the Genesis of the US Problems in Iraq: a Seven point exit Plan

By
Dr. Michael Sakbani*

The Early Mistakes
The U. S. intervention in Iraq would probably have not taken place without three interactive developments in US foreign policy and the US political establishment. The first of these factors is the new foreign policy doctrine adopted by the US in the wake of 9/11, which replaced the old doctrine of containment with the new one of preventive war[1]. The second is the arrival in the foreign policy establishment of the Neo-Conservatives, hereinafter, the Neo-Cons[2]. The third is the advocacy of the Iraq invasion by various influential and self- interested groups with close contacts to the new establishment figures[3].
 It is now revealed that invading Iraq was discussed in a meeting called by the President in Camp David only two days after 9/11 in which Iraq was placed on the antiterrorism list even though there was no proof about Iraqi involvement in 9/11[4] In the process leading to the war and right after arriving in Iraq, the US made several decisions, which in the light of subsequent events, turned out to have been largely erroneous. These decisions can be summarized as follows:
1. There was a fundamental misconception of what is the war in Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld decided to send a small army with much technology and firepower. It turned out to be essentially a guerilla war with little requisite technology but much requisite manpower.
2. The US excluded the UN, the Arab states, France, Russia, Germany and others from any role in Iraq. The UN role, which was described as “vital” by the US consisted, in reality, of some humanitarian aid workers and an office for the late Sergio Vieira di Mello.
3. The President decided to assign to the Pentagon the management of Iraq, in preference to any other US government agency or combination of agencies. However, the Pentagon, ever since Somalia, has been against the concept of nation-building and, thus, had an institutional resistance to planning for the aftermath of the war. This is why the US turned out to have no plans for Iraq after the war. General Wesley Clark, the former commander of NATO, describes in his book Waging Modern War his total surprise upon finding no prior planning in the Pentagon for the war aftermath [5]. As late as February 2003, a memo was circulating at the highest levels in the State Department warning of the dire consequences of the lack of preparation of the Central Command for the phase after the war§ [6].
4. Effectively, the US dissolved half of the Iraqi state: it dissolved the Iraqi army, fired the police and security forces, and dismissed school- teachers and the personnel of the Press and Information Ministry. In so doing, the Administration ensured that Iraq will have no state authority and no keeper of law and order. The Administration followed also the advice of exiled Shià sectarian politicians who wanted to essentially to replace the entire state apparatus controlled by the Arab Sunnis with one manned by Shiites. At any rate, if the people thrown out of jobs headed families of five, like the average Iraqi family, then, 3 million Iraqis were forced to live on the meager retirement income under conditions of hyperinflation.
5. At the advice of Iraqi opposition groups in exile, and against the expert views of old hands in and outside the government, the US dissolved the Baath party and banned its members from any public- sector jobs[7]. There were reportedly up to two million Iraqis enrolled in the Party. Naturally, most of those are political opportunists who wanted to get the bounties of the dictator’s one-party state; Under Saddam, being a party member gave one advantage in getting a job and advancing one’s career. Mr. Bremer, the American Viceroy, claims in his book that his decision was intended to cover only one percent of the membership, but that was abused by Iraqi politicians who applied it at large scale[8]. Again, it is difficult to understand, form the US angle, the logic of placing, at least, one million Iraqis and their five million family members under a special category of suspects. It should be recalled that the Baath before Saddam was the secular party of the Arab world having in its ranks a large number of modern secular Arabs. It would have been more sensible for the US to arrest the incriminated leadership and recuperate the rank and file, which happened to include a large portion of Iraq’s professional elite*.
6. Iraqi exiles, mostly Shià politicians, advised the US to depend on the Arab Shià majority of Iraq. The US not only listened to this advice, it even allowed into Iraq an Iranian trained and equipped force, largely led by Iranians with Iraqi connections, called the Badr Corps, to bolster these partisans. It turned out later, that this paramilitary force along with others brought in with the US forces, were instrumental in looting the Iraqi state, assassinating prominent Sunni ex-officers (38 pilots and a dozen generals) and more than a hundred and forty scientists and professors as well as tens of thousands of civilian Sunnis[9]. This decision created an armed street presence for the new sectarian politicians at the moment when law and order disappeared. It also laid the foundations of an extensive network of Iranian agents and operators, especially in Southern Iraq.

The Iraqi Mosaic
The Shià constitute anywhere from 45 to 55 percent of the population. There are no reliable statistics here because Saddam‘s regime held forth that it was non-sectarian and did not approve of such statistical classifications. Additionally, there is two percent of emigrant-Shià from Iran whose legal status is still in dispute. Nobody disputes the plurality of the Shià in Iraq, but it is rather implausible that they are in fact a majority on the order of 60-65 percent as frequently reported in the Western media. A reasonable guess estimate would be 51 percent of the total[10].
Not all the Shià are Arab; some 4 percent of the population is Shià Kurds (Feylanis) and even some Turkmans are Shià. The Shià are far from being politically monolithic and have a variety of allegiances. For example, the majority of the members of the former Communist and Baath parties of Iraq were Shià. The ethnicity of the Arab Shià is of utmost importance, and it is simple-minded to think that they are the same as Iranian Shià. It is common knowledge that the Iraqi society is not sectarian; intermarriage among Sunnis and Shià is widespread, and the common Arab identification and social fraternity of the two Arab groups are strong and have withstood the trauma of Saddam‘s war with Iran. Thus, by favoring the Shià, the US introduced sectarian distinctions into its approach and ushered sectarianism into the Iraqi body politics.
While the idea of according the Shià their due share is eminently sensible, it is nevertheless, a minefield for both the US and Iraq. As long as the US has troubled relationships with Iran, given the close links between the Shià religious leaderships in the two countries, the sectarian approach risks promoting an Iranian -style regime in Iraq or, at least, one closely allied with it. Furthermore, promoting sectarian politics in the wake of Saddam‘s record of prosecution of the Shià leadership will likely produce vengeful majority tyranny and communal strife. Although the Shià are not monolithic, many of them hold allegiance to their traditional religious leaders, the Marjiiya, which, has the institutional authority and is financially well endowed. Thus, there is a real risk of politicizing the Shià hierarchy, thereby complicating the Iraqi national compact and the US dealings with Iran.
The other big Iraqi group is the Sunnis. The Sunnis are Arabs, Kurds and Turkmans[11]. As a total, one is talking about a figure around 46 percent of the population. A recent UN workshop organized by ESCWA, attended by varied Iraqi demographic scholars, put the Sunnis total at 53 percent of the population (Islam onLine, fn.7). That is rather doubtful according to this paper research. A reasonable guess-estimate would be 46 percent. Regardless of the true figures, the ethnic identification among the Sunnis is perhaps more important than the sectarian one. This is certainly true of the Kurds. Within this group, the largest are the Sunni Arabs. They account for anywhere between 22 and 30 percent of the total population. Perhaps, a reasonable guess-estimate is 26 percent. There are some 4 percent Iraqi Turkmans whose vast majority is Sunni and four-quarters of Iraq’s 16 to 17 percent Kurds, are also Sunnis. All in all, the Iraqi population can be said to have, as far as we know, a small Shià majority. At any rate, the central facts that emerge are that more than 79 percent of the population is ethnic Arabs and about 97 percent are Muslims.
The Arab Sunnis have been very well represented in all the previous Iraqi regimes, and have had a disproportionate share in both government and business. CIA sources claim that 55 percent of government officials during Saddam‘s regime were Sunni Arabs, but only 33 percent Shià Arabs. If this were true, it is incongruous that of the top 50 officials of Saddam`s regime wanted by the US, two-thirds were Shiàs. Expectedly, Sunnis constitute a major part of the Iraqi middle class. But because of this historical dominance, which continued during the Saddam regime, and equally, because of the entrenchment of Arab nationalist thinking among them, the US decided to treat them as suspects and not to open up bridges to them. Saddam, however, was an equal opportunity oppressor; he did not spare Sunnis, including members of his own family, his rapacious repression. Instead of recuperating this vital stratum, the US pushed the Sunnis aside and accorded them 5 out of the 25 seats on the Governing Council.
The exclusion of the Sunni Arab population was justified to the US by its Israeli connection, as a strategic move to split Iraq from the rest of the overwhelmingly Sunni Arab World. In view of the absence of peace with its neighbors, Israel has always had a strategic interest in splintering its neighbors. It is plausible also that some exiles, had personal political or material interests in a new Iraq free of Sunni power. The new Iraq was bound to change to a more democratic structure of power, but the way the US and its sectarian allies have done it amounts to Sunni exclusion.
The last group is the Kurds. They are probably about 17 percent of the population. The northern Kurds are US‘friends. However, they have their own agenda of independence. The majority of Iraqis across the board oppose Kurdish independence, and so do all the neighboring states. The Kurdish politicians say now that they want autonomy within a democratic Iraq. One would hope that this is truly the case and that they have learned from their experience and read correctly the regional political circumstances. However, Kurdish ambitions, as a matter of historic record, have surely been more than autonomy. If the US, as their friend, sponsors their unrestricted national aspirations, it will be a disaster for Iraq, for the Kurds as well as for US prospects there; in view of the exaggerated land claims of the Kurds, no Iraqi government will ever tolerate ceding to the Kurds all the lands they claim. The national aspirations of the northern Kurds got them into trouble with Saddam during the Iraq- Iran war when they allied themselves with Iran in the hope of getting independence after its victory. And that was not the first time the Kurds made such a tragic error; their former tribal chief, Mulla Mustafa al Barazani, made an alliance with the Soviet Union and was expelled from Iraq for twelve years. After he came back to Iraq, he started again an armed revolt and this time aligned himself with the Shah of Iran and Israel. Saddam brutally repressed the Kurds and used against them all his panoply of repression from gassing to killing to massive deportations. No other group suffered as much collective punishment. Nonetheless, observers of the Iraqi scene have always remarked the absence of malice in Arab- Kurdish relations at the level of the populace. A striking phenomenon is that some very important tribes in North Iraq are half Arab and half Kurds. Against this demographic and ethnic mosaic, it would be unwise for the US to stoke the ethnic fires in Iraq.

