ISIL, a Phenomenon Pre-told; Evaluation of President Obama’s Strategy
ISIL, a Phenomenon Pre-told; Evaluation of President
Obama’s Strategy
BY
Dr. Michael Sakbani*
The record of Mr. Maliki combined sectarian bias with incompetence in dealing with the security and economic sufferings of the Iraqi people in all the regions. In the last year and a half, Mr. Maliki at the behest of Iran, supported Bashar Assad in Syria and allowed Iran to supply him through Iraq with men and arms. He also gave financial aid to Assad.
In both countries, the national armies should have a monopoly of arms. The Iraqi Shiite militias, under whatever names, have been agents of sectarian crimes and foreign influence and should be disbanded. And so should be the Assad militias, known as Shbihas.
In the short run, while the indigenous military reorganization is taking place, Mr. Obama aims at assembling a multinational alliance to lend support to the military efforts. In addition to NATO members, the alliance will include local regional states like the Gulf States, Turkey, Jordan and perhaps Egypt to give it legitimacy and political cover.
Mr. Obama’s second phase seems to echo his Pakistan and Yemen Strategies of liquidating significant ISIL leaders. This means using Drone strikes with all their collateral damage. How long one might ask will this phase take? Eliminating ISIL as a military force and resettling the affected population requires expediency. It is questionable, at any rate, whether such a strategy can yield significant net positive results.
With respect to the third phase, there are five questions. The first is what should be the objective in Syria; only inflicting loses on ISIl or also eventually weakening Mr. Assad to coax him into meaningful negotiations in accordance with Geneva I. The second is: will the US support and protect local implantation of the Syrian opposition authorities in the recaptured areas? The third is the financing of the SFA manpower to recruit soldiers as professionals. Another order of questions concerns the 1.8 million refugees expelled from their homes in Iraq. These include Yazidis and Christians from the Nenawa plain and, more numerically, Sunni Arabs from several provinces. While the coalition faces the 20-30 thousand strong ISIL, what will happen to the refugees and where will their returning to their homes figure in the priorities of the campaign? Similar considerations apply to the Syrian refugees. Finally, what time framework are we talking about? If Mr. Obama drags training the SFA for years, there will be nobody to train.
*
The rise of the Islamic State in the Levant, hereinafter,
ISIL, is about the most predictable thing any observer of the developments in Syria
and Iraq could have contemplated[i].
In Syria, a sectarian regime foisted itself for half a
century on 75 % of the population through repression and police state willing
to commit any crime to keep its hold on power. When a spontaneous, initially peaceful
but ill-prepared revolution erupted in the early days of the Arab Spring, the
West listening to the advice of Israel, stood on the side-line. And as the the regime turned on the civilian population with every arm in its possession, deploying
even chemical weapons, and killing more than 200,000 in the last three and a
half years, the west led by the US stood there with no strategy and chose no
party to support (Washington Post)[ii].
Under the pretext of fear that arms might fall into the wrong hands, it denied
the moderate Syrian free Army the qualitative help that might tip the scales in
its favor. The horrendesness of the regime’s crimes did not convince Mr.
Obama and other Western and Arab leaders, that this popular uprising of the
majority deserves qualitative military backing (Washington Post)[iii].
Instead, they hid behind the paralysis of the UNSC, done by Mr. Putin, and let the
situation fester for years with hundreds of Syrians killed, gassed and
dispossessed every day. This tragedy took place with complete indifference by
the international community as if the wasted lives had no value. The Syrian
people were left to face alone their destruction and destitution. No wonder,
that many co-religionists around the world were revolted and some went to Syria to join the fight infused with fundamentalist
fury to fill up the vacuum of indifference.
For a full year, the policy of doing nothing allowed crucial time for the extremists to build up their force and organization in Syria, and hence, ISIL emerged. ISIL has neatly fitted into Bashar Assad’s strategy of turning the Syrian democratic uprising against his dictatorship into a claimed external terrorist intervention. No wonder that many rumors circulate about ISIL`s links to Syrian intelligence.
For a full year, the policy of doing nothing allowed crucial time for the extremists to build up their force and organization in Syria, and hence, ISIL emerged. ISIL has neatly fitted into Bashar Assad’s strategy of turning the Syrian democratic uprising against his dictatorship into a claimed external terrorist intervention. No wonder that many rumors circulate about ISIL`s links to Syrian intelligence.
