaces and in the rest of the Arab World became a hindrance to the transforming promise of the Arab Spring.

VII.        The Special Case of Syria

Syria represents a special case with its own dynamics and particularity. Contrary to what many commentators asserted, Syria is a society with historic mutual tolerance among its demographic components and 94 years of secular education. The identification with the national state is stronger in Syria than elsewhere in the Arab World. The Sunni majority in Syria constitutes 77 % of the population. If one adds the Arab Christians and other small Arab minorities, one arrives at about 89% of the population, certainly a large homogenous mass. This leaves 11% of Arab Alawites, who find themselves unwittingly objective allies of the regime and among whom there are plenty of its beneficiaries. The revolution broke the fear barrier among the population but created another fear: the fear of what will come after Assad. This is heightened by the prominence of Islamists in the ranks of the revolution in a country whose society is averse to intolerance. Unfortunately, the divided Syrian opposition has not succeeded in assuaging this fear through a unified coherent future project. Moreover, the political opposition outside Syria has failed to connect with the interior and establish itself anywhere in the liberated areas thereby showing itself in control.

The dominant Sunni bourgeoisie of Syria built after Independence a

Mr. Assad and his father created a web of interlocked interests between the regime and its beneficiaries so that they equate the survival of the regime with their own. To be sure, they are a minority, but one which controls key power levers. The most prominent among them are the Army and security forces which are led by, and sometimes entirely composed of Alawites. It was a miscalculation by the revolutionaries not to anticipate the resistance of these elements to the revolution. In retrospect, taking up arms, was a strategic miscalculation; the regime drew them into a game where it had the advantage.

Finally, the foreign intervention has had perverse effects on the revolution: the friends of Syria strengthened the Islamists and splintered the opposition, while Iran and Russia sustained the regime. And therein lies the tragedy: from their history and sociology, the majority of ordinary Syrians are not sympathetic to the regime, but they are equally non-sympathetic with an Islamist revolution with medieval ideas.

Concluding Synthesis

In 2011, this author wrote that the uprisings of the Arab Spring were in their scope and potential the most significant events since the collapse of Communism (K.E.Haseeb.)^[i]. This was not a leap of imagination, because it continues to be true that the Arab Spring was a definite break with the failed economic development and modernization of the societies under the Dictators. That all the above-analyzed factors have aborted current fruition, is a fact. But it remains true that given time, these uprisings will change the Arab World because there can be no return to the status quo ante (Hanafi)^[ii].

The uprisings threw out the Dictators in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya in a few months, raising unrealistic expectations and subsequent disappointments. There were also so many mistakes made by the inexperienced revolutionaries such as neglecting factoring in the stance of the Army in Syria and the web of interests of the beneficiaries and knowing how to connect with populist masses. 

In Egypt, General al Sisi claims to be the orderly continuation of the Arab Spring. Setting aside his power grab, he should be held to that by the Egyptian people and their activists. There is still hope that he can pull through since he has succeeded in re-establishing stability and some economic movement. His strength is the popular support, but that also is the check on him.

In Libya, the election of a new parliament which set up a new government in Tubrok, is beginning to make halting progress against the Islamist militias in Benghazi and the East, but a judicial intervention by the high court reinstated the old National Congress and thus created a rival Islamist-controlled authority in the west of Libya. With external help from Egypt, a new Libyan army is in the process of formation. There is now a promising UN-led effort to find a political compromise and spare Libya a failed state destination. The moderate majority in the Parliament will certainly be a break on the soldiers if they wanted to rule.  