The US Economic RealitiesUp until early September 2003, the cost of the military in Iraq was, according to the Pentagon, $49 billion[12]. The other costs were for the oil industry and reconstruction, at $15 billion and $10 billion respectively. In September 2003, the President asked and got eighty -seven more billion, thereby bringing the total to $ 146 billion. Additional appropriations were authorized in 2004 and 2005 bringing the total by September 30, 2005, to $ 204.6. Extrapolating this figure till the end of 2005 would bring it up to $ 225 billion. Almost the same figures are given by the National Priorities Project, which places the cost of the war at $197 billion on 6 September 2005 [13]. In September 2005, the 8 -month cost of the war per US family reached $1731. In 2006, the President is asking for $98 billion more. All of this is charged to a budget that was, according to the Congressional Budget Office, in a deficit of $412 billion in 2004, and is estimated to be in $331 billion deficit in 2005 [14].
Economics informs us that the sum of the current account and the difference between domestic investments and savings must eventually add up to the difference between government spending and taxes plus the current account, such that the grand sum of the three converges to zero. According to The Economist consensus forecast, the current account was in deficit of $ 510 billion in 2004, i.e. 5.2 percent of the GDP. In 2005, it is to reach $ 749 billion according to The Economist’s poll of forecasters. At 6.7 of the GDP, that is by far higher than any in the industrial countries[15]. This means that the US has to borrow from abroad to finance these deficits, generate more internal savings, attract more FDI and/or increase tax receipts. Increasing tax receipts goes counter to the political agenda of the President and his congressional supporters. With the current prospects of the dollar and the inability of the US to generate net exports, amassing some $ 1 trillion to finance the twin deficits, will require heroic assumptions and a very steep rise in interest rates, i.e., a tight monetary policy[16]. The ability of any country to change its competitive position or its trade structure or its habits of savings is present only in the long run. It is common knowledge that the US dollar has been supported in the last two years by purchases by the Asian countries running into several hundred billion. This cannot continue indefinitely. As to monetary policy, the Fed is likely to change the stance of the monetary policy and stop interest hikes once the Federal Fund rate reaches 4.5 %, which is just half a point away from where we are. Any further tightening of monetary policy is likely to be ill-advised from a macroeconomic point of view.
The Federal budget deficit takes place against a backdrop of severe budgetary crises in the finance of almost all the states of the Union. . It should be added that the size of the US defense budget in peacetime already exceeds the combined total of the next thirteen largest countries in the world. The American public sooner or later will have to debate this skewed budget posture in view of the glaring neglect of national infrastructure as shown in New Orleans and the secular decline in spending on education. Such is the state of the economy and the country that Iraq is a burden on every American.
The Administration never provided the public or the Congress a precise cost of the war. In his testimony before Congress in June 2003, Paul Wolfowitz said that only $10 billion are needed to start reconstruction. Thereafter, he said, Iraqi oil revenues will start paying. Today, Iraq exports less than what Saddam exported before the war despite the embargo. With this situation, it is high time to start thinking seriously about whether the US can afford to continue footing the bills of the war. A country in severe public finance deficit at all levels of government, large foreign and domestic indebtedness and, as New Orleans showed, massive poverty, simply cannot afford such expenditure. The average American has been shielded from feeling the tax pinch by the Administration's loose fiscal discipline. But loose fiscal discipline has negative long-run economic consequences on growth, employment and the balance of payments. There is, however, a minority view among economists that disputes this deficit alarm[17].
The War Accomplishments and aftermath
The Administration waged this war for three purposes: 1.to rid Iraq of the weapons of mass -destruction; 2.to defeat terror and cut the Iraqi terror connection and 3; to liberate the Iraqis and transform their country into a peaceful and prosperous democracy. Many also said that peace in the Middle East passes through Baghdad, to use Henry Kissinger‘s term.
After two years and nine months, no weapons of mass destruction have been found, Saddam`s connection to international terror proved false and there is still no functional democratic governance in Iraq; there is almost a civil war. The war on terror is now full-blown in Iraq, which was clear of Jihadis before the invasion. The President and the US-sponsored government of Iraq are now saying that Iraq is the forefront of the war on international terror[18], an irony apparently totally lost on both of them. The only positive accomplishment is the toppling of Saddam and his regime.
The economic situation in Iraq is catastrophic. In addition to the vast devastation of the war and the large -scale security operations such as those in Falluja, Tel Afar, al Kayem and Samurra, which leveled large parts of these cities, the economy is literally paralyzed by the prevailing and pervasive insecurity in all except the Kurdish region. Hardly any reconstruction is underway and donors pledges have not been translated into received funds, due to both the security situation and the rampant corruption. There are no reliable statistics on the unemployment situation, but the Coalition Provisional Authority put it at 25 to 30 percent in 2004. It should now be much worse in view of the deteriorating security and the devastation wrought upon several areas by the security operations. A University of Baghdad study quoted on Aljazeera net-site put the figure at 70 percent of the working-age population. However, unemployment is not calculated against the working-age total, rather against the fraction thereof that participates in the labor force. A conservative estimation was given in a report jointly authored by the Iraqi Ministry of Planning in cooperation with the UNDP published on May 12, 2005, which puts unemployment at 18.4 percent of those seeking work[19]. However, the number of job seekers under the present situation in Iraq is considerably less than those wanting to work. Interviews with job seekers in Baghdad consistently report that, because of the security situation, job seekers cannot go out to search for work half the time. So, it would be reasonable to multiply the above estimate by two, thereby bringing it to 37 percent. Yet, there is little doubt that under the standard statistical methodology of unemployment, considering the percentage in the labor-force of participants from the devastated areas whose jobs have disappeared, it can be shown that there would be more than 45 percent unemployment. As for the GDP, the end of 2005 issue of Newsweek provides a GDP estimate of $20.5 for pre-war as opposed to $29.3 in 2005. This means a growth of nominal GDP of 50 % in two years. Given the inflation growth of 20 % in 2005 and at 28 % in 2004, i.e. midpoint between 2003 and2005, the figures imply an approximate real growth of GDP at no more than 1 % in each of the two years, 2004 and 2005[20]. And this is mainly due to the infusion of some $12.1 billion of disbursed aid by the US. Obviously, the GDP pace is the combined effect of the shortfall in oil revenues and the lack of investment. Aside from this rank joblessness and near-stagnation of growth, Iraq has sustained in this war more than 150 thousand casualties, of which about 40 thousand killed.
On the security front, the US is losing an average of 54 soldiers a month in the last quarter of 2005, up from 34 in 2003. By the end of September 2005, it had lost 1334 soldiers since the end of hostilities. On October 28, the total loss of the coalition since the war stated was 2200, of which 2001 killed US soldiers. By mid-2006, there will be about 2400 US dead soldiers. The number of injured is less precise, but it is put at more than 15300 injured[21]. Naturally, this total does not include killed American civilians working for the US and for private companies as well as civilians holding other nationalities. This low-intensity guerrilla warfare, as described by General Abizaid in his congressional testimony, has already cost seven times more casualties than the war itself. CBC News In-depth: Iraq, compiled from various sources on Iraq‘s total casualty figures, places the total at about a hundred thousand casualties, of which twenty-seven thousand are deaths[22]. Others, like the John Hopkins study, put the total at 150 thousand. This is an enormous price entailing heavy moral responsibility for a war whose announced reasons proved basically false.
In addition, the war has forced the US into military-security operations not designed to enhance its standing with the local population. Leveling cities like Falluja, al Kayem and Tel Afar, in order to clear the terrorists, leave bitterness and breeds vengeance. It is very hard for any army to avoid brutalizing civilian population when there is armed opposition to it, and no army can completely control the behavior of all its elements in a state of war. Abu Ghraib is surely shocking, but can any one be certain it would not happen again?