The Syrian tragedy continued and stalemated in a sea of
blood and destruction. And, while the west witnessed that with benign neglect; the extremists gathering in Syria
from around the world were determined to fill the vacuum and take advantage of the tragedy. Their first step was to try to take over the
Syrian revolution by occupying the areas liberated by the opposition and
killing hundreds of armed opposition fighters and this has been the pattern up till now. After establishing themselves in
Syria, they entered into Iraq to halt the Shiite backed slaughter and increase
their writ. It became soon clear to the
moderate Syrian opposition that these groups were a burden on the revolution
and have their own different agendas. When the moderate opposition turned its
arms against ISiL in the midst of 2014, they were, in the words of Mr. Obama,
"outgunned and outmanned".
In Iraq, destroying the Iraqi state, dissolving its army and
security forces and installing a sectarian political process were prime
objectives of the US, Iran and Israel (Sakbani, 2007)[iv].
And in the faulty management of Iraq under Donald Rumsfeld and his proconsul
Paul Bremer, they fashioned the modalities to accomplish that.
The political process installed by the US in Iraq was based
on sectarian sharing. In three elections under all kinds of restrictions and
political exclusions, Iraq has had two sectarian Prime ministers from the same sectarian
“Daawa” party, Messrs Jaafari and Maliki. The first fell by his sheer incompetence,
while the second, Mr. Maliki installed in 2006 in a deal between the US and
Iran, was kept in power, against all advice, for eight years until he almost
brought down the Iraqi state. Maliki was bent on a policy of marginalizing the
30 % Arab Sunnis and exacting collective revenge upon them for the crimes
committed by the previous regime. He was an authoritarian product of the sectarian
divisions instituted by the US. In eight years of governing, he let 28 Shiite militias terrorize and
disposes the Arab Sunnis and built up an army and security forces officered,
in part, by Shiites trained by Iran and others with scant military background
or training. It was inevitable that this situation would be exploited by al
Qaida in the Arab Sunni areas. Indeed, in 2007, it became clear to the US that
only by mobilizing the Arab Sunni tribes can al Qaida be defeated. General Petraeus
did precisely that. But after defeating the extremists, Mr. Maliki refused to
fulfil the promise to integrate these forces into the security forces, cut
off their funding and put hundreds of them in jail. al Qayda thereafter picked their leaders one by one for assassination. When a year ago, the Arab Sunnis rose in a peaceful protest
against their mistreatment, Mr. Maliki turned his militias, and infiltrated
armed forces on them, killing hundreds and imprisoning thousands.
The record of Mr. Maliki combined sectarian bias with incompetence in dealing with the security and economic sufferings of the Iraqi people in all the regions. In the last year and a half, Mr. Maliki at the behest of Iran, supported Bashar Assad in Syria and allowed Iran to supply him through Iraq with men and arms. He also gave financial aid to Assad.
The combination of absent strategy by the West and, at best,
the ambivalence of the Gulf Arabs about the Arab Spring, has in effect parented
the ISIL. Now that it has shown its savage face and manifested its hostile regional
designs, the West, led by the US, still seems to have no comprehensive strategy
and so far, has made wrong choices in its tactical approach.
The prevailing stance in Iraq, which is the first phase of Mr. Obama’s strategy, consists of gathering sectarian Shiite militias, the sectarian and ineffective Iraqi army and the self -interested Kurdish Peshmerga, into an alliance for containing ISIL. These disparate elements have different agendas that will not serve the objective of making the Sunni Arabs peel away from ISIL. According to the Washington Post reports of Friday 5 September 2014, the minute the battle of taking back Emerli ended, these diverse elements fell back upon their contradictory agendas. The Shiite militias wanted to cement their dominance over the Sunni Arabs and in fact massacred and pillaged the liberated villages, the Iraqi army wanted to keep its infiltrated and incompetents command in charge and the Kurds wanted to conquer more territory to incorporate into their region. Giving arms and support to this coalition is an adventure in folly.