In Syria, war fatigue afflicts all sides. Russia and Iran both realize that Assad cannot continue to rule and he and his collaborators are an acceptable price to pay for safeguarding their respective interests. Both countries are impelled to seek a political solution by the deterioration of their economies compounded in recent months, by the 35 to 45 percent decline in the international price of oil, which represents in both countries the bulk of their export earnings and government revenues. Recently, Iran has invited personalities from the Syrian opposition to talk about a political resolution (the Economist, September and October)^[iii]. On the other hand, James Traub writes in Foreign Policy that a devil bargain is being muted to arrange local ceasefires under the neutral, Geneva-based,  Humanitarian Dialogue Authority, which will accept that Assad remains in power till the war ends. Subsequently, a transition arrangement would be agreed to ease him out and introduce changes in the political structure^[iv]. The details are, so far, sketchy and cannot be examined with accuracy. Nevertheless, this is an attempt to stop the killings in Syria without achieving the aims of the Syrian revolution in one go. The plan fits in with Mr. de Mistura`s, the UN special envoy, local ceasefire propositions. It is doubtful that the plan would be muted without some interest by the US and the UN and perhaps Saudi Arabia. Some supporters of the regime are also behind this pragmatic plan. Will the moderate opposition accept this plan? I doubt they can have a unified position. More importantly, it is doubtful that the Jihadists in Syria accept such a plan which ultimately will isolate them. Nevertheless, these are all signs of desperation by the two sides. Syria needs now to stop the killing and destruction and then proceed to transition in a political compromise between all the factions, including the regime, the biggest armed militia, and then proceed to democratic transition.  

After ISIS, the US is beginning to see that strengthening the Syrian Free Army and the moderates under it, is needed for stopping ISIS` terror and forcing the regime to come to negotiations (NBC)^[v]. Mr. Obama is a reluctant leader avert to foreign interventions, but as long as he does not commit ground troops, he is willing to examine such strategies according to Secretary Kerry^[vi]. The role of Turkey and the Arab countries allied against ISIS is to keep the pressure on the US not to limit its engagement to Iraq and force it to deal simultaneously with the Syrian problem. Turkey has already made public its stand in this respect.^[vii] So did Saudi Arabia, France and other Europeans as they began to see the connection between Assad and ISIS^[viii].

 In Iraq, the new Government of National Unity that came to power after removing the sectarian Maliki, is beginning to make progress on salvaging Iraq from the sectarian “derive” and Iranian domination; The US has made policy of national inclusiveness a precondition for its help. But unless and until Mr. Abadi reforms the security forces and forges links with the Arab Sunni component, the outcome will not be certain.

If Egypt, Syria, Libya and Iraq in addition to Tunisia can find their way to freedom, democracy, economic development and modernization of their societies, half of the Arab World will have entered the positive dynamics of the Arab Spring. To be sure, many ifs are involved and other countries are still in flux, but some problems are finding a “denouement”: the end of the populist adventure with Islamists’ inept governance and the exposure of their limited experiences, the common realization that disbanding of militias in Iraq and Libya is essential, the common realization of the destructive impact of Sectarianism in Iraq and Syria and the necessity to rebuild the national states with national compacts based on the equal citizenry.

Let us hope the virtuous cycles are beginning.

Geneva (November 2014)

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                                                            Notes

^[i] Michael Sakbani, JCAA, Op.Cit.,

^[ii] Sami Hanafi,” the Arab Revolutions, the Emergence of a New Political Subjectivity”, in Haseeb,ed., the Arab Spring, Ch. 3

^[iii] The Economist, September 27, 2014, p.22; October 4, 2014, p.38.

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^[iv] James Traub,” Bashar al Assad and the Devil Bargain”, Foreign Policy, November, 14, 2014.

^[v] President Obama’s interview on NBC, Meet the Press,  on 7 September, 2014

^[vi] Secretary Kerry press conference on 9  October, 2014 reported by Agence France Press-

^[vii] President Holland of France declared on 9 October, 2014  that France supports the Turkish demand for a protective zone. He conveyed France’s position to President Receb Tayeb Erdogan the same day.

Prince Saud al Faisal the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, said that Asad is the main problem, see Aran News .com, 14 October 2014.

^[i] See M. Bessinger, Jamal Amaney and Kevin Mazur, Who Participated in the Arab Spring; the Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions, Princeton University Press, 2013.

^[ii]Michael Sakbani, ISIL, a Phenomenon Pre-told; Evaluation of President Obama’s Strategy, in www.michaelsakbani..blogspot.com, September 2014.

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^[iii] Abdullah al Saidi, “Three Years after the Arab Spring; the War between Hope and Despair Continues”, Global Observatory, 21 May, 2014.