The Current Exit Strategy and the Iraqi Scene.
In November 2003, the Governing Council of Iraq and the Occupation Authority signed an agreement in which a seeming exit strategy was laid out. This strategy consists of following a series of steps that end up in setting in place an Iraqi Constitution and governing institutions run by the US selected cast of loyal Iraqi politicians to whom the US hands over authority. A critical factor is training a new Iraqi army and security forces that can gradually take over from the US, at least, the major day- to- day operations. Another is the assumption that the insurgency will calm down as soon as the political institutions are up. This strategy is unilateral and completely under US control. It depends on setting up a widely acceptable but controllable government. It has no time framework for withdrawal and finally, it places US disengagement hostage to the development of an effective Iraqi replacement force.
Events in Iraq have taken place against the background of a vicious and brutal Iraqi insurgency not perceived at all by the US[23]. Counteracting the insurgency, the US aided by Iraqi Government security forces has undertaken search and destroy missions in several cities and villages in the so-called “Sunni Triangle”. These operations, using incendiary and fragmentation bombs, resulted in leveling large portions of these cities, in arresting a large number of their inhabitants and further alienating the locals. The authorities admitted that 137,000 Iraqis were under detention on September 21, 2005, and that the overwhelming majority has no charge against them. In consequence, a spiral of violence and mistrust dominates the Iraqi scene.
The insurgency is manned by an amalgam of various dissatisfied groups fighting for completely different purposes. The remnants of Saddam‘s regime, perhaps members of his security apparatus and the bands of his two sons, together with Jihadis from al Qaeda newly brought into Iraq, have combined with disaffected former Iraqi army elements, and nationalists including non-compromised Baathists, to man the insurgency. The first two elements are, according to informed observers, a distinct minority. The purposes of the Jihadis, said to be under the Jordanian al Zarqawi, is to engage the US and kill a maximum number of its forces and friends and, as of late, to ignite a civil war in Iraq. The remnants of Saddam`s bands are “desperados” with nowhere to go. However, the other two elements, a big majority, are sincere nationalists whose aim is to harass the US into withdrawal. It would be a grave mistake for the US to believe its own propaganda, namely, the insurgency is supported only by die-hard Saddamists and al Qaeda followers and is, to quote the Vice President, “in its last throes”[24]. Even though the latter two factions seem to have no political program for Iraq and have not put out any ideas about what kind of country they want to have, most of the Arab Sunni and a very large part of the Arab Shià, for example, those sympathetic to the clerk Muktada al Sadre, are sympathetic or supportive of the insurgency in its opposition to the US occupation. The US is generally viewed by such partisans as an occupier that has failed its responsibility in providing the Iraqis with the most basic minima of security and services. The claim that foreigners dominate the insurgency has no support in facts; of the thousands of captured insurgents, the US and Iraqi officials admit that more than 95 percent are Iraqis.
The Government under Dr. al Jaafari is a coalition of four sectarian and ethnic factions, each of which with its own militia or paratroops financed by the faction or its outside supporters, for example, Iran. Thus, corruption and public funds have become two main sources for keeping up the sectarian political business. For almost a year, the Javari government has hardly had an achievement to its name: it still is not in charge of the security question and has failed in re-establishing minimal government services, viz, providing water, electricity, public sanitation and health facilities, schools, and above all, security and law and order. Dr. Jaafari is widely perceived as a bumbler incapable of even controlling his ministers. The latest example is the discovery by the press and Amnesty International of secret prisons, unknown to him, run by his Minister of the interior in which prisoners (Sunni Arabs) are systematically tortured[25]. Furthermore, the government has proved incapable of formulating a budget for the fiscal year 2006, and of starting the reconstruction of the country, so badly needed in an economy with massive 45 percent unemployment.
The failure to move on the reconstruction front reflects in addition to incompetence the pervasive corruption rampant at all levels. Under this and the previous two governments, Iraq wallows in corruption that has extended to stealing billions of dollars of the public budget funds[26] Mr. Alexander Croft, the head of International Transparency, UK, said on Aljazeera TV on September 19, 2005, that Iraq is now ranked by his Agency as number one in corruption. This corruption seems to have started with Interim Occupation Authority (IOA) under Mr. Bremer and continued thereafter. In October 2005, The American Conservative published an article by Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, in which he details how $ billions of non-metered oil revenues were siphoned off and disappeared without ever being entered on the official accounts during 2003 and 2004[27]. While the article is not clearly documented and its facts cannot be readily checked, it tells a story consistent with what is reported from Iraq by much of the media. Numerous Iraqi commentators advance the explanation that the new sectarian sharing and party quotas in the Iraqi government have created ministerial fiefdoms with beneficiaries owing exclusive allegiance to the top Minister-cum-benefactor who secures loyalty by spreading around the bounty he exacts from corruption and public funds. Rounding out this record, the government has failed in asserting itself against the extensive and increasing influence of Iran in Southern Iraq; its officials blame the US for looking the other way. Similarly, having no power base of its own, it has failed to assert its legitimacy vis-à-vis the United States undermining in the process both itself and its US benefactor.
The open and stark disappearance of the Iraqi State is corroding the allegiance of the citizenry and creating alternative poles of loyalty among Iraqis on sectarian, tribal and ethnic lines. Numerous Iraqi commentators liken this situation to the political scene that the British faced in 1920; it seems as if eighty-five years of modernization have dropped out of Iraqi history and the country is back to being represented by bearded Mullas and traditionally clad tribal chiefs!! This is quite disturbing to any Iraqi looking forward to reconstructing a modern and peaceful society; one can glean this despair by the extraordinary immigration of qualified Iraqis in the last two years. And in no lesser measure, this disappearance of the State is quite unsettling to Iraq’s neighbors.