The prevailing stance in Iraq, which is the first phase of Mr. Obama’s strategy, consists of gathering sectarian Shiite militias, the sectarian and ineffective Iraqi army and the self -interested Kurdish Peshmerga, into an alliance for containing ISIL. These disparate elements have different agendas that will not serve the objective of making the Sunni Arabs peel away from ISIL. According to the Washington Post reports of Friday 5 September 2014, the minute the battle of taking back Emerli ended, these diverse elements fell back upon their contradictory agendas. The Shiite militias wanted to cement their dominance over the Sunni Arabs and in fact massacred and pillaged the liberated villages, the Iraqi army wanted to keep its infiltrated and incompetents command in charge and the Kurds wanted to conquer more territory to incorporate into their region. Giving arms and support to this coalition is an adventure in folly.
The US has insisted
that the formation of an inclusive Iraqi national government should come first after Maliki.
Mr. Haydar Abadi did form an incomplete but new government. The new Iraqi
government is, however, the product of the same sectarian political process of
Iraq and has familiar old faces, some of whom have eminent sectarian past. But Mr. Abadi
is also a member of the same sectarian Daawa party. It should be recalled that Mr.
Maliki was the head of a unity government that in reality excluded everybody
from actual power. To be sure, it will take some time to jump over the
prevailing sectarian parties to an Iraqi national compact with national Iraqi
political parties, i.e. a civil state with no religious preferences. It is this
objective plus meeting
the grievances of the Iraqi Sunnis that is the key to a successful strategy against ISIL Mr.Abadi must be placed under scrutiny to
see if his government headed and manned by the same politicians will indeed
behave as a non- sectarian Prime Minister for a civil state of equal citizenry. In
addition, the new Government has to carry out the daunting task of providing the
staggering economic and security needs of the entire population. The Iraqi population in all regions is beginning to take stock of the corrupt politicians in Iraq, It would not be surprising if we see a common protest against the sectarian and corrupt politicians in all of Iraq.
Iraq, as it is now led, cannot easily change itself.
Towards a New Strategy
of Confrontation:
Addressing the US population on 10/9/2014, Mr. Obama laid
out a broad strategy for facing the danger of ISII. Mr. Obama did not elaborate
in his 13-minute address the details of his strategy; he was concerned to
convince the American public of why it is in the US interest to intervene and
to assure them that there will be no boots on the ground in his strategy. He
did, however, invoke the broad outlines of forming an international coalition to
deal with ISIL. From the press interview he gave three days before the address on the NBC Meet the Press, one can discern a three-phase strategy (Meet the Press, NBC.)[v]: a
containment phase, a degradation phase and an elimination phase. The timeline
is in years and not defined. Crucially, the President indicated that he will
deal with ISIL in both Syria and Iraq, a sound view. It would be too premature
to evaluate Mr. Obama’s strategy; we simply do not know the details and cannot delve
into work-in-progress military plans. Nevertheless, one can bring out some
points of the critical bearing.
In both Syria and Iraq, the first task ought to be establishing
viable national states based on equal citizenry, endowed with pluralistic free
democratic institutions laid down in national compacts. Only such governments
can defeat ISIL and secure and stabilize the situation. This is not a Utopian
objective. Despite all that has happened in Iraq, the Sunni Arabs, the Kurds,
the smaller minorities and a large portion of Shiites, i.e. the majority of the
population, are non-sectarian and would subscribe to a democratic national
compact. The problem in Iraq is largely the result of the sectarian religious political
parties that have populated the political process after the US invasion.
Syria is much more
amenable to a national compact. Its Sunni majority (80 %) practices a tolerant Islam
and has lived under secular regimes and received secular education for 94 years. In all their denominations, the Syrians basic reference is national, not
sectarian.
This implies several tactical steps:
a. In both countries, the present political systems must be
revamped. This means in Iraq, the severing of the Iranian tutelage and the total
abandonment of sectarian politics, together with the dissolution of all
militias. It also means discarding discriminatory laws such as the uprooting of
the Baath and the often abused law on terror and clearing the administration of
agents of external interests. Mr. Abadi has yet to release the thousands of
Sunnis imprisoned by his predecessor and to negotiate with the Council of
Revolution of the Sunni tribes that rose a year ago against the sectarian
regime of Maliki. If after eleven years, the Iraqi politicians cannot turn the
page, and keep insisting on delegitimizing their opponents, then Iraq will
never settle into peace and stability.