^[iv] See Samir Amin,” 2011: an Arab Springtime, Monthly Review, June 2, 2011 and Samir Amin, “An Arab Springtime”, Op. Cit., October 1, 2011.

^[v] The leftist criticism of the Arab Spring as articulated by Samir Amin emphasizes the capitalist nature of the economy and the lack of program for transforming the economy into a socialist based organization. This is a dated view and lacks empirical support. Growth theory research shows three empirical findings: shares of capital and labour in all countries are quasi constant between 1920 and 1988, and they are within a band of 70% to 74% for labour and 30 to 26 % for capital; Productivity accounts for two thirds of the growth of GDP and is captured by both in the same ratio. This implies a homogeneous production function of degree one, which means that the marginal product multiplied by average real wage exhausts the total output. This evidence contradicts Marxist economic theory. See Robert Solow various publications on this.

  

^[vi] The fear of Islamists is evident in Adonis`s writing. He holds a secularist view in which there is no room for pluralistic culture; it is either the Islamists or the secularist militants. His call for cultural change is not forged within liberal democracy.

^[vii] George Friedman, “Re-examining the Arab Spring”, Geopolitical Weekly, August 15, 2011.

^[viii] see K. Haeeib,ed. The Arab Spring,  Ch.1, 3,  Routledge, New York, 2013., Also Michael Sakbani, “The Revolutions of the Arab Spring; are Democracy and Development at the Gate”, in Journal of Contemporary Arab Affairs, May 2011.

^[ix] UN.WFP, Op.cit.,

^[x] George Corm, “the Socio-Economic Factors behind the Arab Revolutions”, in Conference of the Circulo de Economia de Barcelona, 22June, 2011. See also Sakbani, 2011.

^[xi] UN.WEB, Op.Cit.  

^[xii] See Michael Sakbani, Fundamental Islamic Militancy: a Phenomenon of Religious Schism and Regime Failures. In www.michaelsakbani.blogspot.com, 2012

^[xiii]G. Freidman , Op.Cit.

^[xiv] Interview on Orient TV on 19/10/20114.

^[xv] Michael Sakbani, Op.Cit., 2014

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^[xvi]  See Michael Sakbani, Fundamental Islamic Militancy: a Phenomenon of Religious Schism and Regime Failures. In www.michaelsakbani.blogspot.com, 2012

^[xvii] Michael Sakbani, Islamic Militancy and the failure of reform and development, in www. Michaelsakbani. blogspot. Com, 2008.

.

^[xviii] Eli Shalala,” The Arab Spring; the Original Arab Revolution”, Al Jadid Magazine, vol.16, No. 21, 2014.

^[xix] M. A. Moukaled, “the Arab Spring is their Revolution Two Centuries after the Enlightenment”, Al Hayat, London, August 7, 2011.

^[xx]e Tragic Impass, in www.mivhaelsakbani.blogspot.com, ,2013

                                               

^[i] Michael Sakbani, the Problematique of Transition from the Arab Spring to Democracy: Issues and Problems,   www.michaelsakbani.blogspot.com, June, 2012.

^[ii]   A recent report published by the United Nations' World Food Programme .X on Sun, 2014-08-03 17:47.

^[iii] According to The UN, 191,369 people were killed in Syria from March 2011 till April 2014. If one extrapolates the monthly rate since April, the total is well in excess of 200,000. For details see Laura Smith Park,  CNN, august 2014.

^[iv] Michael Sakbani, Op. Cit.,

^[v] The editor of al Hayat newspaper, published in London, has argued that the Arab Spring was a failure. The same view is now held by Thomas Freidman of the New York Times. Freidman was an early supporter of the Arab Spring, but as of 2012, he changed his views and began to doubt the promise of the Arab Spring on account of the Islamists, the entrenched interests and the unpreparedness of the revolutionaries. Lisa Anderson takes a more nuanced view. See, Lisa Anderson,” Demystifying the Arab Spring”, Foreign Affairs, June 2011.

^[vi] See M. Bessinger, Jamal Amaney and Kevin Mazur, Who Participated in the Arab Spring; the Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions, Princeton University Press, 2013.

