Debt, Growth, Austerity and the Rest of the Confusion In the USA and Europe
Thursday, December 08, 2011
Debt, Growth, Austerity and the
Rest of the Confusion in the USA and Europe.
By
Dr. Michael Sakbani
(the outline of a lecture given by Dr. Michael Sakbani at an International
Conference on debt on 12/11/2011 at Webster University,
Geneva, Switzerland)
Ladies and Gentlemen
I am going today to talk about the Confusion called the debt
crisis. In fact, it is the crisis of the political class in Europe and the USA. Debt is normal for individuals and countries. what is not normal is
to make it a way of living and ignore what will happen next or refuse to deal
with the crisis when it explodes. Let us give the picture first:
-
US Public
debt at the end of 2010 at $ 14.96 tri, US GDP was $ 15.02 trillion. Public debt to
GDP was 99.6%. Excluding due payments to Social Security and Public Pensions,
the privately held public debt is 68% of the GDP. Among the developed
industrial countries, only 9 countries have a debt GDP ratio higher than 100 %
(Rogoff/Reinhardt).
-
The net interest service of the debt is 9.5%
of the US. budget.
- Potential crowding-out; Is it real?
only if the country is closed is this a possibility. the example of the USA during the Reagan years, when the US borrowed from the rest of the world the equivalence of its budget deficit.
- Burden of the stock of the debt on future generations, The Sargent- Barrow equivalence hypothesis. this is a theoretical hypothesis about people anticipating higher taxation in the future, the consequence of which cutting their current outlays. There is no empirical proof of that. After the 2008 crisis, like most of the assumptions of the new macroeconomics, it proved unsupported.
- the structural problem for the budget, impact on discretionary policies (investments in tech., education, and infrastructure); only 19% of US expenditures are discretionary.
- the US dollar and US
borrowing ability. are unlimited as long as the rest of the world has no alternative international key currency and is willing to hold and accept dollars.
-
Dependence
on foreign funding. As the political developments in Greece and Italy have
shown, in a globalized setting, the financial markets can rob a heavily indebted
country of its economic sovereignty.
- The Pattern of use of global
international savings. Is it normal that the most advanced country is the biggest borrower of international savings?
Why did
the US get into a debt Problem?
- Reagan and Bush each added $ 4 trillion to the deficit. The former to finance military expansion and the latter to fight in Iraq and the war on terror.
- The weakness of the BOP of the US: Manufactures disappearance, Chemicals and restrictions on them, Energy, imports, high propensity to import for consumption, high propensity for foreign goods: eg. cars
-
The
structure of the US budget is such that there is very limited room for discretionary spending.
-
Inability
to deal with the problems at the political level. because of partisan politics in Washington.
- Deterioration of the US financial
position since 2001.: the start of the subprime mortgages accumulation, the globalization of financial markets has attracted to the US volatile financial inflows and has equally generated volatile outflows.
1. The structure of the Budget expenditure:
US Federal Budget in 2010 stood at $ 3.’5 trillion of which 25 % is spent on the military and on wars, 9 % on servicing the net interest of the public debt, 52% on various mandatory entitlements, 19 % discretionary.
- The total tax collection of the
three levels of Government is about 18.3 % of the GDP, much lower than any
other industrial developed country.
2. Reasons for the recent US financial deterioration since 2001:
- Revenue decline (28%)
- Increased defense expenditure(15%)
- Bush tax cut (13%)
- Increase in net interest payments (11%)
- Other tax cuts (8%)
- Obama’s stimulus (6%)
- War on terror (2%)
- Increases in medicare (2%)
- Other reasons (8%).
The breakdown shows that the US recession is responsible for 42 % of the deficit, while the structural elements account for the 58%
The US public is in virtual revolt against paying
more taxes as taxpayers do not see direct benefits to public Federal
expenditures. Yet, it wants social programs and military spending.
US press has not opened any public discussion of the pattern of public expenditure.
48% of Americans do not pay Federal income tax.
Since the Reagan era, US politician have fed this aversion to paying taxes
without ever pointing out the implications.
The US economy has not recovered fully from the
recession even after 4 years. the US is running 8.6 % unemployment on official statistics but more than 12% if one factor in the statistics part-timers,
and people who dropped out of the active labor force.
- Consumers demand, which has historically been 67%
of aggregate demand, is now only 60% of AD. -Today, the corporate sector in the
US has profits twice their size of 2007, but it produces 10% less in value
added to the GDP.
Conclusions:
-1.The US public indebtedness is for
the foreseeable future out of control unless major changes in the tax and
expenditure structures are made.
2. 2. The US has hardly any room to use
discretionary spending to steer its economy or undertake investments in infrastructure
in new technologies and in any social educational domains. This threatens
future growth.