b. In Syria, Mr. Assad and his collaborators must be removed
and a new fully empowered body would prepare transition to a new system in
accordance with Geneva I. This fully empowered authority would prepare
elections for a Constitutional Assembly which drafts a new constitution and
ushers the country into a new system based on equal political participation of
all, including regime supporters not involved in the crimes of the last three
and a half years. This will not be feasible right away and as Geneva II
meetings showed, is unacceptable to the regime. But any multinational strategy to
deal with ISIL cannot succeed if it ignored the Syrian uprising's demands for a
genuine change, for which the Syrian population has endured the terrible cost of hundreds of thousands of victims. If Assad and
his collaborators are allowed to stay, the principal motive for all the recruits
into ISIL will continue.
c. The territorial integrity of Iraq is crucial to more than
80 % of the Iraqi population and is a barrier against potential ethnic
cleansing and extended instability in a country with a mixed populations
everywhere. Moreover, Iraqi society has never experienced ethnic
animosities and has had a record of peaceful co-living and inter-marrying.
Thus, a liberal democratic federated state can give the Kurds a wide regional
autonomy which should satisfy their aspirations of running their own affairs.
To carry that into full independence will not work; Kurdish nationalism is a 19th
century idea which will face external and internal resistance and will not
serve the welfare of ordinary Kurds. A landlocked Kurdistan in Iraq stands to
lose more than it might gain and Kurdish opportunism and territorial overreach
would also be dangerous for Kurds in all the surrounding countries. This means
that arming the Peshmerga without the approval and control of the Iraqi
government is a direct threat to the territorial integrity of Iraq as the Kurds
claim territories where they are a minority. The US should, despite Israeli splintering policies, reach a clear
understanding with the Kurds that the price of arming them and helping them is
to stay within a democratic federal Iraq.
d. Iran is involved in both Syria and Iraq. If some
collaboration with Iran is possible, it should not include bargaining about
keeping Assad and his criminal collaborators in power. Iran’s role in inflaming
Sunni –Shiite strife, and its intervention through local agents, in the internal affairs of the Arab states is destabilizing and nifast to the social tissue. The confrontation between Iran`s Shiism and Saudi
fundamental Sunnism is at the root of the chaos in the area. Iran should be
shown that its expansionist strategies which aim at splitting the Arab societies vertically on sectarian lines will not work and will only gain it Arab hostility and further, it is harmful to its interests and welfare. A historical regional compromise with
Iran’s new leadership is not beyond reach if firmness and reason are combined
There are four
factions involved in the Syrian civil war: the regime and its militias, foreign
forces from Iran and its clients: Hizbullah of Lebanon the Iraqi Shiite
militias and other recruits sponsored by Iran, from central Asia, ISIL and the Syrian Free Army with its various components. A
successful strategy must train and supply the Syrian Free Army and equip it
with qualitative advanced arms. Several Arab countries, including Jordan and
Saudi Arabia, are ready to host that. If the US really means to change its stance on Syria, then, it is a chance to be used to give the SFA a sound structure, cohesion and unified command. Its recruits should be screened and paid salaries and not be loose volunteers. It should
be equipped with arms that can neutralize the air force and armored units of
the regime so that it can establish a foothold and an administration on Syrian
soil. Next, the regime must be placed under
military pressure to encourage defections and enable the Syrian Free Army to
take over areas recaptured from ISIL. If the US persists in giving priority to ISIL and leaves Assad in place, its strategy will yield no results. The Syrian population will not accept the regime that slaughtered them and destroyed their countries.
The second prong of the military strategy is the
reorganization of the Syrian and Iraqi armies on a professional basis. Both
armies have a pool of qualified professional cadres with genuine national
allegiances. These can be mobilized in a
short time.
The starting point in Syria is the revamping of the Syrian
Free Army and gathering into it all the deserted officers and recruiting into
it new paid elements. Assad’s army, or whatever is left of it, is at the top an
Alawite force, but unlike the Iraqi army, it is a competent one. Thus, officers not associated with Assad should be kept
In Iraq, Mr. Maliki has given the most commanding position to mostly unqualified
loyalists with scant military backgrounds. He retired most of the senior cadre of the old
Iraqi army. The bulk of these officers of the old army are not Baathists but are
non-loyalists to the sectarian regime. The new Iraqi Prime Minister
acknowledged that the Iraqi army and security forces have failed and should be
reorganized on a professional basis.
In both countries, the national armies should have a monopoly of arms. The Iraqi Shiite militias, under whatever names, have been agents of sectarian crimes and foreign influence and should be disbanded. And so should be the Assad militias, known as Shbihas.