The Political Impasse in Iraq
As the insurgency rages on, neither the US nor its political allies in Iraq seem to be prepared to deal with the fundamental political problems. There is wide agreement that the Iraqi armed opposition to the US cannot be effectively diminished without setting a definite US withdrawal schedule, which the US does not contemplate at present. The US perceives that the insurgency is driven by the remnants of the old regime and that behind the refusal of the Sunni-Arabs to accept the Pax Americana in Iraq lies the hostile thinking of the Arab nationalists regarding its policies in the area. The US is not prepared to deal with this thinking or to open a dialogue with the Sunnis except on its own terms and with due regard to its Kurdish and Shià allies. Several attempts at dialogue with the insurgent and the Arab Sunnis have failed on account of the unwillingness of the US to discuss withdrawal and to entertain the Nationalists' demands. This is at a piece with the US locked position over five decades on dealing with the Arab Nationalists, even if secular, on everything from the Arab –Israeli conflict to Middle East security. For all these years, the US has refused to entertain Arab Nationalist grievances regarding its unbalanced posture on the Palestinian problem.
There are several factors behind this frozen attitude, one of which, the Nationalists alliance with the Soviet Union, is no longer operative. But several others persist. The first is the antithetical attitude of Arab Nationalists towards Israel and the unflinching US support of Israeli policies. The US has not been capable under various administrations of forging an independent and balanced stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict because, inter alia, until a few years ago, the Arabs did not countenance recognition of Israel. The notable exceptions happened during the Suez war and Mr. Baker’s stewardship of the US State Department at the time of the Madrid Conference. The second reason is the anti-US stance of most Arab Nationalists, which in reality is a mixture of a reflexive reaction to its support to Israel, its enmity to Arab Nationalism and of ignorance of the US political realities. The third is the underlying US contemptuous judgment of the evident failure of Arab Nationalist regimes to develop their economies and transform their societies and the anti-democratic and repressive nature of all of them. The events of 9/11 introduced another complicating factor: the US realized that Middle East terror is driven by backwardness and the absence of democracy in the region, including in countries whose regimes the US has supported. On this theory, regardless of regional opposition, the US occupation of Iraq offered a double opportunity: inversing yet another nationalist regime and setting up in Iraq a model democratic regime of US making manned by controlled allies, which sets a benchmark for all those around it. And, in a further extension of the anti-nationalist logic, this Iraq should not share the Arab nationalist aspirations and be at peace and active cooperation with Israel, a dangerous take of reality with which hardly any impartial expert would agree.
As far as the new Iraqi allies of the US are concerned, there are a variety of motives. The Kurds, represented until the last elections at more than twice their relative demographic weight, think that Iraq under the US offers a historical opportunity to realize their dreams without opposition. They are loath to a US withdrawal before their ambitions are cemented concretely on the ground and not eager to bring in the Arab Sunnis since they oppose a loosely federated Iraq and their claim to Kirkuk. The Shià mix of politicians includes Islamists, who want to secure Shià control for themselves in the Southern part, and others who have personal interests and political ambitions of doubtful realization without the US presence and without playing the sectarian card. There are still others who think that the new Iraq should have barriers to central control and to a repetition of the old Sunni dominance.
This is what explains the reluctance of the new Iraqi body politics to move towards the idea of convoking a national reconciliation conference comprising all parties, old and new, first proposed by the UN envoy Mr. Lakhdar Ibrahimi in the spring of 2004 and later on adopted and reiterated by the Government of Dr. Iyad Alawi in its decision 1546 of July 2004. The government-mandated at the time Mr. Fuad Ma‘soum of the Kurdistan National Union Party, the party of Mr. Talabani, to follow up on the implementation of this decision. But Mr. Bremer, the US administrator, vetoed this idea[28]. At any rate, the Iraqi new politicians were not prepared to enter into such a dialogue; they did not approve of the idea of participation of all parties, old and new. They also did not want to drop the idea of debathification, which is perceived by the Arab Sunnis as a cover to exclude much of their cadres from government and public positions. And not least, the new Iraqi politicians are not willing to accept the likely Arab Sunnis demand for a time schedule for US withdrawal before they secure their interests and positions.
While the US still wields the ultimate power in Iraq, its created Shià and Kurdish allies are not as controllable as it was thought at the outset. Nor are these allies, specifically the Shià clerics, willing to think of a national Iraqi program that includes the Arab Sunnis and the scatter of seculars in the Iraqi society. Thus, the US, by sheer lack of post-war planning, might have unleashed clients whose interests are not coincidental with its own, and whose relationship to Iran will impede US movements in the future.