3. The US economy is in recession for reasons that
have yet to be dealt with effectively.
4. 4. The debate on dealing with the
large deficits has had no strategic design; there is a wide consensus on cutting the budget
without factoring in the adverse impacts on economic growth. Indeed, growth is
more effective in reducing the growth of debt than mere austerity.
5. 5.Split on what to cut and what to
increase (rep. debate).
6. 6. There is a massive need for
investments in new technology, human resources, R &D and infrastructure if
the US wants to safeguard its leading economic position.
7. 7. Large segments of the public
harbor a deep sense of social injustice, as the top 1 percent of income earners
in the US have doubled their share in the GDP to 20 % in the last decade.
8. 8.US global firms have moved away
many jobs to garner global profits and these jobs have not been replaced by
more intensive skills jobs.
9. 9. the US cannot afford its entitlement
programs and its military spending.
Europe: EU and Eurozone.
The EU 27 members had in 2010 a collective
indebtedness of $ 12.9 trillion. Their Combined GDP stood at $16.3 trillion resulting in a
debt ratio of 80%.
The Euro monetary zone total GDP
stood in 2010 at $12,458 trillion, while their debt stood at little more than $
9.1 trillion, thereby resulting in a debt GDP ratio of 76 %.
Seven members are indebted at
more than this average ratio. If one eliminates France (81%) and Austria
(72.3%), Greece, Italy, Belgium, Ireland and Portugal had in 2010 debt-GDP
ratios between 142% and 93.0 %. For Greece and Italy, the ratio is certainly
higher in 2011.
Except for Germany, Sweden, the
Netherlands, Slovakia, Poland and Finland, other members are either in recessionary
conditions or anemic growth. The eurozone combined growth over the three
quarters of 2011 was only .2 %.
Europe’s social compact involves a great measure of
social solidarity. However, without significant increases in productivity or
human and other resources, Europe cannot afford such a social compact.
Europe has a severe demographic problem, which is
non-amendable to immigration solution in as much as its societies loath
multiculturalism and its various states have no immigration policies. As a
result, its pension systems are in stress and need significant reforms.
Almost all European countries are now adopting
restrictive macroeconomic policies. In view of their very large intra- trade
and connections, this stance leaves no room for trade-led growth.
The Euro was launched as a political project
without thinking carefully about its economic design. It is a monetary union
whose Central Bank does not have a bank of last resort function and is barred
from lending to its member states. The fiscal policies of the member states are
independent and in recent years nonconvergent. Although there are common
criteria, there are no mechanisms of enforcement. There is no Union authority
over sovereign fiscal decisions by member states. The Union has no sovereign
governmental authority to decide resource transfers when needed.
The Eurozone incorporated, knowingly and purely on
political grounds, states whose economies are inefficient and uncompetitive
(Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland) The internal balance of payments
deficit of the weak countries shows up in significant debt positions of their
respective national central banks vis a vis the ECB. In effect, the Eurozone is
not an optimal currency area, in as much as labor, capital, and public transfers
are, for a variety of sociological and other reasons, not completely mobile.
And, if resources and labor were perfectly mobile, members' public opinions
would not accept the national consequences of such mobility. If these deficits remain, there should be
income-employment and price-wage adjustments and deep structural reforms that
affect wages and the standards of living. Otherwise, the EMU risks becoming a
transfer union.
Greece
and Italy:
Both countries have recently been in financial
limelight. I will take up the problems of these countries bellow.
The Greek economy is uncompetitive; export labor
unit costs 44% more to import from Greece than from next-door Turkey.
The export sector is dominated by
tourism, thus, domestic prices rule most services.
Greece does not have outside
maritime transport, world-class big export firms.
The budget has been bloated for decades; it pays
very high salaries and pensions. Greek banks have weak capital positions and
deteriorating assets. The state must drastically cut its expenditure and
increase its taxes engendering in the process of severe deterioration in the
standards of living.
Eurozone recent package to help Greece is neither
sufficient nor well designed. The agreement has four pillars. It established a
European Financial Safety Facility ( Euro 440 billion with unexplained gearing
potential), approved a package of lending to Greece by the IMF, the European
Bank and Governments (Eur. 140 billion), forced specific austerity measure on
Greece’s budget instituted performance and monitoring clauses and restructured
Greek private debts, down to 50% of their book value.
After this hair cut, the Greek debt ratio will go down
from 160% to 120% of the GDP, the same as Italy. Interest yield on 10-year
Greek bonds has passed 7 %, some 511 basis point higher than the German
comparable yield. At 2.1 % inflation, the real interest rate is 4.9 %.