In the short run, while the indigenous military reorganization is taking place, Mr. Obama aims at assembling a multinational alliance to lend support to the military efforts. In addition to NATO members, the alliance will include local regional states like the Gulf States, Turkey, Jordan and perhaps Egypt to give it legitimacy and political cover.
The Arab League has
muted forming a Pan Arab force in its meeting on 5- 6 September 2014. Mr.
Kerry, the US Secretary of State, held in Jidda on 11 of September 2014, a
meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Arab
Gulf states to discuss setting up a multinational coalition for facing ISIL. There
was an endorsement of the objective by all the participants, but Turkey did not
sign the concluding statement. In the same vein, France is calling for a
meeting in Paris on September 15 for all the Coalition members plus the
permanent members of the UN Security Council. The purpose
of the Paris meeting is to discuss the tasks and distribute the roles. According to US official
statements, some forty countries are willing to join the coalition. However,
it is unlikely that these countries will put on the ground the necessary boots
to do the job; the basic fighting will have to be done in phase one by the reorganized
Iraqi and Syrian Free Armies, the Peshmerga and the Arab Sunni tribes. The Arab Gulf- states will perhaps pay the bills and
provide logistic support. Crucially, they promised to help in drying up the
financial sources of ISIL.
Is there an Arab
Sunnis pay off?
The Arab Sunni tribes and former military officers from Sadam’s
time must be peeled off ISSL and pressed into the fight. However, the
experience of the tribes with Mr. Maliki, as discussed above, is a very
negative one. This time an ironclad arrangement must be made. This will certainly deprive ISSL of very
significant support.
There is a general question that is common to all Sunni
participation in this alliance: what is the payoff? Iraq after the US invasion
has become a killing field of Sunni Arabs and a state that uses its force and
laws against them. Mr. Maliki did not even behave as a part of the Arab
collective. Therefore, in what way is the new Government ushering in a new
order? ; we only have Mr. Abadi’s word on that. Mr. Obama should give this point cardinal
importance and condition his support upon holding this promise.
The question arises as to who will be the beneficiary of the Sunni
participation in eliminating the ISIL, a Sunni terrorist organization operating side by side with numerous Shiite militias, of equal terrorist bend? Obviously, it will be Iran if the Iraqi
government does not change its previous sectarian relationship to Iran. Indeed,
Iran‘s strategy is to help in Iraq defeating its challenger, the ISIL, and to
insist in Syria on rehabilitating the Assad regime by making it a partner in the fight. Absent, a clear cut and publically declared US strategy, Iran will sabotage any attempt to deal with Shiite militias. a precondition for meaningful Sunni participation. If Mr. Abadi returns to Iraq an Arab character to its policy, that would then create
its own dynamics at the expense of Iran and its militias. Iraq`s identity as an
Arab country has been buried under the chaos of current sectarianism and the
old despotism of Saddam Husain.
In the containment first phase, the above-mentioned forces
would stop the ISIl advance in Iraq and would role it back helped with US and allies
air power. The question arises what will happen if ISSL decides to melt into the
local population in big cities like Mosul. Specifically, how can military
operations avoid the civilians and collateral damages so that this war would
not look as another US war on Sunnis.
Mr. Obama’s second phase seems to echo his Pakistan and Yemen Strategies of liquidating significant ISIL leaders. This means using Drone strikes with all their collateral damage. How long one might ask will this phase take? Eliminating ISIL as a military force and resettling the affected population requires expediency. It is questionable, at any rate, whether such a strategy can yield significant net positive results.
With respect to the third phase, there are five questions. The first is what should be the objective in Syria; only inflicting loses on ISIl or also eventually weakening Mr. Assad to coax him into meaningful negotiations in accordance with Geneva I. The second is: will the US support and protect local implantation of the Syrian opposition authorities in the recaptured areas? The third is the financing of the SFA manpower to recruit soldiers as professionals. Another order of questions concerns the 1.8 million refugees expelled from their homes in Iraq. These include Yazidis and Christians from the Nenawa plain and, more numerically, Sunni Arabs from several provinces. While the coalition faces the 20-30 thousand strong ISIL, what will happen to the refugees and where will their returning to their homes figure in the priorities of the campaign? Similar considerations apply to the Syrian refugees. Finally, what time framework are we talking about? If Mr. Obama drags training the SFA for years, there will be nobody to train.