Some Unavoidable Issues

The debate on the constitution raised several unavoidable issues. While views might differ on the merits of the constitution, the issues that were raised by the critics bear on the future of Iraq and very much determine whether there is a common vision among Iraqis.
In the time leading up to the referendum, realizing that passing the constitution as is, will perpetuate the sectarian and ethnic divisions, the US pushed for a last-minute amendment four days before the October 15 referendum, whereby a new article 140 was introduced. According to this article, the next parliament will appoint a commission to look into all the issues raised and then reports to the new parliament to vote on its proposed amendments. In the event that amendments are approved, the constitution will be resubmitted to another referendum. In effect, this amounts to redoing the exercise but without restarting the political process set in motion by the US.
The last-minute amendments seem to have split the opposition vote and helped to pass the constitution. According to the official results, the constitution was rejected by more than two thirds in two provinces, while in two others it was rejected by a simple majority of the voters. But the results are disputed in four other provinces°. Moreover, adding to the confusion, Secretary Rice announced the results before the count was over!
In general, the constitution embodies a loose form of a federation for Iraq with a central government much weaker than the regional governments. Furthermore, and quite strangely in view of its implications on federalism, the constitution gives the ownership of the region of national resources, including water and oil. The supporters of the constitution point out its several merits: in many aspects such as human rights, protection of the liberties and the dignity of the citizens, the establishment of a state of the law with a decentralized administration, and the enshrining of democratic governance, this US-inspired constitution, drafted on the basis of a complete US proposal, is worthy. Its non- sectarian supporters mostly place their faith in the pragmatic working out of the current problems in the next phase as Iraq emerges from the ruins. In particular, it is hoped that the December elections will bring about significant Arab Sunni participation in the political process and the goodwill of the others to amend the constitution in a manner acceptable to all*.
Nevertheless, a large number of Iraqis of all persuasions and backgrounds think that this constitution plants the seeds of continuous strife and disintegration. There are first of all two overall issues: the incongruity of drafting a constitution under the dictate of an occupier unwilling to commit himself to a definite withdrawal schedule, and Iraq’s prior need for national reconciliation and thus a national vision before drafting a constitution. At any rate, five more specific issues are in dispute: 1.the attempt to blur the dominant Arab character of Iraq; 2.the loose form of federalism given to the Iraqi Kurds together with the institutionalization of constitutional procedures for demands for similar arrangements by other regions; 3.the setting up a form of “guardianship of the Islamic jurist” over legislation, 4.the weak authority of the federal government and its restricted ownership of natural resources; 5.the precariousness of the statues of women in view of other constitutional provisions on the primacy of Islamic law.
Regarding the first issue, Iraq, at 79 percent Arab, is predominantly an Arab country with other fraternal and equally respected ethnicities. Why was it so difficult to find language to accept this evident fact? For the critics, it is pointed out that there are many countries in the world with different sects and ethnic origins, yet they define themselves in terms of their dominant group and do not have constitutions that enumerate all ethnic groups and sects in their preambles. In this view, it is rather odd that the constitution starts by enumerating ten groups “that came together in Mesopotamia, to unite into a federated democratic Iraq”. In this context, it is recalled that Iraq is among the oldest countries in the world and not, as the constitution preamble states, a place in which ten communities have just decided to unite. These critics hold that the minority Kurdish and Turkmen ethnicities should not, and actually would not, find reasonable objections to stating that Iraq is an Arab country+. It is stressed that the chauvinistic character of the regime of Saddam is at a piece with his other aberrations and should not be charged against Arab Nationalism. The important thing in their view is the legal and factual respect of all groups and the treatment of every citizen on the principle of equality of citizenry.
The second problem is quite serious. That the Kurds should have local “regional” autonomy within a federal structure for Iraq is now a historical and juridical "fait accomplis", acceptable even to the Sunni Arabs. In fact, it is widely seen to be in the interest of the unity of Iraq to give the Kurds this association after decades of discrimination, suffering and, therefore, lack of trust. Indeed, the election of Mr. Talabani, the Kurdish leader, as an interim President was regarded by many of these critics as an act of political maturity. It is argued, however, that autonomy does not amount to having Kurdish representatives in Iraqi embassies, barring the Iraqi Army from stationing non- Kurdish regulars (non-Peshmerga) in Iraqi Kurdistan; the right of the Kurdish region to enter into international agreements on its own; the primacy of the region over the federal law in case of dispute; the right of Iraqi Kurdistan to negotiate on its own with foreign companies to exploit undiscovered resources. Moreover, the institutionalization of procedures for further creation of federated regions even in the areas of the majority Arab Shià is seen as leading to sectarian “parcellation” capable of splintering Iraq.
The question of the place of Islam in the state was given a far from ideal treatment. There should be no dispute about the status of Islamic jurisprudence as a reference for legislation; Islam is not only the religion of 97 percent of the population but the main fold of the historical pluralistic civilization of Iraq. However, that being said, the critics ask what justifies having Islamic “jurist guardianship” over the laws of the Parliament? Is this the guardianship of the theologian, i.e., Willayat al Faqih à la Khomeini, or a form of Wahhabi style moral police in the sovereign legislature? In the preamble of the constitution, it is stated that the religious Marjiiya (the Shià religious authority and other Islamic authorities) are the overarching references over the constitution and over Iraq. In other words, religion is above the state. Moreover, the prospective Supreme Federal Court is supposed to consist of religious experts and lay jurists adjudicating over questions of law. It is asked who are these experts and who selects them and from what school of Islamic Jurisprudence?
The fourth problem concerns the central government control of national territory, its ownership of wealth and the provisions about the non-permissibility, without regional parliamentary approval, of stationing and moving troops to the federated Kurdish region. The critics maintain that all of this violates the known norms of the exercise of sovereignty in federal states. There is also a provision to the effect that oil wealth, “under exploitation”, is the property of the Iraqi people, but the oil reserves and other unexploited wealth, including water resources, are owned by the regions, a recipe for future disputes among the regions. Is not this in reality, argue the critics, a prelude to the Kurdish claim to Kirkuk**, and to the exclusion of the central regions from the oil wealth of Iraq, which is located in the north and the south?
Regarding the fifth issue, Islamic jurisprudence accepts traditions and social customs as sources of the law. In view of the provision that no legislation contrary to Islam would be valid, the critics wonder how can the positions of reactionary Islamists, who always base themselves on the prevailing traditions of contemporary Islamic societies, be countered in the future on such questions as women rights, interest rates, children custody and gender mixing.