To pay this interest on the stock of the debt
without deterioration in living standards, Greece should grow at about 5.88 %
in real terms. Greece has averaged only 1.5 over 2001-2007 and is now expected
to shrink in 2012 by 6.0 %. Under the Euro- system cannot adjust its exchange
rate. Therefore, Greece cannot on objective grounds continue being in the
Eurozone without other buying its debts.
Italy,
the third-largest member in the
Eurozone has a debt GDP ratio of 120%. Italy must grow at 5.96 % per year to
keep its debt burden steady.
Italy has grown by 1.3 % in 2010 and is expected to
shrink by 2.2 % in 2012. It has shrunk by 1.3 in 2008 and 5.2 in 2009. The Italian economy is not competitive and its exports cannot be helped, as in the
past, by currency devaluations. It needs substantial income and price
adjustment and deep structural reforms.
The good thing is that the Italian state owns
significant and viable assets, which can be sold. Italy also does not run a
significant budget deficit; its 4% deficit is modest by European current
standards. Moreover, the majority of its public debt is domestically owned. Sr.
Berlusconi’s resignation will be helpful in the financial markets once the new government is installed.
Italy’s main problem, besides economic
mismanagement, has been the deterioration of its productivity. While Italy has
some world-class export firms, its small and medium-size firms dominate. This
is not helpful to increasing productivity and is a source of its large
underground economy.
Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Austria
are all in need of structural economic reforms. These include labor market
liberalization, privatization of some state assets, pension reforms, tax and
expenditure adjustments and a variety of other measures to improve
competitiveness within and without the Euro Zone. In some respects, even France
is in need of such reforms.
The Eurozone sovereign debt problems will feed into
a global banking crisis. Within the Eurozone, banks from France, Germany, Italy
and Spain have large Greek and Italian assets. This crisis will have two main
dimensions, deterioration of bank balance sheet assets, and capital inadequacy.
It will also result in erosion of the value of collaterals and mutual default
insurance contracts, as the value of these instruments fluctuates with the
cycle. Globalization of financial markets synchronizes this fluctuation
globally and renders banks everywhere simultaneously vulnerable.
Conclusions:
-1. The Euro
package for Greece arrived at in October needs to be revisited: There are five
ways in which the Eurozone may deal with its debt-deficits dual problems.
- First, allow the European Central Bank to
purchase bonds of member states, thereby printing money and in effect
distributing the burden of the severely indebted countries to the strong
economies.
- Second, keep lending to Greece and potentially to
Italy, Portugal and Spain on an unlimited basis, a recipe of symptom suppression
under the current Eurozone arrangement. Besides, the funds required are beyond
any feasible size of the projected EFSF at any workable gearing ratio. This
alternative renders the Union a transfer union, which surely would be voted
down by the Public.
Thirdly, force adjustment in the form of structural
reforms and austerity measures upon the weak economies and stimulate the strong
ones to act as locomotives. That creates a two-tier Eurozone at two speeds.
Fourthly, force adjustment and austerity only on
the weak deficit countries. In view of the rather restrictive policies of the
core countries, the price and income adjustments therein would take a very long
time; it took France close to ten years to adjust to 1981 payments problem
through automatic price and real income adjustment.
Fifthly, allow controlled default and possible exit
from the Eurozone. This can be done cooperatively and is perhaps easier than
carrying on with the Euro Zone faulty design.
The current crisis points to the imperative of
revising the Euro Treaty. Mrs. Merkel and President Sarkozy both brought up
this issue by the end of November. In the summit of late January, the Council
of Europe approved a draft treaty, in which 25 members indicated that they will
sign. The revision included: stronger fiscal integration and a modified common
monetary mandate for the ECB. It also created enforcement mechanisms for the
Euro three criteria (debt ratio, deficit ratio, BOP ratio). There is
furthermore a veto power in the hands of the Commission on budgetary decisions
by member states.
These all are long term measures.
For the short term: the ESF and its gearing; the
ECB (2 changes); the banks’ capital.
The taboo of
countries dropping out of the Euro is now broken. It is better in the long run
to have fewer but more cohesive and stronger Eurozone than the present limping
spectacle.
A
possible process of devolution:
Greece can revert to a new Drahma for all contracts
signed forthwith and for all government taxes and payments under Greek law,
thereby regaining its full monetary independence. Old accounts denominated in
Euros would continue on bank books. The exchange rate of the new Drahma to the
Euro would find its market rate at perhaps very low levels. Europe can help in
mitigating the impact on Greek debtors in Euro and the deterioration of banks’
asset values. Greece would also be helped in coping with its payments balance.
There would be undoubtedly significant inflation during the adjustment. But
this will be easier than staying within the Euro trying to service the
escalating cost of the debt.
A strong and healthy Euro is a common international
good for the International Monetary System; a viable Euro is needed as an alternative to the US dollar in the IMS.