The international coalition led by the US, will not defeat
the phenomenon of Jihadi terrorists even after it defeats ISIL. As long as 27
million Arab Sunnis spread from West Iraq to Syria are not engaged in their own
governance and excluded from decisions affecting them, there will be a vacuum
into which will slip all kinds of terrorist groups. The key to solving this
problem is not allied airstrikes, Beshmarga fighters and Shiite militias, but
a social contract with disaffected Sunnis, especially in Syria, which makes
them feel they are citizens equal in treatment to all others. That is why the
promised democracy of the Arab Spring and by implication, the success of the
Syrian revolution should be the key strategic goal of the US, and its
compliant Arab partners.
Military means are surely not enough to solve the problems.
The Syrian and Iraqi populations need reestablishment of security and restarting
of their economies. Poverty and economic misery are the hotbeds of all evils
and the recruitment grounds for extremists[vi]. While
Iraq has all the financial resources for reconstruction and for building the
necessary service infrastructure, Syria needs massive financial help to rebuild
its destroyed infrastructure and restart its shattered economy. A multilateral Fund principally financed by
Arab states should be established to oversee this rebuilding effort.
Fortunately, both countries have qualified cadres capable of carrying out this
effort.
Iraq and Syria are major Middle East countries with a
combined educated population of close to 56 million. If they can find
democratic stability and economic prosperity, then the power relationships in the
whole area will shift. The Arab Spring will then bear its transforming promise
and the instability and chaos here and there would be a temporary and passing
phase. The tasks required ahead are not easy but they are doable in the
intermediate-term.
In the longer term, the reasons for the rise of ISIL must be
dealt with. ISIL is a phenomenon of religious schism and Governance failure
(Sakbani, 2011)[vii].
It recruits its support and manpower from two sources: the disaffected segments of the
population with economic, political and injustice grievances and from those, especially foreigners seeking a psychological or social refuge. Its followers,
mostly not well educated, are not interested in following real Islam, rather
using Islam as a justifying platform of action. The fundamentalists include a very large
number of youngsters from the Gulf States. A factor that might explain this zeal is
the constant mixing in these countries between the religious and political
discourses. Thus, deracinating jihadi fundamentalism requires dealing with the
ills which facilitate its growth. This includes winding down the Shiite- Sunni
clash, liberating the people from poverty, tyranny and absolutist views in
order to give them the hope that their future will be better than their past. A part of any program is the demonstration of the sterility of political Islamists and their failure everywhere they won power. The establishment of civil states, on the principle of equal- citizenry is a sine qua non for a sure future. There is an
obvious need to reform and liberalize the educational systems towards more open
and tolerant Islam and the exposure of the fantasy that the past is better than
the present common to all jurist (fiqh) thinking in Islam.
Geneva, 13/9/2014.
·
Professor
of Finance and Economics, Webster university, Geneva; former Director of the
divisions of economic cooperation, Poverty alleviation and Special Programs in
UNCTAD, Geneva; Senior advisor to the UN system, The EU and Swiss private
banks.
[i] The
Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, said a year ago that if the US does not act,
fundamentalists will fill the vacuum. Senators Macain and Graham went to
President Obama in September 2013 urging him to hit strategic targets in
Assad’s controlled area. Senator Macain said on hard talk, of BBC on
September10, 2014, that the president promised to do so and then changed his
mind 4 days later. Turkey, according to its foreign minister, warned the US
about the fundamentalist threat if Mr. Maliki continued his discriminatory
policies and if Mr, Assad continued in Syria.
[ii]
See the Washington Post,
“Train and Equip”, 12 September, 2014 on how the president and his security
advisers chose to support no party in the conflict.
[iv]M.
Sakbani,“, “the
Gensise of the US problems in Iraq”, in www.michaelsakbani,
plogspot.com, 2007.
[v] Interview
on meet the Press, NBC,
7 September, 2014.
[vi]
Michael Sakbani, “The revolution of the Arab Spring; are Democracy, Development
and Modernity at the Gates “, in Journal
of Contemporary Arab AffairsDevelopment,
volume 6, May 2011.
[vii] Michael
Sakbani, “ Islamic Fundamentalism as a
Phenomenon of Religious Schism and Governance
Failure of Modernization and Development.”,
in. michaelsakbani,www.michaelsakbani.blogspot.com,
2011.
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