The Impasse after the Elections
The elections of mid-December 2005, whose results took weeks to announce and was disputed by many, did not rebalance the political forces in Iraq. Despite the large- scale Sunni participation, the political disparateness of the Sunnis impeded the emergence of a counterbalancing political force. Additionally, the elections entrenched the sectarian and ethnic divides and despite the Clerics' bad performance in the previous governments, they still managed to win 128 seats in the new elections. Surely, this is short of a majority, and a drop of some 30 seats from before, but their alliance was successful in appealing to the average Shià voter. In the Kurdish area, the seats declined to 58 (five of them are Islamists), more in line with their demographic weight than before. In the Arab Sunni areas, the Islamists managed to win 55 seats under the banners of two Islamist formations. A great disappointment to Nationalists and seculars was their failure in places like Baghdad whose population is, at least half Sunnis, to organize in the face of the Clerics who won a large and unexpected majority of 65% of the votes, considerably in excess of the Shià share in Baghdad’s population. They accomplished this by disciplined and united efforts across all the Shià Clerical factions (including the Sadri current) and with the clear support of the Marjiià, while the secularists managed to win only 34 seats. Absent clear alternative programs and organized efforts by non-Islamist parties to reach the average insecure voter, the Clerics and Sheikhs wrote from the mosques the music of the voters' march. Hence, instead of rebalancing the two Arab communities away from sectarian factionalism, and bringing up their common allegiances, the elections entrenched the sectarian differences and gave the Shià Clerics and the Sunni Sheikhs the biggest say in the future of Iraq. The majority vote on lines of sectarian identity proved the inability of Democracy to produce stability when parties have no political programs, the society has no firm institutions and performance has little weight in relation to identity in the mind of a voter polling for his sectarian kinsman- ship. The results deprive the Clerics of a majority to form a government; they are 10 short of that. If the Clerics succeed in forging once again an alliance with the Kurdish parties, they will face the opposition of 94 parliamentarians out of 275, but one of the disparate groups. This will be a continuation of the resent impasse and would eventually lead to splitting Iraq into several mini-states. It is possible, however, that a government of national unity might be formed by a push from the US with the help of the Kurds who have been rather constructive so far. Such eventuality might yet lead to the rebalancing and strengthening within each camp of the national moderate elements. But this will require that the Arab Shià politicians stop to put the accent on their sectarian allegiance and embrace a unifying vision of Iraq rooted in their Arab ethnicity. They would also have to accept the dissolution of militias such as the Badr Brigade and the Mehdi Army and the Peshmerga in the Kurdish area. The US has a definite interest in having such a unity government, without which there will be no stability in Iraq[†]. It is rather extraordinary that in a country of 79% ethnic Arabs, there is not in the current scene a single group representing the National Arab current. And while it is accepted that Kurdish nationalism is an essential component in Iraq, no such status is acceptable for the 79% Arab majority.
Within two weeks of the elections, Mr. A. al Hakim, the prominent leader of the Alliance (the Shià list), ruled out significant changes in the constitution, has also ruled out a national concord government and renewed his call for autonomous provinces in southern Iraq[29]. All of this is not what the US wants and what Iraq needs. At any rate, the Alliance was asked to suggest a candidate for Prime Minister. This it did by renaming Dr. Jaafari once again. The failures of his government and the mayhem of sectarian violence it allowed did not seem to count one iota in disqualifying him. Dr. Jaafari spent four months trying to form a government to no avail. He was persona non grata to both the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs, yet he insisted on carrying on with his labor. Finally, the US ambassador seemed to have exerted enough pressure to convince the Alliance to nominate somebody else, Mr. Nouri al Maliki, who stands a much better chance in forming a unity government.
It remains an open question whether the new politicians will be able to run an Iraqi government that has a national vision and can restore the authority of the Iraqi state and look after the welfare of its citizenry.
In the particularly acute confrontation with Iran on the nuclear issue, Mr. Hakim and similar sectarian politicians with the same allegiances might face the US with unpredictable turns backed by their militias` abilities to raise hell for the US in Iraq. Nothing that interests Iran is impossible in the current political equation of Iraq; an irony begotten by US money and sacrifice. Another problem though little discussed, is the inability of the new Iraqi army so far to prove itself in combat on its own. The US and its Iraqi allies have therefore been forced to allow the return to active service of officers from the old army, up to the rank of Major, if not involved in the regime's crimes. More such recourse to the old army elements might be necessary for the future.
All of this casts doubts on the viability of the US current exit strategy and deepens the political impasse in Iraq. The monster of sectarianism introduced by the US threatens to thwart completely its national purposes and sabotage the policies it wishes to accomplish.

The Attitudes and Policies of Iraq‘s Neighbors
The attitude of the Arab public opinion, commonly called “the Arab Street” to the US invasion of Iraq is understandably, hostile, given the US past policies in the area. The hostility of the “Arab Street” is premised on the fear of dividing Iraq and the suspicions of an Israeli design behind US policies. While most Arab governments supported secretly the deposition of Saddam, they have expressed reservations about the war’s destabilizing repercussions and are genuinely worried about US plans for the region. There is also a third factor rarely voiced out: the challenge to many countries with substantial Shià minorities of having a Shià dominated regime in Iraq. In addition, it is perceived that the US favors splitting Sunnis from Shià so as to splinter several countries and to distance Iraq from the 85 percent Sunni Arab World. The Arab governments are essential for maintaining the status quo and cannot be enthusiastic about a democratic Iraq next door. It should be recalled that during the Saddam era, Iraqi sufferings found no public sympathy by the Arab governments; there was a game of “solidarity of the dictators” in play. The same silence was on display in the Arab Street and in the media. Saddam was able to deceive the Arab public through appealing to their aspirations and playing upon their anti-Western, anti-Israel frustrations. After his fall, there prevailed a strange and rather ambiguous reluctance to get involved in the Iraqi situation. The US unilateral attitude and the mayhem in Iraq all are surely factors in this passivity. Naturally, in view of the illegitimacy of most Arab regimes, they are more preoccupied with their domestic survival than with making policies for their area on behalf of their peoples. Had this not been the case, governments would have been forced by their public to forge a common position on Iraq based on realism and on the Arab national interests. In this context, the Arab Summit in Tunisia in 2003 clearly stated that Arab states would help Iraq after the end of the occupation. This is undoubtedly on account of the destabilizing effects of the war and, as well, the result of a calculated self -interest in letting the US get bogged down in the Iraqi swamp, thereby sapping its ability and willingness to intervene against them. Nevertheless, there are two contravening factors that might shake off this passivity: the danger of civil war in Iraq with its enormous destabilizing consequences, and the augmentation of Iranian influence to the extent that it puts in question the Arab identity of Iraq. These two factors perhaps explain the mission of the Arab League launched in mid-October with the blessing of the US to help settle the intra-Iraqi disputes. After extensive and intensive consultations, the Secretary-General of the Arab League called for a national reconciliation conference with a preparatory meeting in mid-November. It is doubtful that these efforts will succeed unless the US is willing to start talking about withdrawal.
Iran, a non -Arab neighbor, deserves a special mention. Iran interfaces strategically with the US in Iraq. It also might have an interest in a weak, possibly divided, Iraq where Iran maintains a sizable influence. Iran has also a genuine interest in having the US bogged down there. In its confrontation with the US and the West on the nuclear issue, Iraq’s chaotic state serves Iran as a controlled pressure button. There is no doubt that Iran’s influence in Southern Iraq has reached a level that enables it to become a major player in Iraq. This implies an asymmetrical strategy where Iran might be interested in not seeing the US off from Iraq until the resolution of its nuclear issue. Similarly, the US might not want to quit Iraq, the immediate neighbor of Iran, until the confrontation is over.