^[vii]Michael Sakbani, ISIL, a Phenomenon Pre-told; Evaluation of President Obama’s Strategy, in www.michaelsakbani..blogspot.com, September 2014.

^[viii] Abdullah al Saidi, “Three Years after the Arab Spring; the War between Hope and Despair Continues”, Global Observatory, 21 May, 2014.

^[ix] See Samir Amin,” 2011: an Arab Springtime, Monthly Review, June 2, 2011 and Samir Amin, “An Arab Springtime”, Op. Cit., October 1, 2011.

^[x] The leftist criticism of the Arab Spring as articulated by Samir Amin emphasizes the capitalist nature of the economy and the lack of program for transforming the economy into a socialist based organization. This is a dated view and lacks empirical support. Growth theory research shows three empirical findings: shares of capital and labour in all countries are quasi constant between 1920 and 1988, and they are within a band of 70% to 74% for labour and 30 to 26 % for capital; Productivity accounts for two thirds of the growth of GDP and is captured by both in the same ratio. This implies a homogeneous production function of degree one, which means that the marginal product multiplied by average real wage exhausts the total output. This evidence contradicts Marxist economic theory. See Robert Solow various publications on this.

  

^[xi] The fear of Islamists is evident in Adonis`s writing. He holds a secularist view in which there is no room for pluralistic culture; it is either the Islamists or the secularist militants. His call for cultural change is not forged within liberal democracy.

^[xii] George Friedman, “Re-examining the Arab Spring”, Geopolitical Weekly, August 15, 2011.

^[xiii] see K. Haeeib,ed. The Arab Spring,  Ch.1, 3,  Routledge, New York, 2013., Also Michael Sakbani, “The Revolutions of the Arab Spring; are Democracy and Development at the Gate”, in Journal of Contemporary Arab Affairs, May 2011.

^[xiv] UN.WFP, Op.cit.,

^[xv] George Corm, “the Socio-Economic Factors behind the Arab Revolutions”, in Conference of the Circulo de Economia de Barcelona, 22June, 2011. See also Sakbani, 2011.

^[xvi] UN.WEB, Op.Cit.  

^[xvii] See Michael Sakbani, Fundamental Islamic Militancy: a Phenomenon of Religious Schism and Regime Failures. In www.michaelsakbani.blogspot.com, 2012

^[xviii]G. Freidman , Op.Cit.

^[xix] Interview on Orient TV on 19/10/20114.

^[xx] Michael Sakbani, Op.Cit., 2014

.

^[xxi]  See Michael Sakbani, Fundamental Islamic Militancy: a Phenomenon of Religious Schism and Regime Failures. In www.michaelsakbani.blogspot.com, 2012

^[xxii] Michael Sakbani, Islamic Militancy and the failure of reform and development, in www. Michaelsakbani. blogspot. Com, 2008.

.

^[xxiii] Eli Shalala,” The Arab Spring; the Original Arab Revolution”, Al Jadid Magazine, vol.16, No. 21, 2014.

^[xxiv] M. A. Moukaled, “the Arab Spring is their Revolution Two Centuries after the Enlightenment”, Al Hayat, London, August 7, 2011.

^[xxv] Michael Sakbani, Syria: the Tragic Impass, in www.mivhaelsakbani.blogspot.com, ,2013

^[xxvi] Michael Sakbani, JCAA, Op.Cit.,

^[xxvii] Sami Hanafi,” the Arab Revolutions, the Emergence of a New Political Subjectivity”, in Haseeb,ed., the Arab Spring, Ch. 3

^[xxviii] The Economist, September 27, 2014, p.22; October 4, 2014, p.38.

.

^[xxix] James Traub,” Bashar al Assad and the Devil Bargain”, Foreign Policy, November 14, 2014.

^[xxx] President Obama’s interview on NBC, Meet the Press,  on 7 September, 2014

^[xxxi] Secretary Kerry press conference on 9  October 2014 reported by Agence France Press-

^[xxxii] President Holland of France declared on 9 October 2014  that France supports the Turkish demand for a protective zone. He conveyed France’s position to President Receb Tayeb Erdogan the same day.

Prince Saud al Faisal the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, said that Asad is the main problem, see Aran News .com, 14 October, 2014..