A Seven Point Plan of Exit
The continued political impasse in Iraq calls for fresh thinking about how to extricate the US from the Iraqi swamp. That has to be done without compromising its foreign policy and its genuine national interests. Now that the US is in Iraq, rightly or wrongly, it would be disastrous for it and for Iraq to cut and run. Not only would the US lose all credibility, Iraq as well would be left alone in ruins. No lesser casualty, the world would lose the ability to enforce multilateral security cooperation for years to come.
The US will not operate under the UN umbrella. Thus, any exit plan will have to be under the US tent. Since exiting from Iraq is meant to address the military presence and the daily running of the show, the proposed plan confines itself to military force exit and does not touch US- Iraq bilateral relationship. The plan is motivated by multiple considerations accommodating a variety of parties.
For the US, it recognizes that Iraq will still need help for some time to come Consequently, the rhythm of withdrawal is left to the judgment of the US and Iraq. However, one of the main purposes is to commit the US to a definite withdrawal schedule that starts and ends at a given time. The plan enables the US to replace some of its forces without losing political control, thereby assuaging the US public opinion about the war without sabotaging the US's main purposes. It secures help in reconstructing Iraq and in assuring its security from the major powers and the regional states. Finally, it affirms the US declared goals in the region, but it accompanies that by confidence-building gestures.
For Iraq, the plan should assure Iraq that the US would remain engaged in helping it on all fronts, in particular the reconstruction and security problems. At the same time, it brings in the major economic powers freeing Iraq from exclusive dependence on the US. It also brings help from Iraq’s neighbors, thereby assuring the regional embrace of the new Iraq. In addition, the plan sets forth a vision of an Iraq that satisfies its people, the US and its neighbors. In particular, it assures a state of equality among the citizenry and all the democratic and human rights recognized by the UN charter. It re-establishes the authority of the Iraqi State within its integral territory. Furthermore, by fixing dates for the beginning and ending withdrawal, it sends a message that will be helpful for isolating the insurgency and bringing about internal peace.
For the Arab and other neighbors, it spells out the intentions of the US in a way that, hopefully, eliminates suspicions of a hidden agenda. It reaffirms US goals in the region but in a context that removes fears that the US is against the territorial integrity of the states of the region and is about to redraw its political map. It also sets the record that the US favors Arab and regional cooperation. It assures the nervous neighbors that the internal arrangement of Iraq will not threaten their internal peace and stability. Finally, by fixing a date of withdrawal and a schedule for it, it opens the way for Arab states' co-operation with the US in Iraq.
The various considerate of the plan reflects a reading of the situation in Iraq and the region at variance with that of the US. It also takes the US at its word that it seeks no oil and military interests in Iraq. Naturally, there has to be a series of political and diplomatic preparatory steps with all concerned parties. This should involve agreeing on a program for Iraq along the lines suggested below that satisfies all the constituent elements of the country without destabilizing its neighbors. The US has to deliver the new political class it introduced into this compromise and the Arab states should perhaps deploy the Arab league in this effort. Once, a scenario is agreed, the US would be well advised to announce it, in an appropriate forum, as a major policy reorientation. The seven pints underlying the plan are as follows:
The US declares publicly its intention to withdraw its forces from Iraq starting at a specific date in accordance with a schedule it will announce in the near future in consultation with Iraq and other countries participating in this plan.
· The US and the participating countries will set up a multi-national force under US command, drawing on contributions by the regional states to replace the withdrawing US forces according to schedule that factors in the evolving local needs and circumstances as judged by the US and Iraqi government. The financing and other details would be determined on a case- by -case basis. The replacement of US forces is totally independent of the US political status in Iraq.
· In the program agreed to with the cooperating countries, it would be appropriate to restate that the US is interested in the development of a democratic non -sectarian Iraq based on equality of citizenry and enjoying full territorial integrity. Iraq would choose its own system of governance without danger to the stability of its neighbors.
· The program agreed to recognize the importance of re-establishing the authority of the Iraqi state over its whole territory, free of militias and restrictions. In the context of its withdrawal, the US will assist the Iraqi government in assuming all the normal functions of government in serving the citizens through mobilizing all the capable hands of Iraqis not compromised by the previous regime before Iraqi courts.
· Reiterate in the program the US commitment to help rebuild the economy of Iraq, its infrastructure and civic fabric. At the same time, invite the major economic powers and parties interested in Iraq to work with the US and Iraq through a Reconstruction Fund that (unlike the present UN Fund) has only projects financed and managed by the donor (s) involved. Prime candidates for this “manage thy project” Fund, would be countries such as France, Germany, Russia, Japan, China and other European and neighboring countries.
· The US should explicitly state that it sees the new Iraq as a part of an Arab environment in which peace prevails with and among all regional partners (including Israel) and neighbors, and that it encourages mutual cooperation and the respect of territorial integrity and recognized borders of each and every state.


· State that the US policy in the region aims at helping the development of a community of states which respect the rule of law enforced by an independent Judiciary, and in which democratic alteration of governance is through the ballot box, with guaranties and respect for the human and political rights of all their citizens and the freedom of expression to all. It would be appropriate to register a US pledge of help to all countries of the region supportive of this plan that organize their economies on market principles, in meeting the multiple challenges of economic development, full participation in the benefits of globalization in all its aspects, the obtainment of knowledge and technology and the reforms of governance. Furthermore, the US encourages in this context both their own efforts and their regional cooperation.

Beyond Iraq, the US should get on seriously with achieving peace in the Middle East. Mr. Sharon’s withdrawal from Ghaza, despite being unilateral and done to serve Israel‘s own interests, is the first instance in which Israeli politicians faced their public opinion with the fact that peace has a price and occupation is costly. It has shattered the myth that what Israel takes by force is hers by God’s gift and that security means occupying Arab land. Perhaps his bigger act was the wedge he drove in Israeli politics by offering a viable center party to the electorate. Mr. Sharon was not a peace convert but a resilient tactician with a one-sided view of his people's interests. Perhaps the cruel hand of fate has fortuitously eliminated the old leadership on both sides to offer peace a chance. The US has to make sure that Israel after Sharon does not pursue a policy of Ghaza first and last and unilateral drawing up of the frontier. The Palestinians, especially now that Hamas is in power must stop terrorist actions as a part of a brokered deal of mutual concrete concessions.
This requires using firmly all the leverage the US has on Israel in all the domains: financial, diplomatic, strategic and political. The US has since 1972 donated more than $102 billion to Israel in official transfers and has allowed more than $35 billion in non -official inflows. In addition, it has shielded Israel from UN –Security- Council decisions by using its veto dozens of time, has covered Israel against international isolation and has supplied it with enough arms to be superior in force to any combination of Arab states. With all that, it would seem inconceivable that Israel can resist determined US demands. Still, there are some, citing the same statistics, who argue the opposite point of view[30].
International efforts for peace would require the activation of the other members of the quartet to pressure the Palestinians and eventually impose a fare peace on both sides. Peace in the Middle East has become an international public good, and the international community is entitled to pursue it on account of the failure of the two sides to secure it for their future generations. In Arab countries, even Syria is willing now to settle this problem. The cost of this conflict exceeds what it has exacted in blood and wealth; it has stopped economic and political development in the Eastern Arab World and allowed military dictators and repressive regimes to take hold in the name of liberating Palestine. Moreover, the US support of Israel has been the single most important factor in the unfriendly attitude of the Arab and Islamic peoples towards the US.

                                           Footnotes:
* Former Director of Economic Cooperation, Poverty Alleviation and Special Programs in UNCTAD; Adjunct Professor of Finance and Economics at Thunderbird-Europe and Webster University-Geneva; Senior Consultant to the UN system and the European Union
.§ It was revealed on 25 August from declassified documents that States Assistant Secretary Paula Dobranskie received on February 2, 2003, a memo warning the State Department that CENTCOM has not prepared any policies or measures for after the war. The memo pointed out the security and law and order consequences of that.* One of the simplifications of the Iraqi situation is lumping together all the Baath in Saddam`s basket. Saddam liquidated the old leadership of the Baath as well as the wing that supports Syria and replaced both of them with his henchmen and clan members. The Baath remains a force on the Iraqi scene and a part of the resistance to occupation with a big popular base, and it is unrealistic to exclude it from the political equation.° In the provinces of Ninawa and Dialah, the ballot boxes were allegedly taken by force to Baghdad to count the votes rather than count them locally by the local officials. There are also disputes over the results in the mid- Euphrates provinces.* The divided Sunnis and seculars did not win much more than 35% in Baghdad! Baghdad's results were strongly disputed.+ In early September 2005, President Talabani, a Kurdish nationalist, was asked in Ann harbor- Michigan about Iraq’s recognition of Israel. In his answer, he said Iraq is an Arab country, and as such we have to move together with other Arab states on this issue.** The Kurds claim to Kirkuk has a dubious basis. The population of Kirkuk is now of Arab and Turkman majority. However, the Kurds claim that Saddam uprooted forcibly many thousands of their own from Kirkuk in his Arabization drive. They want to expel the new residents and reintroduce the old ones. In actual fact, they have been expelling Arabs to camps located around the district of Salahuddin and bringing in Kurds from all over to replace them. Further, they claim the place on the grounds of its place in Kurdish history. The other two groups reject these claims and believe they amount to a petrol grab.[†] A subject of rife speculation is that if the US faces resistance from the Shià politicians, it would strive to put together an alliance of Arab Sunnis, Mr. Alawi`s group, the Kurdish parties and independents. Such would garner up 145 deputies. This would then presage the formation of national unity of qualified ministers representing all the strips of Iraq

                                     End Notes :
[1] See for a detailed discussion of the new policy, Michael Sakbani, The US Foreign Policy: the Case of Iraq, pp.1-3, a paper presented to the Geneva chapter of American Democrats Abroad on 23 September 2003, distributed by ADA and available in a revised edition dated 29/4/2004 form the Web.
[2] ibid. pp. 2-4 for the names and writings of some prominent Neo-Cons. See also the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Proliferation Brief, volume 6, number 5, Wednesday, March 19, 2003.
[3] Sakbani, Op. Cit., pp.3, 4, 5, for a discussion of the advice and intelligence offered by the Iraqi exiles and the Israeli Mossad; Also see for the full story of Israel friends Stephen J. Sniegoski, “ The War on Iraq: Conceived in Israel”, WTM Enterprise, www.thornwalker.com/ditch/snieg.
[4] Jason Leopold, “ Wolfowitz Admits Iraq was Discussed Two days After 9/11”, Utne, September, 2005.
[5] Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War, Janklow & Nesbit, 2001, ISBN 15864-043-x.
[6] National Security Electronic, briefing book no.163, 13 August 2005.
[7] When the Iraqi opposition met with US representatives in the town of Salahuddin in Northern Iraq, Mr. Khalilzad, later on, the US ambassador in Iraq, informed the gathering that the US intends to use the cadres of the Iraqi state and the Baath, not contaminated by the crimes of the regime, in rebuilding Iraq. Alas, this stance was changed subsequently by intensive pressures from the sectarian and Kurdish politicians working with the US, with the known disastrous consequences.
[8] Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a future of Hope, Simon & Schuster, 2006.
[9] According to Mr. Q. Haris al Dhari, spokesman of the Iraq Muslim Scholars Association, some 40 thousand Arab Sunnis were liquidated during the term of the government of Dr. Jaafari by militias and elements in the Interior Ministry.
[10] See Islam on Line, News/2004-01/291/article 2/shtml. This article quotes UN sources, including, the Humanitarian Coordinator Office, to the effect that Sunnis constitute 57% of the population. The author of the article elsewhere places the numbers at 53% Sunnis and 45% Shià. An expert demographer (identified as Shiite) put the Shià at 52%. His sources are the statistics of the Iraqi trade and Finance Ministries and the Planning Ministry and the food distribution cads issued at Saddam`s time. The author of this paper believes that the truth of the sectarian composition is not really known, and has been manipulated by the various contending groups
[11] The Economist, September 5, 2003.
[12] National Priorities Project, net –site for data. The NPP posted on the internet with a running electronic cost counter per second
[13] See also CNN.com, War in Iraq, p.1.
[14] The deficit cited in the text represents 3.6 % of the GDP. Compared to many advanced countries in Europe that figure is not large. However, according to William Gail and Peter Orszag, there are no prospects of reducing or eliminating this deficit up till 2020 unless there is a fundamental revision of the budget. They predict a budget deficit averaging 3.5 % of the GDP over the next decade. A persistent fiscal deficit raises the long-term interest rate and crowds out private investment, thereby reducing long-run growth. In view of the paltry 3 % of the GDP saved by Americans, this implies borrowing from abroad. The US is already the world's largest debtor, and in view of its trade prospects, it will not earn enough net exports to pay its debts. Sooner or later, the world will stop lending the US by refusing to take in more dollars.
[15] The Economist, October 29.2005, p 109.
[16] For the Budget projections, see, Gale & Orszag, Budget Deficits, National Savings and Interest Rates, Brooking Institution paper, available at: www.brook.edu/views/papers/200409.
[17] James K. Galbraith, Breaking out of the Deficit Trap: the Case Against the Fiscal Hawks, the Levy Institute, June 2005 argues an opposite point of view. The problem with Galbraith's argument is that it postulates implicitly an under full employment situation and a large coincidental increase in productivity.
[18] See Dr. Jaafari`s talk with the US press during his visit to Washington DC, in July 2005.
[19] CNN.com net-site, Thursday, May 12, 2005.
[20] Newsweek, December26-January 2, 2006, pp.28-29.
[21] Cost of the war in Iraq, Op. Cit.
[22] CBC News In-depth: Iraq, “CBC News”, 10/10/2005, pp 1-4.
[23] Bremer, op.cit. various pages.
[24]Dick Cheney’s speech to the Washington Press Club on June 5, 2005 broadcast live by, inter alia, CNN.
[25] The Economist, November 19, 2005, p.43. In this context, Dr. Iyad Alawi, the former Prime Minister, gave an interview to the Observer of London, published on 26 November, in which he likened present-day Iraq to that of Saddam in so far as human rights violations are concerned.
[26] On 16 and 17 of September 2005, the Satellite channel “Democracy” broadcasting from London, had two round table discussions about corruption in Iraq. All the participants agreed that corruption is very widespread. One of them, Mr. Mohammed al. Khozaii, an Iraqi politician and a prominent tribal dignitary said that an internal Parliamentary report cites $2 billion missing from the budget, one billion of which in the defense ministry. Three days later, the Iraqi Parliament constituted a committee to investigate this matter.
[27] Philip Giraldi,, “ Money for Nothing”, The American Conservative, issue of October 25, 2005.
[28] See for details, the interview of the Iraqi politician and statesman Adeeb al Jader, with Al Shiraa, February 2, 2005.
[29] See his interview with the BBC in the second week of January 2006.
[30] Israel receives yearly, some $3.2 billion in official aid, almost one-fourth of total US official foreign aid. In addition, US laws allow and confer tax privileges on private transfers of diverse forms, such as the funds raised by the United Jewish Appeal. These top $2 billion per year. There are also loan guaranties and bilateral lending. Moreover, Israel is the only foreign country allowed bidding in the Pentagon procurement; thereby having access to US classified strategic secrets. Furthermore, in the wake of the Ghaza evacuation, the press reports that Mr. Sharon will ask for $ 2.2 billion in extra aid to resettle the evacuees. It is inconceivable that Israel can withstand a determined US stand, given all this aid and support. In this context, it is our opinion that the bulk of American Jewry would support a determined US policy of fair peace in the Middle -East. For an opposite point of view, citing the same statistics, see, Dani Bilinfante, “ Israel Alone”, Israelpundit, August 29, 2005.

Geneva, December 22, 2005, revised May 15,2006.
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